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The thesis examines the representation of China in American mainstream 
newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power. It 
addresses the following research questions: In what ways has China been defined 
and represented in the American press? How have linguistic tools been employed 
to construct China in particular ways? How have such representations and discourse 
concealed racialised ideology of the press and unequal power between cultures and 
nations? These research questions are answered through an interdisciplinary 
approach combining critical discourse analysis (CDA) and a postcolonial 
perspective. The American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in 
Hong Kong, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist 
aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013-2016 are selected for the 
CDA analysis. Deconstructing the dominant media discourse, the thesis 
additionally provides alternative interpretations through contextualisation and re-
establishing historical connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and 
western colonialism and imperialism. It thus allows the subjectivity of the colonised 
and oppressed, and a space where the “subaltern” could speak for herself rather than 
being spoken about as a mere object. 
 
The study finds that American mainstream media has discursively constructed 
China in a way that is resonant with the racialised “Yellow Peril” imagery and 
ideology of the imperialist and colonial times. It argues that the construction of a 
contemporary “authoritarian” “threatening” China vis-a-vis a “democratic” 
“civilised” west serves to invoke colonial imaginaries and fantasies, inflict 
epistemic violence, and reproduce and reinforce the existing power structure 
between the “Self” and the “Other”. The study represents one of the first attempts 
to apply postcolonial theory and the CDA method in analysing the western media’s 
representation of China. As such, it contributes to an emerging critical theoretical 
reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about discourse, 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This study deals with the representation of China in American mainstream 
newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power. Critical 
scholarship has examined the discourse/power/knowledge nexus and revealed that 
knowledge is constructed through discourses as a site of cultural, political, and 
ideological contests (Foucault, 1980, Grosfoguel, 2013, He, 2012, Shi, 2007). In 
other words, knowledge production is imbued with politics, power, cultural 
interests, information control, and therefore, is dynamic and competing (Grosfoguel, 
2013, Mawdsley, 2008, McEwan, 2008, Quijano, 2000). Such research, especially 
the challenges posed by postcolonial theory to Euro-American-centric 
interpretations and knowledge of world history, as well as to established notions of 
development and modernity, have generated scholarly debates and gained increased 
prominence in various disciplinary and inter-disciplinary fields, such as African 
Studies, Development Studies and Geo-political Studies. However, with only a few 
exceptions,1 these critical perspectives have barely been engaged with the China 
Studies field. Consequently, western-centric constructions, discourses and 
knowledge of China and the Chinese culture are scarcely questioned, and the voices 
of China (as the largest developing country) and non-white Chinese people are 
hardly heard and represented in academic discourses. This thesis, informed by 
critical theory of postcolonialism, aims to transcend the dominant Euro-American-
centric tradition in China Studies by questioning the nature of knowledge about 
China discursively constructed through discourse, in particular the American media 
discourse, through deconstructing such discourses by means of critical discourse 
analysis (thereafter referred to as CDA). The remainder of this chapter introduces 
the research questions. Then it discusses the socio-cultural background, the 
international situation and the intellectual context within which the study is 
                                                     
1 See Cao (2007, 2014), He (2012), Liang (2015), Shi (2007), and Vukovich (2012).  






positioned. The chapter concludes by elaborating on the significance of the study, 
and providing an outline of the thesis. 
1.2 Research questions 
The study seeks to address the following research questions: 
1. In what ways has China been defined and represented in the American 
mainstream press? 
2. How have linguistic tools been employed to construct China in particular 
ways? 
3. How have such representations and discourse concealed racialised ideology 
of the press and unequal power relations between cultures and nations? 
While interrogating and deconstructing the dominant media discourse, the study 
provides alternative subaltern interpretations by re-establishing historical 
connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and western colonialism 
and imperialism.  
1.3 Background of the study 
The dominant discourse and knowledge about China in the West is part of a much 
larger political, ideological and cultural process of systemic knowledge production 
in the world. The structure and system are, as about other non-western societies and 
cultures, Euro-American-centric in nature, reflecting an asymmetrical power 
relation between the global North and the global South. Liang (2015, p.228), uses 
the metaphor of “pilgrimage to the pinnacles of western civilisation” to describe the 
role of Western higher education in shaping the minds, and limiting the 
epistemological imaginations, of young people from developing countries like 
herself. Critical theorists, especially scholars of postcolonial and decolonial theory, 
such as Grosfoguel (2013), Hall (1992) and Shi (2007), point out that the 
experiences and worldviews of the global North, despite their historical, political, 
socio-cultural specificities, are constructed and presented as ‘universal’ and 
‘advanced’, and thus constitute the foundation of theories, analytical concepts and 






frameworks in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in westernised universities. 
Subsequently, this western-centric knowledge system is imposed on non-Western 
nations as ‘objective truth’, ‘universal rules and regularities’. Thus, for non-Western 
countries to achieve ‘development’ and ‘modernity’, they must imitate the West and 
Western ‘civilisation’ by repudiating and breaking with their own essentially 
‘backward’, ‘decadent’ and ‘bad’ cultures and traditions (cf. Escobar, 2007, 
Grosfoguel, 2013, McEwan, 2008, Mignolo, 2007, Quijano, 2000, 2007, Shi, 2007). 
Implicit in such universalism and essentialism is the notion of the West’s ‘positional 
superiority’ over and against non-Western nations, cultures and peoples (Vukovich, 
2012, p.xii). The positional superiority leads to the subalternity of the indigenous 
knowledge that is held by non-Western nations, and hence gives rise to “asymmetric 
ignorance” (Chakrabarty, 2000a, p.28), and symbolic and “epistemic violence” 
(Spivak, 1988, p.281).    
 
This thesis extends the literature on asymmetric structures of knowledge production 
and epistemic violence to the field of China Studies. It problemises the ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’ defined and discursively constructed by the West through hegemonic 
discourses about China and the Chinese culture. Euro-American-centric 
perspectives remain dominant in the China Studies field as manifest in its (western) 
cultural univocity and monolog (Shi, 2007), and its salient dearth of critical, 
pluralistic and reflexive perspectives. Writings on China are explicitly or implicitly 
orientalist and often racialised. Such a body of knowledge, instead of being 
interrogated and deconstructed, tends to be taken for granted, that is, as the 
departure point and basis for conceptualisation and argumentation, and serves as 
the prime frame of reference. As Vukovich (2012, 2017) aptly points out, the 
stereotypes and constructions of China as ‘Oriental despotism’ and an ‘authoritarian’ 
‘Other’, and those of the Chinese culture as ‘static’, ‘backward’ and rooted in a ‘bad 
tradition’, frequently serve as presuppositions, or unquestioned priori assumptions 
in current studies on China.  
 
The orientalist discourses of China are not restricted to a particular time period, but 
have historically evolved and continue to the present today. As early as the 






thirteenth century, when European travellers such as Marco Polo made their trips 
to China, China was portrayed in travel books as a land of ‘mystery’, ‘aliens’, 
‘exoticism’ as well as ‘barbarism’ and ‘cruelty’. These images of China were 
reflected in the West’s portrayal of Kublai Kahn2 in Coleridge’s (1797) poem, in 
which Kublai Kahn was represented as a combination of a demon and a hero (cited 
in Jiang, 2006). The discursive constructions of China was a concomitant of the 
global imperialist and colonial expansion. Following the West’s colonial expansion 
and its subsequent carving up of China, in the nineteenth century, additional 
stereotypes and demonising imageries of China and the Chinese culture were 
created and spread throughout the West, such as the “Yellow Peril”, the “drug 
addict”, and the “sexual hazard” (He, 2010, p.10). All these came in tandem with 
the emergence and institutionalisation of a racial hierarchy, in which the West is 
considered to be ‘superior’ over an ‘inferior’ China. In the 19th century, the colonial 
powers brought the Chinese to the West as indentured labour or coolies, as they did 
with many other colonised and oppressed nations and peoples. In this era, the 
demonising imagery of the ‘Yellow Peril’ was created to represent the Chinese as 
‘morally debasing’, and thus a ‘potential danger’ and ‘threat’ to the West, especially 
the white race. These images and cultural constructions of China and the Chinese 
served as “a racialist justification for imperialist aggrandizement and expansionism” 
(Hensman, 1968, p.51), as well as a means to justify the Western invasion, 
occupation, plundering and exploitation of China.  
 
Following China’s victory over the Japanese imperialists and their fascist 
aggression in World War II, and its attainment of genuine national sovereignty and 
independence after the triumph of the socialist revolution in 1949, the ‘Yellow Peril’ 
discourse began to incorporate what would become the well-known Cold War 
narrative of ‘red communism’ (Hensman, 1968). Since then, China has been 
represented, on the one hand, as a mixture of a ‘communist’ ‘totalitarian monster’, 
                                                     
2 Kublai Kahn (Chinese: Chengji Sihan) is the founder of the Yuan dynasty, reigning from 
1206 to 1294. The Yuan Dynasty had a territory larger than any other previous dynasties, 
with its West reaching the Mediterranean sea, South reaching Zengmu Ansha (English: 
James Shoal), and North reaching Stanovoy Range. 






and ‘unrepentant dictatorship’ (Cao, 2007, Hensman, 1968), and on the other hand, 
as the non-white, morally ‘corrupt’ ‘Other’. Given the Chinese economy’s rapid 
growth, which goes hand in hand with the rise of China and its growing global 
significance during recent decades, images of China constructed by the West, while 
remaining essentialist in nature, have become more subtle and entangled with old 
stereotypes and new myths (Cao, 2007). Discourses, such as the ‘China collapse’ 
and the ‘China threat’ have been dominant, which have discursively represented 
China and the Chinese in a variety of ways. Implicit in all these historical and 
contemporary discourses is an enduring pattern of constructing China as the ‘Other’ 
within the West’s mind. This pattern has permeated various forms of representations, 
reproduced homogenous and orientalist portrayals, and established a textual 
authority that is embedded in “asymmetric ignorance” (Cao, 2007, Chakrabarty, 
2000a, p.28). The western-centric knowledge about China is derived from this 
discursive pattern, and has been reinforced as an established “truth”.  
 
The domination of Euro-American-centric knowledge of China has repressed, 
marginalised and silenced the voices and perspectives of China’s indigenous 
scholarly community, which, in turn, further enhances the hegemony of the western 
monological narratives on China. Shi’s (2007) critique highlights that this state of 
affair has produced and reproduced culturally univocal and circular forms of 
understanding, impeded the generation of culturally diverse forms of knowledge, 
invalidated the relevance of genuinely open scholarly debates, and undermined 
intellectual growth and innovation.  
 
The changing international context has also motivated this study. Economic growth 
in Asian nations and their participation in global politics, are restructuring today’s 
world (Liang H., 2015). Lee et al. (2015) observe that “the 21st century is moving 
back to the Pacific as a centre stage”. In correspondence with the growth of the 
Asian economies, contemporary discourses, such as the “return of Asia”, the “Asian 
Century” and the “Chinese Century”, have appeared (Liang H., 2015, p.227). The 
“return” of Asia, which is different from the “rise” of Asia, should not be regarded 
as Asia taking the place of twentieth-century Western forms of hegemony in a race 






for control (Liang H., 2015, p.227). The “return” should be understood as a move 
towards a more balanced and multi-polar intellectual, political and cultural world, 
which is no longer based on unilateral decision, and is no longer exclusively 
conceptualised according to a western-centric knowledge base (Lee et al., 2015). 
The return of Asia should not be just economic and political, but also 
epistemological (Lee et al., 2015). With the “Asian century” looming in the 
background, cultural-intellectual communities of marginalised and silenced 
Chinese aspire to become interlocutors in genuine intercultural dialogues and 
critiques, and reassert their voices and identities (Liang H., 2015, Shi, 2007). 
 
Concerned with the Western cultural domination, epistemological colonisation, and 
knowledge formation that heavily draws on racially and culturally hierarchical 
binary frameworks, the study is committed to the Chinese collective cause of 
altering the unequal cultural relations and uneven knowledge production between 
the West and China by undertaking a critical discourse research project. Moreover, 
the “return” of Asia calls for concerted and systematic efforts by Chinese 
researchers to interrogate and critique Eurocentric framings of the world, and at the 
same time to take seriously indigenous knowledge and discourses that have 
emerged or been emerging in China. Based on such a reflective departure point, the 
study looks at Western media discourses on China, and enquires into these 
epistemological foundations and the accepted ‘wisdom’, i.e. the superiority 
accorded to Western knowledge, by critically examining how China is represented 
in American newspapers. 
1.4 Research significance and original contribution 
This section discusses the significance of the research inquiry in relation to 
academic studies on China. It briefly introduces current academic studies on China 
before outlining the significance and contributions of this research project.  
 
Historically, although China was never fully colonised by a single power and its 
territory was never made into a foreign possession, the country suffered from 






multiple overlapping colonial agendas and was carved up by western powers in the 
same way as other fully colonised nations, e.g. India (Lee et al., 2015, Liang H., 
2015). Chairman Mao Zedong (1936) has used the term semi-colonialism to make 
sense of colonialism in China. One of the consequences of this unique form of 
colonialism is that semi-colonialism has often been treated as non-colonialism 
(Liang H., 2015), and thus is overlooked in postcolonial studies. This way of 
thinking disconnects China from its colonial past, and has influenced the works of 
some leading scholars in China Studies, such as Marion J. Levy, Lucian Pye, and 
John K. Fairbank. Barlow (1993, p.244) criticises Fairbank – one of the leading 
scholars in China Studies– for treating China and the West as two “internally friable, 
externally discrete, boundaried, patterned concrete entities”, rather than sites of a 
world system integrated by colonial relation. Thus, colonialism disappears in 
Fairbank’s work (Liang H., 2015). More importantly, the perspective which 
disavows colonialism in China has an impact on the development of the 
postcolonial turn in China Studies (Vukovich, 2017). Current studies on China tend 
to keep to their traditional paths – researchers tend to pursue ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ 
and ‘universal’ theories, methods and research questions, and have largely 
discarded the relevance of postcolonial theoretical perspectives (Shi, 2007, 
Vukovich, 2017). Postcolonial perspectives, and especially their challenges to 
established notions of ‘universalism’, ‘objectivity’, and “modernity” are often 
overlooked in researchers’ projects (Meinhof et al., 2017). Meanwhile, the majority 
of intellectuals in China Studies reproduce West-centric discourses by establishing 
a knowledge classification and educational system based on European 
‘universalism’ (Liang H., 2015). Research on China that was often based on only 
superficial regional knowledge and an application of ready-made methods or 
theories developed in the West, and that was largely conducted in ignorance of the 
voices of the indigenous Chinese knowledge is still dominant (Meinhof et al., 2017). 
There lacks a theoretically informed, self-reflexive approach to studying China 
(Vukovich, 2012).  
 
Similar to other fully colonised nations, Chinese modernisation has been 
interwoven with Western imperialism and colonialism, and shaped and limited by 






the latter (Meinhof et al., 2017). Therefore, postcolonial concerns matter for China. 
China Studies needs a postcolonial and decolonising moment, and should open 
itself up to cultural and political critiques outside the disciplinary confines 
(Vukovich, 2012). Moreover, the postcolonial turn matters in the sense that it 
provides a useful paradigm in examining the scope, scale and impact of the colonial 
and imperial encounters on the West as much as on the former colonised, namely 
the Third World (Vukovich, 2017).  
 
While there are earlier academic endeavours on the debate concerning China and 
post-colonialism in China Studies, such as the works by Fengzhen Wang (1988), 
Kuan Zhang (1993), Qin Bian (2013), Sautman and Yan (2014, 2016), these studies 
are either concerned with literary critiques or empirical discussions, rather than with 
theoretical debates. Although there are several works in Migration Studies that 
explore Chinese migrants from a postcolonial perspective (cf. Hier and Greenberg, 
2002), these critical works have not yet been introduced to the field of China Studies 
due to their disciplinary boundaries. Current studies on China are dominated by 
Western-centric perspectives, except for a few pioneering works. Qing Cao (2014), 
Xu Shi (2007), and Hongling Liang (2015) are three of the few scholars in China 
Studies, who offer a theoretical discussion of Western knowledge construction of 
China with a focus on a critical cultural perspective. Although their works offer a 
critical voice that challenges the orientalist underpinnings of the present knowledge 
systems concerning China, all of these works remain marginal to the overall China 
Studies field. Theoretical debates on postcolonialism in connection with China are 
scarce, fragmented and sporadic in China Studies. Systematically postcolonial 
critiques in China Studies are in dearth, as opposed to, say, India’s subaltern studies 
or Latin American studies, and so on (Meinhof et al., 2017).  
 
This study deals with the lacunae in current China Studies by applying a 
postcolonial perspective and critical discourse analysis (hereafter referred to as 
CDA) to examine the representation of China in American newspapers, and 
critically analyse the ideology and power underlying the media discourse. Against 
the background of epistemic colonisation and cultural domination, as well as the 






marginalisation of the voices of subaltern China, this study is significant in offering 
an insight into the relationship between media discourse, knowledge and power that 
becomes apparent in the Western representation of China. The study extends 
postcolonial theory and CDA approaches to the field of China studies, whereby it 
questions accepted ‘wisdoms’ and interrogates taken-for-granted assumptions. 
Interrogating epistemological superiority accorded to Western knowledge, and 
deconstructing hegemonic ‘truth’ and ‘facts’, the study opens up the spaces for new 
voices to be in dialogue with existing, often dominant discourses, and represents an 
attempt to resist essentialist representations of the ‘Other’ in general, and of China 
in particular. It contributes to a more balanced and just relationship among different 
kinds of knowledge, and facilitates the achievement of epistemic justice (Santos, 
2014). 
 
As previously discussed, China’s historical semi-colonial status is often considered 
as non-colonialism, and thus tends to be neglected in postcolonial studies. For that 
reason, postcolonial theory and China Studies have not yet fully engaged with each 
other. The study fills this gap, and represents one of the first attempts to apply 
postcolonial theory and the CDA method to analyse the Western media’s 
representation of China. The study seeks to uncover how news texts are discursively 
organised, and how the knowledge which is constructed through these news texts 
reflects ideologies of the press and power relations between the West and China. 
The study contributes the Chinese experience and perspective to the postcolonial 
and CDA studies, and thereby broadens and enriches this body of literature with a 
China-specific empirical analysis. As such, it contributes to an emerging critical 
theoretical reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about 
discourse, domination, representation of the Other, and ideology.  
1.5 Thesis outline 
The thesis, which examines the representation of China in American mainstream 
newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power, is laid 
out in eight chapters.  







Chapter One introduces the study and maps out its background. The chapter 
problematises the hierarchical ways in which knowledge is accepted and diffused 
in the world in general, and outlines the dominance of Euro-American-centric 
discourses in the discipline of China Studies in particular. Having outlined the aims 
of this study, the chapter concludes by highlighting the significance and 
contributions of the research project.  
 
Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework and the theoretical foundations of 
the study. An interdisciplinary approach combining CDA underpinned by Marxism, 
and the postcolonial theoretical perspective is developed. Key concepts are 
identified, elaborated, and their relevance and applicability to the study are 
established. Chapter Three critically reviews the existing relevant literature, 
situating the study in the wider body of scholarship. Gaps in existing literature are 
identified, and the original contributions of the study are highlighted. 
 
Chapter Four presents the study’s methodology. This chapter identifies issues 
concerning the selections of newspapers, the timeframe, and the three cases (i.e. 
The American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary 
against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 
2016). Following an explanation of the rationale for data collection, the chapter 
further elaborates on the process of data collection. The chapter concludes by 
illustrating the tools for analysing the data.  
 
Chapter Five, Six, and Seven presents the results of the data analysis of the three 
cases stated above. These chapters investigate how the media’s representations and 
discourses on China conceal the ideology of the press and unequal power relations 
between cultures and nations. Chapter Five problematises the ways in which the 
media represent the “Occupy Central” event as ‘democratic’, and provides 
alternative interpretations of the event by historicising and contextualising it in 
relation to the specificities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial 






present, its relationships with the British Empire, the Chinese mainland and its 
changing position in Asia. 
 
Chapter Six scrutinises the American media’s coverage of the 2015 anniversary 
parade. It examines the hidden power of the media discourse in ignoring collective 
memories and experiences of subaltern China, and representing the 
commemoration event of China couched in a ‘China threat’ narrative. The analysis 
also reveals the dominant discourses as ‘myths’ and interrogates the Euro-
American-centric knowledge of WWII’s history by bringing back the collective 
memories and reconstructing the media’s distorted realities of the Chinese people’s 
resistance against Japanese Fascism.  
 
Chapter Seven is organised around the case of the American press coverage of 
China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. It examines the way in which the 
media represent China-Africa relations in a “neo-colonialism” narrative. Moreover, 
the analysis deconstructs the dominant discourses, and provides an alternative 
interpretation of China-Africa relations by building the historical connectivities 
between the colonialised Africa and West’s colonialism, and contextualising the 
discussion of China-Africa relations in relation to China’s historical and 
contemporary role in Africa. 
 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by synthesising the key findings and arguments 
of the research study, and reflecting on the ways in which the research questions 
have been addressed. Moreover, the thesis’ contributions to scholarship are 



































The main aim of this study is to investigate the American mainstream media’s 
representation of China in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and 
power. An interdisciplinary approach drawing on concepts and ideas of a few 
relevant critical theoretical traditions is adopted to address the overall research 
objective, and to guide the analysis of the selected cases. The conceptual framework 
developed for this project incorporates Marxism and Foucauldian ideas of the 
power/discourse/knowledge nexus which underpin CDA (Fairclough, 1995, Van 
Dijk, 1993a, Wodak, 2001, Wodak and Meyer, 2009), as well as postcolonial and 
decolonial theory. In this chapter I’ll elaborate on the key concepts of this 
theoretical framework and discuss how and why it can help shed light on and 
advance an understanding of the ways in which China has been represented 
historically and contemporarily in the Western press in general, and in American 
mainstream newspapers in particular. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 
2.2 discusses Marxist conceptions of ideology and hegemony, Foucauldian ideas of 
the power/discourse/knowledge nexus, and establishes the ways in which these 
analytical concepts connect to the analysis of American newspapers. Section 2.3 
introduces postcolonial and decolonial theory, and define their key concepts. The 
section also establishes the relevance of the postcolonial perspective to the analysis 
of cultural inequalities between the U.S. and China. Section 2.4 summarises the 
main arguments put forward in this chapter. 
2.2 Marxism, Foucauldian power/discourse/knowledge, and 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
The study will critically examine the American media’s discourse on China through 
case studies. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is identified as a powerful 






theoretical and methodological tool in the research. van Dijk (1993a) defines CDA 
as a theoretically-informed and socio-politically committed approach guided by 
Marxism, which mainly studies the way in which social inequality, dominance, and 
power abuse are enacted, reinforced and reproduced by discourse in the form of text 
and talk in its social and political context. Accordingly, Marxist concepts of 
ideology and hegemony, and Foucauldian discussions of discourse/power distinctly 
figure in CDA.  
2.2.1 Ideology 
Within Marxist theory of culture and society, the concept of ideology has been 
intensively elaborated by Marxist theorists such as Marx and Althusser. Classical 
Marxist theory interprets society and ideology by using a base/superstructure model. 
According to this model, the economic base of society constitutes the primary and 
crucial organising factor of a human society (Allen, 1992). The economic structure 
of society, such as the material force of production, is the foundation based on 
which superstructures such as the arrangement of legal and political systems, 
institutions, culture, and ideology are built (Berger, 2014, Marx, 1976). The 
interests of the dominant class, which controls economic and productive resources, 
are then expressed and manifested in the organisation of the superstructure. Within 
this mode, the superstructure is not only organised in line with the interests of the 
ruling class, but thereby functions to transmit dominant ideas and values, and 
sustain and perpetuate the current dominant mode of production and production 
relations (Allen, 1992, Berger, 2014). 
 
Within the base/superstructure mode, the dynamics of cultural industries, and in 
particular the mass media, are understood primarily in terms of their economic 
determination (Chandler, 2016, Curran and Seaton, 2010, Murdock and Golding, 
1977). According to this view, “the contents of the media and the meanings carried 
by their messages are […] primarily determined by the economic base of the 
organisations in which they are produced” (Curran et al., 2005, p.13). In other 
words, the routines employed in the production of news are not neutral, but are 






shaped by the political, economic and ideological leanings of the news 
organisations (Schlesinger, 1989). Consequently, values and beliefs produced by 
the media within a given mode of production are seen as primarily lining up with, 
and reflective of, dominant class interests, given that the dominant class controls 
the ownership of media industries and the revenues of media institutions (Allen, 
1992, Curran et al., 2005). The close relationships between a society’s media 
organisations and other powerful institutional sectors in terms of ownership and 
management have led to monovocality in the media discourses (Siu, 2009).  
 
Marx and Engels use the term “ideology” to describe dominant ideas and 
representations that are taken as ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ in a given social order when 
in fact they naturalise, legitimate, and perpetuate the status quo and the existing 
institutions and values (Allen, 1992, Durham and Kellner, 2001). For Classical 
Marxism, the concept of ideology in capitalist nations is interpreted as false 
consciousness, or “a complex production of illusory ideas about the way society 
works” in the benefit of the ruling class (Allen, 1992, p.124). According to this view, 
the ruling class, by controlling the production and distribution of ideas, works to 
promote its own interests and ideas, and further generalise and universalise them as 
common interests shared by the whole society, so that oppressed or subservient 
classes mistakenly adopt the ruling-class ideas as their own (Allen, 1992, Marx and 
Engels, [1845] 1976). Accordingly, the ideas people have are those that the ruling 
class wants them to have (Berger, 2014).  
 
Applying the analysis of ideology to the media in capitalist nations, Marx and 
Engels ([1845] 1976) argue that the mass media and popular culture have a 
mythologising function. The mass media, owned and controlled by the bourgeois 
class, play a central role in spreading false consciousness, and in manipulating 
people to believe that “whatever is, is right”, and thus constitute a core link between 
the institutions of society (and the superstructure in general) and individual 
consciousness (Berger, 2014, p.44). Classical Marxism defines the media as tools 
utilised by the ruling class to disseminate its ideas and world views, and maintain, 
shore up and universalise the existing ideologies that constitute the dominant 






culture (Curran et al., 2005). As Marx and Engels ([1845] 1970, p.64) state, 
the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the 
class which is the ruling material force in society is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means 
of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. 
For classical Marxism, the mass media are regarded as being “locked into the power 
structure” (Curran et al., 2005, p.16), and function to reproduce the viewpoint of 
dominant institutions as the ‘central’, ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ perspective. As such, 
the mass media indoctrinate the mass audience with ideologies of the ruling class, 
and lead the mass audience to believe that the audience’s actions are motivated 
purely by their own personal desire and interest. The audience fails to recognise the 
ways in which their actions are shaped by the ruling class and by what means their 
ideas and values are formed to serve the interests of the ruling class (Berger, 2014). 
The mass audience, which exists in a state of false consciousness, can be seen as 
dupes of ideology, and fails to recognise that people are being manipulated and 
exploited (Allen, 1992, Berger, 2014).  
 
Althusser further expands the understanding of ideology by introducing the idea of 
relative autonomy (Allen, 1992). Rather than arguing that political and ideological 
practices are merely reflections of economic ones, Althusser proposes “the relative 
autonomy of the superstructure with respect to the base [...] [and] the reciprocal 
action of the superstructure on the base” (cited in Lapsley and Westlake, 2006, p.5). 
For Althusser, society is made up of interrelated social and intellectual activities or 
practices, including the economic, the political, and the ideological. These different 
practices exert mutual influence on each other, but each practice has its own 
structures and dynamics, and operates with relative autonomy (Allen, 1992). In 
rejecting economic determinism, Althusser regards ideology as a determining force 
in its own right. For Althusser (Althusser, 1971b, p.162), ideology is interpreted as 
a representation of “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence”. Althusser emphasises that ideology expresses themes and 






representations through which people establish their relations to the world (Curran 
et al., 2005). Thus, ideology has a material existence, and is inscribed within 
“ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs) – including the mass media, the family, and 
schooling – and their practices (Chandler, 2016, p.6). Ideology functions to 
interpellate individuals as subjects, and lead them to fit in with the dominant 
interests of the ruling class through the normal rituals of everyday life (Allen, 1992, 
Althusser, 1971a, Curran et al., 2005). Rather than being imposed from above, 
ideology, as Curran (2005) argues, is interpreted as a medium through which people 
experience the world.  
 
Althusser’s analysis of ideology in terms of systems of representation and 
individuals’ relations to the material world offers an insight into the way in which 
the media ought to be understood. Within Althusser’s framework, the media, as one 
of ISAs, work by inculcating in all members of society daily doses of dominant 
ideology by means of the press, the radio and television (Althusser, 1971b). The 
power of the media lies in their ability to position individuals in a way that the 
media representations are taken to be reflections of reality (Chandler, 2016). 
Althusser’s analysis of ideology signals the importance of studying representations 
in media texts, and recognising that such media representations are socially 
determined (Allen, 1992, Curran et al., 2005). As Said (2008, p.49) states, 
“newspapers, news and opinions do not occur naturally; they are made, as the result 
of human will, history, social circumstances, institutions, and the conventions of 
one’s profession”; therefore, there is a “qualitative and quantitative tendency to 
favor certain views and certain representations of reality over others”. In other 
words, the news media construct the world in a way that is consistent with the 
interests of people in power (Montgomery, 2007). Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
offer a propaganda model of the mass media, which suggests that the news 
production reflects the consensus of the dominant elite. As Herman and Chomsky 
(1988, p.xii) states, 
Most biased choices in the media arise from the preselection of right 
thinking people, internalised preconceptions, and the adaptation of 






personnel to the constraints of ownership, organisation, market and 
political power. 
Because of their socio-cultural and political positionality, the media are not 
ideologically ‘neutral’ in the making of news. Through the deliberate choice and 
interpretation of news events, a news discourse, which reflects the dominant 
perspective and ideology of the elite is created. For example, in a study of the 
media’s coverage of industrial disputes, the Glasgow University Media Group 
(1980, cited in Gurevitch et al., 2005, p.313) finds that the news discourse reflects 
the dominant capitalist ideology and thus serves to maintain the status quo. The 
group shows that by using subtle verbal and visual techniques, televised news 
presents a distorted picture of the social reality in their reporting of industrial 
disputes. While the TV news frames strikers as renegades on strike, management 
representatives are portrayed as rational and sensible, working away in their offices. 
It demonstrates that the portrayal of social groups (and by extension, reality and 
knowledge/truth) from different social strata is never neutral, but differential and 
biased. Thus, news coverage is never free of ideologies or values. 
2.2.2 Hegemony  
The notion of hegemony is closely related to ideology and constitutes another 
important concept of CDA. As Wodak and Meyer (2009, p.8) point out,  
[o]rganisations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology 
of a society to become closer to what they want it to be. When most 
people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that 
there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony.  
Ideology serves to position people into social networks of subordination and 
oppression, and operates as an instrument of hegemony (Stoddart, 2007). Building 
on the Marxist conception of ideology, the term hegemony is used by Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci to illustrate the complicated ways in which the dominant class 
perpetuates its rule over society (Allen, 1992, Gramsci, 1971). For Gramsci, 
Hegemony refers to “the maintenance of one social group’s dominance over 






subordinate groups through relations of consent and coercion” (Gramsci, 1971, 
cited in Ekers and Loftus, 2008, p.702). Maintaining hegemony over subordinate 
groups makes it necessary to “reproduce the social relations that are foundational 
to a given social formation” (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Ekers and Loftus, 2008, p.702). 
In addition to political and economic control, the ruling class exercises hegemony 
and works to “develop acquiescence to its rule” by projecting its own way of seeing 
the world on subordinate groups as ‘common sense’ (Chandler, 2016). The 
dominant class exerts intellectual and moral leadership through a nexus of 
institutions, social relations, and ideas insofar as its interests and ideology are 
recognised and accepted as the prevailing ones for the majority of people in a 
society (Allen, 1992, Ekers and Loftus, 2008).  
 
From the perspective of Gramsci’s analysis, media products are regarded as 
ideological “site[s] of struggle” for hegemony (Curran et al., 2005, p.26). They 
function as forums for negotiating hegemony. Dominant interests prevail in the 
media, while the range of competing voices that get heard is restricted (Allen, 1992). 
Alternative meanings and beliefs are rarely given full access to the media and are 
ignored in media products (Allen, 1992). Media products are seen as primary 
expressions of ruling class values (Chandler, 2016). As such, the media play a 
central role in “providing legitimacy through asserting moral and intellectual 
leadership and presenting a particular set of interest as the general interests” (Levy 
and Egan, 2003, p.806). The media products not merely serve as carriers of 
dominant ideology that manipulate and indoctrinate people with certain views. They, 
as instruments of hegemonic domination, serve to shape people’s worldviews, 
maintain, and reproduce ideas and values of those who have privileged access to 
the media as ‘accredited sources’, and reinforce the existing hegemonic power 
relations (Berger, 2014, Hall, 1978). 
2.2.3 Foucauldian conception of power/discourse/knowledge  
Wodak and Meyer (2009) point out that CDA analysts are interested in the ways in 
which discourse is employed by dominant groups to impose power abuse and 






reproduce social domination. Since CDA analyses the use of language by the 
powerful groups, who are accountable for the existence of inequalities, power is 
another central concept for CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).  
 
Power is related to an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume 
different social positions or belong to different social groups (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2009, Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Generally speaking, power is defined as the 
possibility of imposing one’s own will on others regardless of the will or interests 
of the latter (Weber, 1980; cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). The Foucauldian 
understanding of power constitutes a theoretical foundation of CDA. For Foucault 
(1990), power is circular and enacted in all spheres of human activities. As Foucault 
(1990, pp.92-93) puts it, 
[b]y power, I do not mean ‘power’ as a group of institutions and 
mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. 
By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in 
contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in 
mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, 
a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the 
entire social body […] Power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that 
one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society. 
Foucault does not think that power in society is exercised in a top-down manner as 
proposed by Gramsci, who argues that “power is mainly exerted by the dominant 
bourgeois class through the medium of ideology” (cited in Daldal, 2014, p.150). 
The omnipresence of power transcends institutions, individual power holders and 
groups. Everyone including oppressors and the oppressed is involved in the 
circulation of power. Power relations, which remain mostly invisible, exist at all 
levels, and in every aspect of social life, including in the private spheres, such as a 
family, as well as in the public sphere, such as the economy, law, etc. (Hall, 1997). 
As such, power offers an insight into the dynamics of control and domination in 
modern societies (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). 
 






Foucault (1990) is concerned with the way in which power is exercised, and thus 
focuses on analysing the importance of discourse in legitimising or de-legitimising 
power. As Foucault (1990, pp.100-101) puts it: 
[d]iscourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up 
against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the 
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, 
a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. 
Discourse transmits and produces power, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it.  
Thus, power works through, and is encoded in discourses. Discourses could be used 
to index and express power, as well as challenge and alter distributions of power. 
Furthermore, Foucault explains the symbiotic relationship between power, 
discourse and knowledge. Foucault (1990) points out that power shapes the rules 
governing discourse and determines the order of discourses, such as the exclusion 
within discourse. Accordingly, certain kinds of knowledge, interpretations, and 
discourses are established through power or asymmetrical power relations as ‘truth’, 
while some other knowledge/interpretations are excluded, silenced and ignored by 
the established knowledge system. As such, Foucault argues that there is no such 
thing as the “Truth” of knowledge in the absolute sense – a “Truth” which remains 
the same irrespective of period, setting, and context – but there is a discursive 
formation sustaining a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2001, p.317). Where there are 
imbalances in power relations, there will be a differential production of knowledge 
and ‘truth’. In other words, power determines what kind of knowledge constitutes 
‘truth’. The knowledge or ‘truth’, in turn, consolidates the particular power 
(Foucault, 2001). 
 
The Foucauldian conceptualisation of relations between power, discourse and 
knowledge demonstrate how discursive practices situate individuals and 
organisations in power relations, which privilege some interests and marginalise 
others (Livesey, 2002). The Foucauldian perspective on the 
power/discourse/knowledge nexus offers a useful insight into the analysis of texts 






in discourse studies. Discursive differences are negotiated in texts, and serve as 
finely articulated means for analysing power differences in social hierarchical 
structures as manifested in the use of language (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As 
Fairclough (1995, p.209) argues, “[t]exts are sensitive barometers of social 
processes, movement and diversity, and textual analysis can provide particularly 
good indicators of social change”. Since texts manifest traces of differing 
ideological battles, they are regarded as sites of social struggle (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2009). Drawing on such theoretical insights, this study considers American news 
texts as sites of struggles for ‘truth’ within an existing dynamic power relations. In 
tandem with the interests of dominant groups, the American media construct and 
naturalise particular discourses on China, which further shape the knowledge 
construction about China. The study explores how the knowledge of China is 
constructed by American news texts. 
2.2.4 Application of Marxist ideological analysis and Foucauldian 
power analysis to my research  
Marxist conceptualisation of ideology and hegemony and Foucauldian ideas of 
power/discourse/knowledge shed light on the analysis of the media’s power. 
Marxist perspectives uncover hidden issues of political and economic interests in 
the mass media, and surface social inequalities in the media’s representations 
(Chandler, 2016). The poststructuralist perspective, especially Foucauldian 
articulations of power/discourse/knowledge, reveals the role of media discourse in 
exercising, maintaining, and legitimising power. Within the Marxist and 
Foucauldian framework, cultural artefacts, and in particular media texts, are 
understood primarily in terms of their ideological contents (Berger, 2014). The 
media texts express and promote certain values, beliefs, ideas and knowledge in 
relation to the larger social formations and contexts in which they are situated, 
produced, distributed and received (Allen, 1992). The American mainstream 
newspapers are not an exception. Being the mouthpiece of the American dominant 
class, the newspapers disseminate and reproduce dominant ideas, shape people’s 
conceptions of the world, and thus serve as important instruments of social control. 






Marxist and Foucauldian emphases on the nature of ideology, hegemony and 
power/discourse allow us to regard the media as a “site of struggle” for ideological 
meanings, and to understand how media texts specifically embody and enact 
particular ranges of values, beliefs, and ideas (Curran et al., 2005, p.26). More 
importantly, such an ideological analysis helps to reveal underlying ideologies and 
power, expose whose reality people are being offered in media texts, deconstruct 
taken-for-granted values, and open up the possibility of oppositional readings 
(Chandler, 2016).  
 
The Marxist’s conceptions of ideology and hegemony are closely linked with class 
power and domination in the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of 
society, and prioritise class as the paramount analytical category. However, despite 
its importance and relevance, in particular in providing the underpinnings of the 
CDA approach, Marxism alone cannot explain or address other identity-based, 
socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities and power relations which are 
generated and reproduced through discourse and representation, for example the 
cultural inequalities between America and China that are analysed in this research 
project. Such cultural power inequalities also intersect with national identities and 
the capitalist world order (Mylonas, 2014). In the following, I will introduce 
postcolonialism as another theoretical strand of this research. The postcolonial 
theoretical perspective addresses issues, such as the impact of colonial/imperialist 
practices on the production and representation of cultural/ethnic identities, and the 
relevance of race and culture in understanding contemporary relations of power, 
hierarchy and domination, and thus is used.  
2.3 Postcolonialism and decolonialism 
Instead of viewing class as a primary analytical category, the postcolonial and 
decolonial perspective draws particular attention to cultural and racial relations, as 
well as domination and hegemony by certain cultural/ethnic groups over others 
through representation and discourse. Post-colonialism emerged from the work of 
scholars from the Middle East and South Asia, and mainly refers back to Western 






colonialism in the Middle East and South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Drawing on Foucauldian ideas (see Section 2.2.3 above), post-
colonialism analyses the power that is involved in culture, discourse and the politics 
of knowledge (production, control and distribution), and reveals the role of 
economic, geographic, socio-political, and ideological and epistemic power and 
domination in sustaining colonialism/neo-colonialism, and cultural imperialism in 
the postcolonial and globalising era (Ahluwalia, 2007). As Özkazanç-Pan (2008, 
p.964) points out:  
as a field of inquiry, postcolonial studies are made up of the work of 
diverse theorists who have critiqued Eurocentric and Western 
representations of non-Western worlds and called attention to the 
canonical knowledge that makes claims about the non-West. 
Decolonialism, which emerged from the work of scholars from South America, 
extends the postcolonial critiques of the West’s epistemic domination and cultural 
imperialism to take into account the West’s colonialism in South America, going 
back as far as to the late fifteenth century. It problematises the (neo)colonial 
relations of political, social and cultural domination established by Europeans, 
challenges the Western-centred thinking of the colonial world, and critically 
analyses the nuanced ways in which the culture, knowledge and racialized 
hierarchies filtered through the colonial past, continue defining the identity 
formation, culture and values in postcolonial nations. Therefore, both 
postcolonialism and decolonialism seek to decolonise and provincialise Western 
claims of ‘universal’ knowledge by unveiling and critiquing Eurocentrism in the 
knowledge systems produced by Western power elites (Özkazanç-Pan, 2008), and 
offer a contrarian to Western-theorising. The following sections further elaborate 
on the key concepts of postcolonialism and decolonialism especially Orientalism, 
Othering, coloniality, and Eurocentrism, and explains the relevance of these key 
concepts to this research inquiry. 






2.3.1 Othering and Orientalism 
The idea of Othering is central to postcolonial theory. It was originally coined by 
Spivak to describe the process by which imperialist discourses create ‘Others’ 
(Ashcroft et al., 2007). Othering, according to Jensen (2011) refers to discursive 
processes, by which powerful groups construct subordinate groups by means of 
dividing ‘Us’ from the ‘Other’ in a reductionist way, thereby attaching moral codes 
of inferiority to these subordinate groups. These discursive processes establish and 
shore up the identity of the powerful groups as ‘Us’, and affirm their legitimacy and 
superiority through their opposition to, and stigmatisation of, the Other (Gabriel, 
2012, Jensen, 2011, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012, Staszak, 2009). In other words, 
the ‘Us/Self’ is defined by constructing the ‘Them/Other’.  
 
Central to the postcolonial elaboration of the ‘Self – Other relationship’ is the 
politics of “binarism” (Chakrabarti, 2012, p.8). According to Derrida (1972, p.42), 
binary oppositions like ‘US/Them’, ‘civilised/primitive’, “are not dealing with […] 
peaceful coexistence […] but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms 
governs […] the other or has the upper hand”. The binaries are therefore conceived 
as essentially unequal, and they exist in closely related logics of domination. The 
asymmetry in power relationships is a central dimension of Othering. The dominant 
group imposes the value of its particularity, denigrates the particularity of ‘Others’, 
and establishes the “normal, normative (good) Self which is mirrored by the 
abnormal, deviant (bad) Other” (McEwan, 2008, p.123). Groups which are othered 
are always defined in a way that resonates with stereotypical characteristics, which 
are largely stigmatising and dehumanising, and thus are rendered ‘pathological’, 
morally and intellectually ‘inferior’ and ‘subordinate’ (McEwan, 2008, Schwalbe 
et al., 2000, Staszak, 2009). In this way, the othered groups are deprived of the 
opportunity to speak for themselves, and instead are defined by demonising 
qualities that the dominant group wants them to have (Gabriel, 2012). The ‘Others’ 
are repressed in the ‘Self-Other relationships’ and subject to logics of domination 
(Creutz-Kämppi, 2008, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). By discursively constructing 
the others as subordinate, the dominant group reinforces its superiority. Subordinate 






‘Others’, which are constructed as deviating from the norms of the dominant are 
marginalised and excluded, and the domination of the dominant group is justified 
and maintained (Staerkle, 2014). By presenting the Western cultural forms and 
ideas as widely-accepted ‘universal’, ‘superior’ ones, whilst other forms and ideas 
as portrayed as ‘particularistic’ and ‘inferior’, the dominant form of the culture 
emerges as, what Gramsci identified, hegemony (see Section 2.2.2) (Clarke, 1993). 
 
The process of Othering has been reified in Said’s seminal work Orientalism. Said 
(1978) demonstrates how the West (especially Britain, France, and the United States) 
otherises non-Western nations, and constructs stereotypes of ‘Others’ as inferior in 
relation to European norms by using the Foucauldian conception of power, 
knowledge and discourse (see Section 2.2.3). He systematically examines the 
Western knowledge production of non-Western cultures, and its links to the 
functioning of the colonial power, as well as Western political, economic, and 
military institutions of domination (Loomba, 2005, Özkazanç-Pan, 2008). 
According to Said (1978), colonialism works not only through military and 
economic domination but also operates as a discourse of domination. The 
‘Self/Other’ binary opposition is deeply entrenched in imperialist and colonial 
discourses, and is employed to legitimise and reinforce the power of the West to 
dominate ‘Others’. Systemic, hierarchical and essentialised constructions of 
difference between the West and the ‘Oriental’ are established on the basis of factors 
such as race, ethnicity or culture (McEwan, 2008). Colonised Others are defined in 
terms of their differences from the West, which are reflected in cognitive 
dichotomies such as “nature/culture”, “irrationality/rationality”, and 
“barbarism/civilisation” (McEwan, 2008, p.125). Said (1978) critiques the false 
assumptions underlying Western attitudes towards, and stereotypes about, non-
Western peoples and cultures, in particular Asia and the Middle East as well as 
Arabs and Islamic peoples and their cultures (McEwan, 2008). Said (1994) 
emphasises that the colonial discourses about the ‘Orient’ are ideological 
representations with no corresponding reality. He (1994) argues that cultural 
representations created by the colonial power, which claims to know about ‘the real 
Oriental’, are inextricably linked to strategies of power in colonial systems. As Said 






(1994, p.5) puts it, “the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship 
of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony”. Orientalism 
is a “system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the 
Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western Empire” 
(Clarke, 1993, p.142). In other words, Orientalism says more about the power 
exerted by the West over the Orient than it does about the real conditions in non-
Western nations (Lindner, 2010).   
 
Said (1994) points out that the technique of Othering inherent in Orientalism is a 
political vision of a reality, whose structure promotes the difference between the 
West and the rest. The binary opposition – “the familiar ‘Self’ (the colonial power, 
the West, ‘Us’) versus the [‘eccentric’] ‘Other’ (the colonised nations, the ‘Orient’, 
‘Them’)” – inherent in Orientalism is crucial to the West’s self-construction 
(McEwan, 2008, p.63). As Loomba (2005, p.47) states, 
If colonised people are irrational, Europeans are rational; if the former 
are barbaric, sensual, and lazy, Europe is civilisation itself, with its 
sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic that of hard work; 
if the Orient is static, Europe can be seen as developing and marching 
ahead; the Orient has to be feminine so that Europe can be masculine. 
By denigrating the colonised nations, cultures and peoples as ‘backward’ and 
‘irrational’ ‘Others’, the West constructs itself as ‘mature’, ‘rational’ and ‘objective’, 
and reinforces its self-image as superior (McEwan, 2008). Moreover, Said (1978) 
argues that colonial discourses – and their false and imperialist visions of particular 
places and peoples – do not simply serve to reinforce the identity and sense of 
supremacy of Western culture, but operate to validate the West’s colonial ambitions 
and policies. The discourses of otherness, which have become ingrained in the 
Western culture, are central to Western ideals and imaginations of the ‘White man’s 
burden’ to ‘civilise the Other’. They have become the basis of, and rationale for, 
colonial oppression, exploitation and domination, and justified racial 
discrimination and prejudice, cultural violence and social injustice, as well as 
continued economic and geopolitical interventions in the name of ‘humanitarianism’ 
and ‘development’ in the postcolonial era (McEwan, 2008). Said’s path-breaking 






work on Orientalism plays a paramount role in uncovering the subtle and persistent 
Western-centric project against non-Western cultures, and the links between 
discourse and representations of the ‘Other’ in Western culture and their colonial 
and imperial ambitions.  
 
The construction of otherness is discursive. Texts and especially news texts are used 
in articulating “Us-versus-Them” relations, and can be seen as “elements of social 
events” that lead to societal change in the form of creating new foci of reporting 
(Fairclough, 2003, p.8). The concept of framing gives an insight into how those 
who are socially and culturally distant are represented as ‘Others’ within media 
texts, and plays a central role in shaping and mediating the media’s discourse and 
knowledge about ‘subaltern Others’ (Breen et al., 2006). Framing, as Cissel (2012, 
p.67) sees, it is “a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and 
stereotypes, that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events”. In other 
words, individuals build various mental ‘filters’ on the basis of biological and 
cultural factors. Through these filters, people make sense of the world. Accordingly, 
frames are mainly implicit and unacknowledged (Gitlin, 1980). Media frames, 
which shape the way in which journalists report the world, are often formed in 
accordance with dominant socio-cultural values or rules that represent the interests 
of elites (Allan, 1999). Entman (1993) argues that the media framing process is 
highly interpretative and value-laden. Persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion 
of events and issues are involved in the mass media process of framing, whereby 
the media reproduce dominant discourses, construct stereotypical interpretations of 
socially and culturally distant groups, and define and construct social reality in a 
way that the interests and ideas of the dominant group based on class, culture, race, 
gender are reflected and represented as ‘truth’. As such, news frames provide a 
contrived perspective by which audiences attempt to imagine and visualise the 
images of the ‘Others’ within the defined frame, and thus shape the way that the 
‘Others’ are interpreted and constructed.  






2.3.2 Coloniality  
The idea of coloniality is central to decolonial theory. It was first used by Aníbal 
Quijano (2000) to describe legacies of colonialism in the form of social and cultural 
discrimination that have permeated in contemporary societies. Coloniality is 
distinct from colonialism. Colonialism refers to a kind of political, economic and 
socio-cultural power which one nation imposes on another nation through the 
establishment, exploitation, maintenance and expansion of colonies (Maldonado-
Torres 2007). In the twentieth century, colonialism may have ended with the 
elimination of numerous colonial administrations and subsequent decolonisation of 
the world (Grosfoguel and Georas, 2010). That notwithstanding, a continuity of the 
colonial forms of domination, which are filtered through the highly racialised 
cultures and social structures in the colonial past, remains (Mignolo and Liang, 
2012). As Maldonado-Torres (2007, P.243) argues,   
[c]oloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as 
a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective 
relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of 
colonial administrations. Thus coloniality survives colonialism. 
In other words, coloniality is the invisible underlying logic of colonialism, which 
highlights the continuity of hierarchical socio-cultural relationships of exploitation 
and domination between the colonisers and the colonised nations. Colonial 
administrations may have ended but not coloniality. The coloniality of power is 
manifested in the existing global neoliberal system of capital and labour with its 
roots located in the racist, patriarchal logic of the colonial system. 
 
Coloniality emphasises cultural and social power relations in contemporary 
societies. It takes form in systems of hierarchy and is entrenched in the West’s 
colonial and imperialist domination of the rest of the world (Bhambra, 2014, 
Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). The systems of hierarchy are based on racial 
classifications and differences, which were established in the 15th and 16th century 
when Europe expanded its conquest and colonisation of the New World, and scaled 
up its appropriation of land and its massive exploitation of labour (Maldonado-






Torres, 2007). Using the physical traits of the people as external manifestations of 
their “racial” nature, the colonisers created a racial hierarchy in which the whites 
are constructed as ‘superior’ over the ‘inferior’ non-whites (Quijano, 2007; 
Maldonado-Torres, 2007). As such, social and cultural characteristics of different 
social, cultural and racial groups came to be stereotyped, and subsequently 
understood as inherent biological features of entire groups. Within this racial 
hierarchy, the colonised territories are articulated and stereotyped as ‘disabled’ and 
‘uncivilised’ nations characterised by ‘deficits’, which further strengthens the self-
image of the colonisers as ‘superior’, ‘civilised’ and ‘rational’. In that way, the 
colonisers imposed political, economic and social orders on the colonialised nations 
in the name of ‘civilising’ and ‘saving’ the latter. The racial hierarchy, which was 
constructed by the colonisers, serves to justify their economic exploitation, 
territorial occupation, and political domination as well as perpetuate the coloniality 
of power (Quijano, 2000).  
 
In addition to economic exploitation and political domination, the coloniality of 
power, which originally was based on racial hierarchy, is now strongly associated 
with a coloniality of knowledge and culture, articulated as modernity/rationality. 
According to Mignolo (2007), coloniality is the darker side of modernity. There is 
no modernity without coloniality. The notion of modernity/rationality is a 
Eurocentric epistemological frame which is built on the presumption that European 
cultures are the ‘only truly modern’, ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ cultures. During the 
colonial era, the notion of modernity/rationality was manifested in discourses of 
‘civilisation’, and ‘progress’. Disguised under the discourses of ‘civilisation’, and 
‘progress’, the colonisers imposed their own cultures and values on the colonised 
nations as ‘truths’, and inflicted cultural and epistemic violence. Accordingly, the 
West establishes a hierarchy of the ways in which knowledge is accepted and 
diffused. Indigenous values, knowledge and aesthetic standards are subalternised 
and silenced (Lee, et al., 2015). As such, the notion of modernity/rationality serves 
to affirm the West’s sense of ‘self’, whilst glossing over the colonial and imperialist 
order that provides the context for its ‘self’-realisation (Bhambra, 2014). Therefore, 






modernity/rationality go hand in hand with the logic of coloniality, with coloniality 
standing for the hidden agenda of modernity (Lee et al., 2015).  
 
In the postcolonial era, the coloniality of power continues to exist and operate in 
much the same way as it has done in the past (Lee, et al. 2015). Disguised under the 
notion of modernity/rationaliy, and expressed through discourses of progress, 
development, and democracy, the coloniality of power exists as a structure of 
management and control at all levels, such as at the levels of epistemology, politics, 
economy, gender and sexuality (Lee, et al. 2015). As decolonial scholars (Mignolo, 
2007, Grosfóguel, 2009) point out, after the WWII, the U.S. took over the previous 
leadership from Europe, and started a global project under the name of development 
and modernisation. The U.S. continued to impose the regime of global coloniality 
to the peripheral nation-states and non-European people through international 
organisations and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Pentagon, and the World Bank 
(WB) (Mignolo, 2007, Grosfóguel, 2009). China, as a former semi-colonised nation, 
is not exempt from the coloniality of power. China Studies are dominated by West-
centric discourses and colonial stereotypes. The theoretical concept of coloniality 
helps to identify the continuity of colonial ideology in the construction of 
contemporary academic and media discourses on China, and gives an insight into 
the impact of legacies of colonialism on the construction of the identity and 
collective memories of China.  
2.3.3 Eurocentrism  
Despite being anchored in different time periods and different geographical 
orientations, both postcolonialism and decolonity emerged as a consequence of 
political developments that challenge the colonial world order established by 
European empires, and are committed to contesting the Eurocentric knowledge 
production. The concept of Eurocentrism is central to both postcolonialism and 
decolonialism. Eurocentrism refers to the process by which Europe and European 
cultural assumptions are constructed as ‘normal’ and ‘universal’ (Ashcroft et al., 






2007), and are regarded as the basis for evaluative judgements concerning the 
practices of others (Joseph et al., 1990). According to Araújo and Maeso (2012), 
Eurocentrism is rooted in the colonisation of South America in the 15th and 16th 
centuries, and marked by the construction of the idea of race. The colonisers 
essentialised the supposedly biological difference based on skin colour between the 
colonisers and the colonised, and constructed a system of racial hierarchy in which 
the colonised nations were placed in a situation of inferiority to the European 
colonisers (Quijano, 2000, 2007). With the acceleration of European colonisation 
of the other parts of the world in the 18th and 19th century, the concept of a collective 
Europe constructed as a sign of superiority and in opposition to the rest of the 
world’s cultures was actively promoted and firmly consolidated through 
exploitation and conquest (Ashcroft et al., 2007). The combination of imperialist 
displays of power and colonialist control of institutions such as schools and 
universities have led to the establishment of European systems and values as 
inherently superior to indigenous ones (Ashcroft et al., 2007). 
 
Lindner (2010, p.2) points out that a form of Eurocentrism is “distinguished not 
only by the presumption that Western societies are superior, but also by the attempt 
to justify this presumption in rational, scientific terms”. Eurocentrism masks its 
ideological basis under the pretence of political and scientific civilisation, neutrality 
and universality (Araújo and Maeso, 2012), implying “evolutionary schemas 
through which societies inevitably progress” (Sundberg, 2009, p.640). Quijano 
(2007) argues that Eurocentrism conceives history as an evolutionary binary set: 
‘the civilised’ versus ‘the primitive’, ‘the modern’ versus ‘the traditional’, and ‘the 
rational’ versus ‘the savage’. Europe is conceived as the centre of the modern world 
against which the world is described, conceptualised, ranked and valued (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013). The whole story of the human history becomes posited in the past 
of a historical trajectory that culminates in Europe (Quijano, 2000). The Eurocentric 
perspective of history considers Europe to be the mirror of the future of all other 
societies and cultures, and regards modernity, rationality and democracy exclusive 
to the West (Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). As such, Eurocentrism is mostly 
codified dualistic terms, such as civilised/ primitive, scientific/mythic, 






advanced/backward, rational/irrational, and developed/undeveloped, with an 
underlying presumption of “a superior white Western self as referent of analysis” 
(Sundberg, 2009, p.640). An ‘Orientalist’ way of looking at the non-Western world 
reflects a Eurocentric point of view. The Western conceptual system includes also 
Western-centric values and ideas (such as ‘democracy’, ‘modernity’, ‘rationality’ 
and ‘progress’), which are perceived as ‘universal’ standards against which non-
Western nations are constructed as ‘Oriental Others’ by means of denigration, 
homogenisation, co-optation, and so forth (Lindner, 2010). In that way, non-
Western nations “are transformed into distorted mirror images of the European self-
image” (Lindner, 2010, p.3). Disguised under the notions of universalism and 
neutrality, the West imposes its Eurocentric understanding upon the rest of the 
regions and peoples of the world, denying the validity, equality and value of non-
Western knowledge systems and ways of life, and thereby exerting epistemic 
violence. 
 
Eurocentrism is bound up in an epistemic hierarchy, which emphasises and gives 
priority to European production of knowledge, memories and histories 
(Chakrabarty, 1992). This epistemic hierarchy, as Grosfoguel’s (2012a, p.83) sees, 
is manifested in the knowledge structure in Westernised universities: “[n]early all 
disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities [in the Westernised university], 
with very few exceptions, privilege in their canon of thought Western male 
thinkers”. In contrast, thoughts from non-Western thinkers are excluded. 
Chakrabarty (1992, pp.1-3) critiques Eurocentrism in respect of its central position 
given to the West in knowledge production, as shown below.  
Insofar as the academic discourse of history […] is concerned, “Europe” 
remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the 
one we call “Indian”, “Chinese”, “Kenyan” and so on […] Third-world 
historians feel a need to refer to works in European history, historians 
of Europe do not feel any need to reciprocate […] The everyday 
paradox of third-world social science is that we find these theories, in 
spite of their inherent ignorance of “us” eminently useful in 
understanding our societies. What allowed the modern European sages 






to develop such clairvoyance with regard to societies of which they 
were empirically ignorant? Why cannot we, once again, return the gaze? 
As a consequence, academic products become imbued with Eurocentric biases that 
have permeated the production, circulation and evaluation of knowledge (Joseph et 
al., 1990). Brohman (1995, p.128) argues that Eurocentrism “perpetuated 
intellectual dependence on a restricted group of Western academic institutions that 
determine the subject matter and methods of research”. In other words, the unequal 
relation between European culture and the other cultures is casted in a binary 
opposition: “subject/object” with different value attachment (Quijano, 2007). A 
hierarchy of the relation between Europe and the rest of the world is thus established, 
with the former being constructed as the ‘subject’ in the generation of theory and 
knowledge, while the latter is constructed as the inferior by nature and the ‘object’ 
of the so-called ‘scientific investigation’ and knowledge production (McEwan, 
2008). As pointed out by Spivak (1988), the West is obsessed with preserving itself 
as the ‘subject’, with talking to itself in a mono-vocal manner about the ‘Other’. 
Knowledge is in a way always colonial in defining the ‘Other’ as thoughtless, 
voiceless and deprived of subjectivity, the ‘object’ of study by the ‘subject’, and as 
a thing that knowledge should be extracted from and brought back ‘here’ (Young, 
1990). By representing the ‘Other’ in a way that privileges the West, the West 
silences subaltern voices. Such silencing not only features in the dominant Western-
centric discourse; it also renders the subaltern without a “subject being” (Maggio, 
2007, p.426). Given that the subaltern never speaks, or their voices are never heard, 
they are marginalised or squeezed out in the process of knowledge construction. By 
neglecting non-Western cultures and relegating their knowledges to an ‘object’ 
position, the knowledge and theories drawing on the West’s provincial and 
particularistic experiences are made ‘universal’ and therefore imposed on the rest 
of the world as the only ‘valid’ ‘truth’ (Grosfoguel, 2012a).  
 
With regard to the construction of world histories, postcolonial historiography 
points out that  Orientalism and Eurocentrism, albeit sometimes in an implicit 
manner, have underpinned the formation of social science knowledge and in 
particular, world histories. Bhabha (1994, p.500) argues that “the world-historical 






events remain centred upon a narrowly defined European history”. The West 
presents world histories as the stories of its achievement. The rest of the world is 
assumed to be external to the world-historical processes selected for consideration. 
The histories of non-Western nations, which are significant to the world-historical 
processes, are erased or rendered silent (Bhambra, 2016, 2010). Drawing on the 
concept of “connected histories” (Bhambra, 2016, p.3), Bhambra deconstructs the 
Euro-American centric theoretical interpretations and explanations of world-
historical processes. As Bhambra (2016) argues, the world was not born out of the 
West having an impact upon and ‘awakening’ a ‘dormant’ non-West, but born out 
of the multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and usually coercive) exchanges and 
interactions between the West and the non-West. Modernity is not what developed 
in the West and then radiated and dispersed outwards in an automatic and peaceful 
way, but instead it witnessed and arose from economic, socio-cultural, political and 
epistemic domination, oppression and violence through colonialism, imperialism, 
enslavement, and the dispossession of non-western nations. 
 
The epistemological hierarchy inherent in Eurocentrism silences the voices of 
subaltern nations, leads to epistemic violence, and blocks communication and 
interchanges of knowledge and modes of knowledge production between cultures 
(Quijano, 2007). Quijano (2000, p.540) states that “Europe’s hegemony over the 
new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, 
culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its 
hegemony”. In a hegemonic structure, resources, such as money, skills, education, 
etc., are distributed along racial lines (Burawoy, 1998). Moreover, knowledge 
which is promoted, and categories and approaches of scientific inquiry which are 
used in European academia help to maintain the political and intellectual superiority 
of Europe (Joseph et al., 1990). Not only were non-Western specific ideas, beliefs, 
images, symbols, knowledge and histories repressed and even effaced, but also their 
modes of knowing, modes of producing knowledge, images, symbols, resources 
were expropriated. The West constructs its culture as a ‘universal’ model, imposes 
its beliefs and images on the non-West, and impedes the cultural production of the 
dominated as well as exerts social and cultural control over non-western nations 






(Quijano, 2007). In that way, Eurocentrism damages non-European societies and 
impoverishes the academic disciplines by colonising non-European intellectuals 
and being ignorant of other rich sources of knowledge outside mainstream 
discourses (Joseph et al., 1990).  
 
Meikle (2009) points out that the global news media define reality on the global 
scale by persistently using narrow cultural preconceptions that lead to 
misconceptions and misrepresentations of the ‘Other’. China, being the biggest 
developing country in the world, is not an exception. The rise of China and its 
increasing global influence, are frequently constructed as a ‘threat’ to the existing 
international order and power relations (Broomfield, 2003, Gertz, 2001, Storey and 
Yee, 2004). The Western media tend to lean towards Orientalism when portraying 
and representing China. The postcolonial theoretical interrogation of, and insights 
into, the embeddedness of knowledge in the historical processes of colonialism, 
imperialism and racism, as elaborated above, will help compensate the Marxist and 
poststructuralist CDA approach by uncovering the ways in which the images and 
knowledge about China are constructed in the American media, and by showing 
how the instrument and process of othering is interlinked with western-centric 
forms of knowledge about and objectification of China. Moreover, this theoretical 
perspective allows for the contextualisation of the analysis of the three cases (see 
Section 4.2.4), and reveals how the American media representation of China is 
closely connected to the knowledge and stereotypes produced in colonialist 
discourses. 
2.4 Summary   
This chapter developed and elaborated on the theoretical framework that will guide 
this study. The framework is interdisciplinary, combining Marxism and 
Foucauldian discourse/power/knowledge, which underlie the CDA approach on the 
one hand, and postcolonialism and decolonialism on the other hand. The chapter 
demonstrated that Marxist and Foucauldian concepts of ideology, hegemony, and 
power/knowledge/discourse help explain the role of the media in reproducing 






dominant ideas, manipulating and indoctrinating people with dominant ideology, 
and maintaining the hegemony and control of the dominant class. They, however, 
remain culture-blind and thus cannot fully address the research questions of this 
study (see Section 1.2). Postcolonialism and decolonialism, including in particular 
ideas of orientalism, othering, coloniality and Eurocentrism, provide theoretical 
insights into cultural and racial relations as well as domination and hegemony of 
certain cultural/ethnic groups over others through representation and discourse. 
They help explain the effects of colonial ideology in the construction of 
contemporary Western media discourses and the existing knowledge on China. 
Therefore, postcolonialism and decolonialism are identified as additional 
conceptual tools to decode and deconstruct the American media’s representation of 
China, and investigate the ways that culture, knowledge and racialised hierarchies 
filtered through the colonial past continue to define the identity formation, 
























Literature Review: Media Discourse and Representation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Guided by an interdisciplinary conceptual framework which combines a Marxist 
conceptualisation of ideology and hegemony, and Foucauldian ideas about  the 
power/discourse/knowledge nexus with a postcolonial perspective (see Chapter 2), 
this chapter critically reviews previous studies on the Western media representation 
of non-Western nations and cultures in general, and of China in particular. The 
chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 reviews critical studies, especially those 
adopting a postcolonial perspective, that examine the Western media representation 
of ‘Others’. It highlights key studies and provides an overview of their findings. 
Section 3.3 extends the review to the field of China Studies, with a particualr focus 
on examinning the literature on the Western media representation of China. Gaps 
in the existing scholarship are identified and the originality of the thesis is 
established. Section 3.4 offers a summary of this chapter’s main arguments.  
3.2 Western media representation of ‘Others’ 
The media representation of China as the ‘Other’ is a key concern of this study, and 
this section reviews the literature on the general theme of ‘Others’ before turning to 
the more specific literature on the representation of China. Cohen and Young (1973, 
p.9) argue that “the mass media are in the business of manufacturing and 
reproducing images. They provide the guiding myths which shape our conception 
of the world and serve as important instruments of social control.” The media, 
which are entangled with a nation’s present economic and political system, do not 
mirror reality in a simple and transparent way, but instead operate to spread “false 
consciousness” as conceived by Marxism (see Section 2.2.1), maintain and 
universalise the dominant ideology, and thus manipulate public opinions towards 
the world. What finally ends up as the “news” is only the result of a highly selective 






process (Cirino, 1973). As Hall et al (1978, p.53) states, news is “the end-product 
of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events 
and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories”. Decisions on 
which stories are covered, and how the stories are interpreted, are shaped by the 
political and socio-cultural contexts in which the media products are situated. 
Through their practices of selection, editing and production, the news media 
determine the kinds of news the public receives about the world, interpret and 
construct reality in a certain way that is consistent with the dominant ideology, and 
thus indoctrinate people with dominant ideas (Connell, 1978, Hall et al., 1978, 
Mahtani, 2001). When it comes to the issue of cultural diversity in a Western 
context, media images reproduce the dominant ideology. As Mahtani (2001) points 
out, minority groups are often marginalised, while the dominate culture is 
reinforced as the ‘norm’.  
 
There has been a burgeoning critical literature on Western media representation of 
‘Others’, which also includes race and minorities, drawing on methods of content 
or discourse analysis, and informed by the insights of postcolonial theory and 
critical media and cultural studies (cf. Hall, 1997, 1999, Mawdsley, 2008, Pickering, 
2001, Stoegner and Wodak, 2016). This body of literature focuses on analysing 
media representation of race and minorities in the world regions, including Africa 
(cf. Hall, 1997, Mawdsley, 2008), Middle East and South Asia (cf. Bullock and Jafri, 
2001, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007, Said, 1978), and Latin America (cf. Quijano, 
2000, Santa Ana, 2013). One strand of this body of literature on relations between 
media and race and minority is devoted to examining the ways in which ethnic and 
racial minorities are represented in Western societies. Here, misrepresentation and 
typecasting are identified as recurring themes (Fleras, 1994, 1995). Marandi (2009), 
for example, points to the misrepresentation of social groups, and argues that such 
misrepresentation is underpinned by deeply rooted racial prejudices and ideologies, 
such as Euro-American-centrism, Islamophobia, and is increasingly manifested in 
subtle and almost hidden ways. More importantly, through such misrepresentation, 
the voice of minorities is silenced or eradicated, which further justifies and 
reinforces the continued oppression of ethnic minorities (Marandi, 2009). 






Research shows that using stereotypes to misrepresent minorities and people of 
colour is one of the ways, in which Western racial domination and hegemony are 
materialised and maintained. Early studies, such as Said’s Orientalism (1978), 
explore how the Western media serve as important means in constructing non-
Western cultures. Said (1978, p.207) explains: “Orientals were rarely seen or looked 
at; they were seen through, analysed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems 
to be solved or confined”. Through this process, large groups of people with diverse 
histories, cultures and traditions become oversimplified into one monolithic, 
subordinate and ahistorical category. Hall (1997) points to the fact that, these 
representations of ethnic minorities and race are deeply rooted in Western 
colonisation and imperialism. Since the first encounter between the West and 
African people in the sixteenth-century – a dark historical period characterised by 
three centuries of inhumane slave trade– popular representations drawing on the 
marking of racial differences have emerged (Hall, 1997). In these representations, 
Africa and Africans are closely associated with negative stereotypical images, such 
as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, ‘simplicity’, ‘lack of cultures’, and ‘nature’, while at 
the same time, the contrasting imaginary of the West is associated with so-called 
‘civilisation’, ‘work ethics”, ‘sophistication’, and being ‘culturally and materially 
advanced’ (Hall, 1997). These binary distinctions, Hall (1997) argues, justify the 
exploitation and degeneration of Africa and black people by Western colonial 
powers. 
 
The repertoire of these stereotypes, drawn from the days of slavery and colonisation 
of what is known as the Third World, has largely continued to exist to this today 
(Hall, 1997). Mawdsley’s (2008) study on British newspapers’ coverage of Africa 
strengthens Hall’s arguments on the continuity of colonial discourses in 
contemporary societies. Drawing on critical geopolitics and textual analysis, she 
examines six UK broadsheet newspapers’ coverage of China-Africa interactions 
from 2000 to mid-2007 to investigate how the newspapers transmit particular 
ideology and portray the Chinese-African-Western relations through the use of 
linguistic tools, such as tropes and narrative structures. Focusing on 230 articles 
collected from The Financial Times, The Guardian (and Weekly Guardian), The 






Independent, The Observer, The Telegraph and The Times (and Times on Sunday), 
Mawdsley (2008) shows how the Brisitsh press transmits ideology by constructing 
a discursive dichotomy of ‘Us’ (the West as the ‘savior’) versus ‘Them’ (Africa as 
‘villains’ and ‘victims’). Mawdsley (2008, pp.518-523) finds that the dominant 
themes in regard to Africa centred on “violent conflict”, “corruption”, “genocide”, 
“authoritarian leadership”, “poverty” and so forth; whereas the West is portrayed as 
a “well-intentioned” and “benign” “saviour” of the ‘helpless’ continent. She argues 
that the UK newspapers’ representation of Africa is congruent with the colonial 
discourse of the “Dark Continent”. By representing Africa and the West in 
contrasting binary ways with hierarchical and moral value attachments, the media 
not only gloss over global inequities that can be traced to, and continue from, 
colonial relations of domination-subjugation imposed by the West on Africa, but 
also justify the West’s intervention and neo-colonialism in postcolonial Africa. 
Mawdsley’s findings resonate with McEwan’s (2008) analysis of development 
discourses concerning Africa. Guided by a postcolonial perspective, McEwan 
(2008) argues that development discourses conceal a racial hierarchy and neo-
colonial ideology by employing the vocabularies that portray African governments 
and individuals as ‘poor’, ‘brutal’, ‘fragile’, ‘failed’ and ‘undemocratic’, which 
echo the nineteenth century imperialist discourses. These discourses and 
misrepresentations disregard the many positive development efforts made by 
African nations and peoples, and hence deny their agency and subjectivity.  They, 
therefore, misrepresent and degenerate Africa as the ‘Other’, and position 
neoliberal capitalism, and by extension imperialism and (neo)colonialism, as the 
only option for African development and global governance.  
 
The linkage between the media (mis)representation and discourse is examined by 
Van Dijk (1989). Van Dijk proposes a theoretical concept of “ideological square” 
to analyse ideologies involved in the discursive construction of the ‘Self’ and the 
‘Other’. According to him (1989), the “ideological square” encapsulates the paired 
strategies of positive ‘we-group’ descriptions and negative ‘they-group’ 
descriptions and functions to polarise in- and out-groups. He analyses the role of 
the media in reproducing racism, and highlights how the thematic structure, choice 






of words, and speech acts are used by the media to construct a ‘positive Us’ and a 
‘negative Other’ to represent ethnic minorities as the ‘Other’. Van Dijk (1989) 
argues that the media reinterpret and reproduce the dominant ideology of racism, 
and thus, construct ethnic minorities in a way that underlies the racist ideology and 
practices of society. With the help of Said’s (1978) notion of Orientalism and van 
Dijk’s (1989) idea of “ideological square”, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) analyse 
the way in which Iran’s nuclear programme is represented in the editorials of three 
American newspapers (i.e. The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The 
Wall Street Journal) from 1984 to 2004. They examine the ideological role of the 
media in their depiction of U.S. policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme together 
with a focus on the construction of in- and out-group identities. By examining the 
lexical choices and argumentative structures of the editorials, Izadi and Saghaye-
Biria (2007, p.151) find that orientalist themes such as “Oriental untrustworthiness”, 
“Islam as a threat”, “Oriental irrationality”, and “Oriental inferiority” are adopted 
to represent Iran as a “threat”. The problematic stereotypes of Iran are rooted in a 
system of representations framed and constructed by forces that brought the Orient 
into Western imagination and consciousness, rather than reflecting essential 
characters of the Orient nations and peoples. Izadi and Saghaye-Biria’s findings are 
echoed in Santa Ana’s (2013) analysis of the television coverage of Latinos in the 
U.S. Following the examination of 118 stories, which deal with Latinos and were 
collected from four networks (ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC) in 2004, Santa Ana 
highlights the ways in which mainstream American media used metaphors to 
portray the minority group, and how this has contributed to negative public 
perceptions. Chavez (2001) combines visual and narrative analysis in examining 70 
front-page coverage of immigration across 10 popular American magazines from 
1965 to 1999. He highlights the powerful role of the media in shaping national 
discourses, and argues that migration is more often portrayed as a ‘threat’ or 
‘invasion’, especially when it comes to Latino migration.  
 
In addition to race and ethnic minority groups, such as Africans, Latinos, Arabs, 
and Muslims, studies on the media representations of ‘Others’ also include 
immigrants and asylum seekers. Critical studies of Western media representations 






of migrants and asylum seekers frequently put representations of race, religion and, 
increasingly, legal status at the centre stage, and form an important part of the 
critical literature on Western media representation of ‘Others’. This body of 
research has pointed out that the coverage of migrants and asylum seekers has often 
centred on negative depictions that reflect deep, underlying racism in the media. 
Pickering (2001), in her analysis of the representation of asylum seekers in two 
Australian newspapers (the Sydney Morning Herald; the Brisbane Courier Mail) 
over the period of January 1997 to December 1999, argues that the news texts tend 
to represent the asylum seekers as ‘problems’. Similarly, Mares (2001) points out 
that asylum seekers arriving by boat in Australia are problematically labelled as a 
‘crisis’. Previous studies have indicated that the dominant themes on refugees and 
migrants centre on ‘deviant’, ‘criminal’ or ‘sub-human’, and ‘illegal’ (O’Doherty 
and Lecouteur, 2007, Saxton, 2003). Boréus (2006) elaborates on the way in which 
language is used to instigate and justify discrimination and construct negative 
stereotypes of immigrants and disabled people in Sweden. He identifies four types 
of discursive discrimination, i.e. negative other-presentation, exclusion, proposals 
towards non-linguistic unfavourable treatment, and discriminatory objectification, 
all of which are used in Swedish media and government reports to assign negative 
traits to immigrants and disabled people, exclude their voices, and form a 
discriminatory pattern in discourses. By these means, the media and government 
construct those immigrants and disabled people as a ‘threat’ and exclude them as 
‘Others’. By identifying certain groups as ‘threats’ to social values, and conveying 
these stereotypical views about migrants through media portrayals and 
representations, dominant social groups and interests justify their harsh and 
punitive interventions, racial discrimination, bigotry and hatred (Every, 2006, 
Every and Augoustinos, 2007, 2008).  
 
In addition to studies which examine the Western media’s misrepresentation of 
‘Others’, another strand of the body of literature on relations between media and 
race and minority is devoted to examining the presence/visibility of positive 
information about non-white groups. Santa Ana (2013), for example, in his study 
of the network television news coverage, finds that the proportion of the positive 






images of Latinos in the U.S. network TV in 2004 is only 0.9%, considering that 
Latinos constitute a proportion of 14.2% of the U.S. total population. Here, Santa 
Ana argues that the underrepresentation of positive images of minorities and race 
in the Western media is in disproportion to the larger share that they represent of 
the population in Western countries. Van Dijk (1989) points out that Western media 
largely ignore racial minorities unless they fit in with the existing ethnic and racial 
stereotypes or prejudices. For example, news reports tend to associate minority 
groups with ‘violence’, ‘illegality’, ‘crime’, or ‘strange’ cultural behaviours, which 
threaten or contradict ‘our’ values and norms.  
 
The existing literature has also examined the effects of misrepresentation and 
underrepresentation of race and ethnic minorities on the non-whites’ sense of 
belonging. As Henry (1983, p.10) points out, “stereotypical images are all 
caricatures of people who intrinsically lack something – who are only half human. 
[…] For non-whites, [this] breeds a sense of inferiority, shame in one’s heritage, 
and lower expectations of achievement”. Media representations, as such, naturalise 
and essentialise differences, produce and reproduce the imaginary ‘positive’ and 
‘civilised’ ‘Us’ versus the ‘negative’ and ‘backward’ ‘Them’, thereby othering and 
reinforcing unequal cultural power relations and domination over minorities on the 
domestic scene, and non-western nations and cultures globally. The 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in respect of positive images serves to 
reject minorities as equal citizens, unrecognise their contributions to society, and 
deny their rights, which further entrenches the invisibility of ethnic minorities and 
reinforces socio-cultural inequality and prejudice in society (Fleras, 1995). Bullock 
and Jafri’s (2001) study of the media representation of Muslim women in Canada 
further confirms this. The researchers conducted a focus group study of Muslim 
women, and found that many of them are acutely aware that their positive 
experiences and identity as Muslim women are constantly ignored in media reports 
(Bullock and Jafri, 2001). The absence of minorities and their voices in the media 
consolidates whiteness as society’s ‘norm’. As Mizra (1997, p.3) argues, 
whiteness […] makes invisible or re-appropriates things, people and 
places it does not want to see or hear, and then through misnaming, 






renaming or not naming at all, invents the truth – what [people] are told 
is ‘normal’, neutral, universal, simply becomes the way it is.  
The absence of minorities’ voices in media representation reinforces socio-cultural 
exclusion and prejudice, and perpetuates the othering ideology and practice against 
ethnic minorities. 
 
The misrepresentation, and visibility/invisibility of race and ethnic minorities in the 
Western media are of great interest to scholars engaged in critical studies. The 
above review of general scholarship finds that current critical research primarily 
focuses on analysing the Western media representation of formerly colonised 
regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as on 
investigating the impact of the postcolonial turn on the production of knowledge 
within the field of these former Western colonies. The body of research, however, 
has hardly engaged with the field of China Studies, which this study shall now turn 
to. China, as a former semi-colonial nation, historically experienced similar 
processes of colonial exploitation, oppression, subjugation and occupation as other 
fully-colonised nations. Thus, postcolonial and decolonial critiques on the 
production of knowledge matter to China Studies. However, studies on Western 
representation of China that apply postcolonial theoretical insights are scarce, and 
this study contributes a Chinese experience and perspective to the postcolonial and 
CDA studies. In the following section, I turn to China Studies, and examine studies 
on the western media representation of China in particular.  
3.3 China and Chinese represented in western media 
When it comes to the specifics of Western media representation of China and the 
Chinese, research has been conducted primarily in the field of 
communication/media studies and linguistic studies. Studies concerning Western 
media representation of China and Chinese could be broadly classified into two 
categories: the exploration of variation trend at the macro-level, grounded in a 
positivist epistemology, and the exploration of media discourse on China at the 






micro-level, grounded in a constructivist epistemology. I now turn to review the 
advantages and shortcomings of each category. 
3.3.1 Macro-level examination 
Exploring the variation trend is an important perspective adopted in studies 
concerning Western media representations of China (cf. Mosher, 1990, Oksenberg 
and Oxnam, 1978, Peng, 2004, Xie, 2008). Studies in this area focus on questions 
as to whether there is any change in Western representations of China over time. 
Quantitative analysis is widely used to examine the number of news texts and the 
proportion of different themes concerning China that is covered in the Western 
media, as well as attitudes/tones (such as positive, neutral and negative) reflected 
in the media reports, and so on.  
 
With regard to exploring the variation trend, one area of interest focuses on the 
effects of the media’s production process on its representation of China in general. 
Specifically, it focuses on analysing how specific institutional constraints on 
journalists (such as performances, lack of access to information, etc.) have impacted 
on the media’ coverage of China. Goodman’s (1999) study of the American media’s 
coverage of China is a case in point. With the help of a quantitative content analysis 
of more than 1000 articles, published in the New York Times and Washington Post 
and about 400 government publications on aspects of U.S.-China relations from 
1985 till 1993, Goodman (1999) compares the American media’s coverage of China 
during the period of the Cold War as well as during post-Cold War years. He (1999) 
suggests that the journalists’ renewed sense of their ‘watchdog’ obligations, 
combined with an increased access to a variety of sources, contribute to more 
‘independent’ coverage of U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War years. 
Goodman’s argument resonates with Evan’s (1995, cited in Freedman, 2000, p.151) 
statement that the Western media need to display “accuracy”, “professionalism”, 
and “civility” with regard to China.  
 






Within this strand of literature, however, the media are ideally and uncritically 
conceived as being part of “an open, diverse and equal clash of interests and 
opinions in a society that shares basic values” (Freedman, 2000, p.150), as well as 
performing a function in liberal democratic societies “through which governing 
elites could be pressurised and reminded of their dependency on majority opinion” 
(Bennett, 2005, p.37). In other words, the media are regarded as performing 
functions of accurately representing reality and being a ‘watchdog’ for the defence 
of liberal democracy. However, the routines of news production are not 
neutral/natural, but shaped by the political, economic and ideological leanings of 
the news organisations, and those of the embedded producers and professionals 
(Schlesinger, 1989). News production, therefore, reflects the views and consensus 
of dominant groups (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). 
 
It is true, as the studies mentioned above demonstrate, that there are specific issues 
concerning a lack of access to information and background knowledge, which 
operate to constrain the journalists’ reporting of foreign countries’ affairs. However, 
this strand of analyses of the production process and professional performance of 
journalists cannot explain why there are commonly occurring biased assumptions 
that dominate the discourse of the Western media representation of China 
(Freedman, 2000). Analyses that remain at this level thus lack any critical reflection 
on how relations of ownership and control of the media can influence media texts 
in their interpretation of events and construction of reality. Moreover, these studies 
fail to unravel the politics, interests and ideology hidden within and beneath the 
Western media. 
 
Another strand of the literature that explores variation trend is devoted to examining 
the effects of macro-level factors, such as the economy and politics on the media 
coverage. This body of literature emphasises the important role of political and 
economic relations between China and the West (and in particular the U.S.), and 
China’s increasing economic prowess in determining the volume, prominence, 
valence and attitudes of Western media’s coverage of China during different time 
periods.  






In her analysis of American news coverage of China, Ting Zhang (2009) employs 
a quantitative content analysis method to investigate the wasys in which U.S.-China 
economic ties influence the New York Times’ coverage of China. Following the 
examination of 15,173 news articles concerning China, collected from the New York 
Times from 1994 to 2003, Zhang argues that with the U.S.-China economic ties 
being much stronger in 2003 than in 1994, the number of positive images in NYT’s 
coverage of China has considerably risen in 2003 compared to 1994. She concludes 
that the quantity and prominence of American media coverage of China are 
positively related to the development of U.S.-China’s economic relations (Zhang T., 
2009). Ting Zhang’s study examines the Western media representation of China by 
measuring their quantity and prominence. Economic factors determining the 
amount of media coverage are stressed without considering the nature of the media 
representation nor a general theory of ideology in capitalist society that affects 
discourses of American media. Similar approaches can also be found in Stone and 
Xiao’s (2007) analysis of the American news coverage of China following the 
dissolution of the former USSR in 1991. They point out that the shift in global 
power, which followed the event, made the U.S. policy increasingly regard China 
as an enemy nation. The subsequent changing political relations between the U.S. 
and China motivated the Western media to produce increasingly negative news 
stories on China (Stone and Xiao, 2007). A critical review of both Zhang’s and 
Stone and Xiao’s studies reveals that they consider political and economic factors 
to be key factors in determining the tone and quantity of the Western media 
representation of China, without exploring the meanings of these representations. 
Thus, these studies often take a Euro-American-centric perspective in that they 
ignore the social and cultural implications of Western media portrayals of China.  
 
Admittedly, an analysis of economic determinants and political relations offers an 
insight into the variation trend of the Western media representation of China. 
However, the producers of media texts have been influenced by society’s dominant 
ideas, which have developed historically and are expressed in the form of various 
codes and myths. The texts produced by media workers interact not just with the 
structures of particular media institutions, but also with the structures and 






discourses produced by government, elites, financial conglomerates, and so on 
(Freedman, 2000). It suggests that examining discourse and power in socially 
constructed knowledge production is vital for the analysis of media representations. 
Thus, examining discourses is critical to understanding hidden power relations in 
the Western media representation of China. 
3.3.2 Micro-level examination 
Examining the way in which the Western media portray China is a key aim of 
studies concerned with the Western media representation of China (cf. Su, 2004; 
Wang D., 2010). In contrast to the approach of exploring the variation trends in the 
media’s coverage of China which looks at the frequency and quantity of media 
representations, this strand of research focuses on the content of news reports. 
Qualitative methods, such as content analysis and linguistic analysis, are used to 
examine news texts, and identify recurring themes and linguistic patterns in media 
discourse. Within this strand of literature, scholars find that themes with the Western 
media perpetuate themes with negative connotations that work to portray China in 
a degraded way. For example, Su (2004), using content analysis, examines 206 
news texts concerning China, which were collected from the New York Times 
between September 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003. Su (2004, p.21) shows that the 
NYT frequently perpetuates discourses, such as China is “a country besieged with 
different social problems” and “a violator of international laws”, in order to portray 
China as ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’. This finding resonates with Di Wang’s 
(2010, p.2) analysis of the way China has been represented in Time Magazine. He 
finds that the media’s portrayals of China revolve around themes, such as the 
“human rights crisis” and the “illegality and immorality of China’s economy”. In 
that way, China is constructed as “autocratic” and “backward” (Wang D., 2010, 
p.21). Both Su’s and Di Wang’s studies have attempted to identify stereotypes and 
orientalist themes that the media have used to portray China. However, these studies 
do not examine the cultural hegemony and power of the West in constructing the 
themes and discourses concerning non-Western ‘Others’ in general, and China in 






particular. Instead they take these orientalist themes for granted. These studies form 
part of neo-colonialist discourses.  
 
Scholars in linguistic studies build a connection between the media representations 
and the linguistic features of texts, and analyse the way in which the media use 
linguistic tools, such as metaphor, rhetoric and narratives, to represent China. For 
example, drawing on Fairclough and Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics, 
Wen Wang (2010) examines 30 news texts concerning China, which were collected 
from CNN’s international website, with a view to investigate the way in which 
China is represented in the American media. Following the analysis of linguistic 
strategies employed by CNN, such as word choice, nominalisation, passivisation, 
and modality, Wen Wang (2010) argues that the American mainstream media 
frequently portray a negative image of China by  framing the news around themes 
centred on ‘human rights crisis’, ‘corruption’, and ‘cheap labour force’. Similarly, 
Yang and Wu (2012) employ corpus-based CDA to analyse the American media’s 
use of language forms and discursive strategies in representing Chinese women. 
Through using key words, such as “Chinese women/woman”, they sift through 
news texts in the New York Times from 1980-2011, and establish a corpus of 
280,000 words. Following the analysis of the  NYT’s use of  linguistic tools, such 
as lexical choice, discursive stylistics, and rhetorical strategies, Yang and Wu 
conclude that American media tend to construct a negative image of Chinese 
women, involving traits such as “passivity”, “poverty”, and “money-worshiping” 
(Yang and Wu, 2012, pp.53-54). Both studies conduct a linguistic analysis of news 
texts, and identify discourse patterns that the Western media use to represent China 
and the Chinese. However, these studies mainly examine the superficial linguistic 
features of news texts without investigating the underlying meanings of the news 
discourses. Studies like these lack a critical cultural perspective, and do not question 
the cultural hegemony and Euro-American-centric power underlying the dominant 
Western discourses on China, and the epistemic violence that the U.S. imposes on 
China.  
 






To sum up, studies within this strand of the literature mainly identify dominant 
themes and images in the Western media coverage of China, and describe linguistic 
features of the media texts. They direct the gaze to the surface and descriptive 
meanings of news texts without investigating the deep meanings of media 
representations of China and unravelling cultural inequality, power relations and 
ideologies underpinning these media representations. Hence, they uncritically 
accept the Western media’s hegemonic discourses on China, and thus perpetuate the 
neo-colonial, Eurocentric knowledge and construct. 
3.3.3 Critical perspectives in studies of western media representation of 
China 
A critical scrutiny of the literature on western media representation of China and 
the Chinese (see Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2) reveals that this body of literature 
is dominated by Euro-American-centric discourses. The historical legacies of 
orientalist, racist, and imperialist discourses still impact on the way China is 
constructed in the China Studies field. While there are occasional counter-narratives, 
such as works by Qin Bian (2013), Yingzhen Chen (2017), Xin He (2012), Sautman 
and Yan (2014, 2016) and Giese and Thiel (2014), this body of research mainly 
concerns itself with re-establishing ‘realities’ or making literary critiques, rather 
than engaging with the theoretical debates. The postcolonial turn (Vukovich, 2017) 
has made little impact on the production of knowledge within the China Studies 
area, except for a few pioneering works, which this section will now review. 
 
The pioneering works (cf. Cao, 2014, Flowerdew et al., 2002, Hier and Greenberg, 
2002, Shi, 2015) within this strand of critical perspectives problematise the Western 
media dominant discourses on China, unravel media representations of China as 
‘myths’, and explore colonial ideologies and unequal power relations underpinning 
such representations. For them, the Western media serve to transmit orientalist 
ideology, producing and reproducing colonial stereotypes towards China. The 
media discourse establish a binary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and construct China 
as the ‘Other’. For example, Hier and Greenberg’s (2002) work on the Canadian 






media representation of Chinese immigrants is one of the few studies that combine 
an analysis of the media’s portrayal of the Chinese with critical media and cultural 
studies. Drawing on CDA and critical discourse analysis, Hier and Greenberg (2002) 
examine the news coverage of Chinese migrants, who arrived on Canada’s Western 
shores in 1999, with a view to investigate how the migrants’ arrivals are 
‘problematised’ and transformed into a discursive ‘crisis’ centred on the constructs 
of ‘risk’. Focusing on four mainstream Canadian newspapers (i.e. the National Post, 
Vancouver Sun, Victoria’s Times-Colonist and the Toronto Sun), they find that the 
dominant themes on Chinese immigrants have centred on ‘criminalisation’, ‘health 
risk’, and ‘illegality’. By using the strategies of objectification and amplification, 
Canada’s newspapers heavily rely on historically derived stereotypes and 
homogenising racialised imager, such as the ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘barbarism’, to 
shape the Canadian perception of Chinese international migrants, and construct the 
Chinese migrants as a ‘threat’ to the integrity of the Canadian state. Such 
constructions, as Hier and Greenberg (2002) point out, evoke anxiety among the 
public, and serve to justify the government’s discriminatory policies towards 
Chinese immigrants.  
 
Qing Cao further analyses the power relations underpinning Western media 
representation of China. For him, the Western media portrayal of China is 
associated with the notion of the ‘Self’. The discursive construction of China as the 
‘Other’ draws cultural boundaries between the West and the rest of the world, 
serving to establish the identity formation of the ‘Self’, and to reproduce and 
reinforce cultural and power relations between the West and China. In his critical 
analysis of the representation of China in British television documentaries between 
1980 and 2000, Qing Cao (2014) draws on narrative and discourse theories in order 
to examine key discursive formations (such as ‘technology’ and ‘progress’), and 
patterns of the portrayal of historical events (such as the Opium War in the 19th 
century) and historical periods (such as pre-1949 and post-1949 China) in the 
documentaries. Cao (2014) reveals that China is represented as a ‘myth’, and argues 
that such representation is underpinned by the West’s self-perceptions and its self-
conceptions of ‘modernity’. Within the framework of ‘modernity’ (such as 






‘rationality’, ‘development’, and ‘democracy), the media portray China as the 
‘deviant’ ‘Other’ that is characterised by ‘irrationality’, ‘undevelopment’, and 
‘authoritarianism’. Using the discursive strategy of de-contextualisation, the media 
ignore the internal historical dynamics and mould a vast and diversified civilisation 
into “a narrow set of ideologically demarcated spheres of consensus and deviance” 
(Cao, 2014, p.202). In that way, the media simplify the image of China and reinforce 
Western stereotypes. Cao (2014) argues that such representation fail to mirror 
‘reality’; it is merely a symbolic domain for maintaining and reinforcing the self-
image of the West, and reproducing the West’s persistent stereotypes of China.  
 
Some scholars from the strand of critical studies are devoted to establishing the 
linkages between the process of ‘othering’ and discursive strategies. For example, 
Flowerdew et al (2002) elaborate on the process of ‘othering’ by analysing the 
representation of mainland Chinese in one leading English Hong Kong newspaper, 
the South China Morning Post (owned by News Corporation, an American 
multinational mass media corporation) during a twenty-month period. They identify 
the composite taxonomy of discriminatory discourse strategies – i.e. negative other 
presentation, scare tactics, blaming the victim, and legitimisation – which are used 
by the newspaper to construct discriminatory discourses of the Mainland Chinese. 
As one of the most pioneering studies, Flowerdew et al (2002) focus their attention 
on the linguistic forms of the news texts and explores the discursive strategies used 
to exclude the Mainland Chinese as ‘Others’.  
 
The discursive construction of a binary between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is 
apparent in Shi’s (2015) analysis of international academic discourse on China’s 
national defence. Drawing on cultural discourse studies, Shi (2015, p.2046) focuses 
on one English research article, published in the international academic journal 
Contemporary Southeast Asia in 2013 and concerning China’s national defence, in 
order to examine the way in which China is constructed as a “regional threat”. Shi 
points out the journal’s use of linguistic tools, such as selection of words and 
rhetoric, in order to denigrate China as a ‘dangerous’ and ‘threatening’ ‘enemy’ of 
the US-led alliance, thereby excluding China as the ‘Other’.  Shi problematises the 






dominant discourses of China, and argues that the portrayals of China as “threats” 
and “dangers” are born, not out of the presentation of facts, but out of the particular 
rhetorical renderings of Western binary thinking and cultural bias, and Euro-
American-centric presumptions of the West as the “guarantor-of-world-peace” 
(2015, p.2046). That notwithstanding, both Flowerdew et al’s and Shi’s studies are 
more concerned with the discourse analysis of the process of ‘Othering’ than with 
the theoretical debates on the othering of the Mainland Chinese. 
 
Even though works as those by Cao (2014), Hier and Greenberg (2002), Flowerdew 
et al. (2002), and Shi (2015) offer a critical voice in challenging the 
colonial/universalist form of the present knowledge systems concerning China, all 
of these studies remain marginal to the overall field of China Studies. Research on 
China remains dominated by Western-centric perspectives. Studies engaging with 
postcolonial critiques, or Marxist-guided CDA analysis, in China Studies are rare. 
Hence, the present study contributes to the current literature on the representation 
of China in the Western media, by adopting a postcolonial perspective to examine 
the portrayal of China in American mainstream newspapers.   
 
3.4 Summary  
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on the Western media 
representation of non-Western nations in general, and China and the Chinese in 
particular. A review of the general scholarhip reveals that current critical research 
is devoted to exploring the way in which non-Western nations are represented in 
the Western media by drawing on postcolonial theory and critical media studies. 
The misrepresentation and visibility/invisibility of race and minorities are two 
major themes that are of great interest to scholars within this body of literature. 
Critical studies find that the media associate race and minority groups with negative 
and stereotypical images, such as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, ‘simplicity’, ‘lack of 
cultures’, and ‘nature’, and thus represent them as ‘Others’. At the same time, race 
and minority groups are ignored and remain invisible in the Western media unless 






they fit in with the existing ethnic and racial stereotypes or prejudices. The 
misrepresentations of racial minorites and the absence of their voices in media 
representations, as critical studies argue, have reinforced socio-cultural stereotypes 
and exclusion, and perpetuated the othering ideology and prejudice against ethnic 
minorities. The review of the general scholarship finds that this body of critical 
literature primarily focuses on analysing media representations of race and minority 
groups in regions, such as Africa, Latin America, Middle East, and South Asia, with 
a particular interest in investigating the impacts of the postcolonial turn on the 
production of knowledge within these former Western colonies. Current 
postcolonial and CDA studies have hardly engaged with China Studies. 
 
Moreover, the review of studies on the Western media representation of China 
reveals that the existing studies on China could be broadly organised into two 
categories: the exploration of variation trend at the macro-level, and the exploration 
of media discourse on China at the micro-level. The macro-level examination looks 
at the quantity and frequency of the media’s coverage of China and is devoted to 
exploring the impacts of certain issues (such as political and economic relations 
between the West and China, journalists’ access to information) on the quantity, 
prominence and valence of the media’s coverage of China. The chapter has argued 
that studies within this strand ignore the important role of the media discourse in 
interpreting events and constructing of reality. The micro-level examination looks 
at the media discourse with a view to identify recurring themes and linguistic 
patterns in the media’s portrayals of China. However, studies within this strand 
focus on examining the surface meanings, as well as linguistic features, of news 
texts, without exploring the cultural inequality and ideology that underpin the media 
representations. These studies lack a critical culture perspective, and in fact 
continue to perpetuate the existing neo-colonial, Eurocentric knowledge and 
construct. Although there are some pioneering works in the field of China Studies, 
which offer a critical voice that challenges the colonial/universalist form of the 
present knowledge systems on China, they however remain marginal to the overall 
China Studies field. 
 







The review has demonstrated that there are considerable gaps in the literature, and 
that the topic of Western media representation of China is yet to be fully explored. 
This study deals with the lacunae in the current literature on China Studies by 
bringing postcolonial perspectives and CDA approaches to the field of China 
Studies, and questioning the accepted ‘wisdom’. By examining the portrayal of 
China in American mainstream newspapers, the study aims critically to analyse the 
ideology and power relations that are hidden in American news discourses, and 
reveal the power/knowledge nexus in the Western knowledge construction of China. 
Moreover, this study contributes a Chinese perspective and experience to the 
general scholarship on postcolonial and CDA studies, and thus broadens and 


































This chapter seeks to outline the thesis’ methodological framework. Organised into 
four sections, Section 4.2 details the rationale for the data collection, and discusses 
issues concerning the choice of American newspapers and time periods. In addition, 
the section explains the reasons for selecting three particular cases for analysis – 
the American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, 
of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and 
of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. Section 4.3 describes the process 
of data selection, explains the steps taken to collect the data, and discusses issues, 
such as the researcher’s access to newspapers. Section 4.4 introduces the methods 
chosen for data analysis. I here elaborate on CDA (Wodak, 2001), as well as its 
relevance to the study. Moreover, the specific discursive strategies used in the media 
to represent ‘Others’ are defined and discussed. Section 4.5 summarises the main 
arguments put forward in this chapter. 
4.2 Rationale for data selection  
The study sets out to analyse news texts, with the aim to uncover the American 
mainstream newspapers’ representation of China. Given the large number of news 
texts on China in the newspaper databases, a sample was selected to form the basis 
for analysis. This section explains the rationale for the data selection, including the 
choice made around the country, newspapers, timeframes, and news events.  
4.2.1 Selection of the country 
The study selected the U.S. mass media for analysis because of the special place of 
the U.S. in the world as a main global hegemon. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (hereafter referred to as IMF) estimates in 2017, the U.S. has the 






world’s largest economy, and China has the second largest economy. Being the top 
two countries in terms of their economies, academics and government officials 
consider the relations between China and America as this century’s most important 
bilateral relationship globally. The importance of China-America relations in the 
world makes it necessary to examine the American media representation of China. 
Moreover, being a typical Western country, the U.S. tends to lean towards 
Orientalism when constructing knowledge on China. As Mawdsley (2008, p.523) 
argues, the “zero-sum, ahistorical, event-driven and rather superficial 
understandings, [and thus representation] of China” as a “threat” widely exists in 
the U.S. government policies and in the public. The Western-centric knowledge on 
China is perceived as a taken-for-granted ‘truth’, and therefore rarely questioned, 
resulting into the marginalisation of China’s voice itself. For that reason, a sample 
of the U.S mass media is selected for analysis with a view to deconstruct the 
Western dominant discourse on China and allow the voice of China itself to be 
heard.  
 
Furthermore, the U.S. has dominated the world media and flow of information. The 
global media market is dominated by a handful of media conglomerates, most of 
which are based in the U.S. (Jan, 2009, Khattak et al., 2012). According to Jan 
(2009), out of the top ten largest media institutions in the world, six are located in 
the U.S., including American On Line (AOL), Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, 
AT&T (U.S.), and General Electric/NBC (U.S.). These six American media 
institutions have regulated the majority of the media outlets and monopolised global 
news services, and in that way manage to dominate the production and global 
distribution of book publishing, films, news, and popular music (Jan, 2009, Khattak 
et al., 2012). For example, CNN International, which is owned by Time Warner, is 
aired in over 200 countries and reaches the vast majority of the world’s population 
(Khattak et al., 2012). The American media institutions distribute and export news 
and entertainment that are produced in the U.S. to non-Western nations, and thereby 
impose American cultures on these countries. As Khattak et al. (2012) argues, non-
Western societies are bombarded with news and entertainment that mainly originate 
in the U.S. American popular culture, such as “American jazz, Hollywood movies, 






American slang, American machines and patented products” has become the 
common cultural denominator for many societies worldwide (Bolton and Olsson, 
2010, p.30). According to Khattak et al. (2012), during the 1990s, American studios, 
such as Disney, Time Warner, and Viacom, dominated global film production. In 
1900, Time Warner and Disney generated around 15 percent of their income outside 
of the U.S. By 2002, this figure rose to 30-35 percent, and reached 25-45 percent 
in 2007, indicating the sheer power that American media institutions exercise 
globally through media representations and discourse (Flew, 2007, Jan, 2009). Jan 
(2009, p.71) considers the global media market to be structured by “an overarching 
framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world”. In other 
words, the dominant strain of global media remains mainly centred in the U.S., and 
the U.S. plays a significant role in generating and directing global cultural flows. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the American media in my research. 
4.2.2 Selection of newspapers 
The study examines news reports in four mainstream American newspapers: The 
New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post (WP), The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 
and the Los Angeles Times (LAT). Broadly speaking, these newspapers are chosen 
due to their large audience, their wide coverage of international affairs compared to 
other newspapers, their geographical distribution and breadth of readership, as well 
as their influence on public opinion, policy debate and other media in the world. 
All four are considered to be elite newspapers (Boykoff, 2007, Peng, 2004) and are 
among the largest media outlets in the country. The four newspapers have large 
circulation (Peng, 2004), tend to cover international news with their own 
interpretations, and are frequently drawn on as a source for other newspapers in the 
U.S. and globally (Ten Eyck and Williment, 2003). The details of each newspaper 
are illustrated as follows.  
 
According to Golan (2006), elite newspapers, such as The New York Times, serve 
to set agendas for other smaller news outlets, in particular with regard to the 
coverage of international events and issues. Moreover, the newspaper is hailed as 






the largest local metropolitan newspaper, as well as the third largest newspaper in 
the country in terms of circulation (Brown, 2012). For example, in 2016, it had the 
largest combined print-and-online circulation of any daily newspaper in the country, 
reaching a daily circulation of approximately 571,500 during any workday 
(Monday to Friday), and 1,085,700 on Sundays (Jr. and Thompson, 2017). The 
newspaper also established an online platform, and it was deemed the most popular 
online platform on the basis of its 122 million visitors per month in 2016 (Jr. and 
Thompson, 2017). Due to its wide circulation and geographical reach, the 
newspaper not only sets the agenda for other U.S. news media, but also exerts 
substantial power in shaping public opinions (Peng, 2004). The Washington Post, 
located in the country’s capital, is considered a “first-tier” “prestige” press (Boykoff, 
2007, p.471). From 2004 through to 2006, The Washington Post ranked fifth among 
the top 100 American newspapers in terms of circulation (Byng, 2010). In February 
2016 alone, it had 890 million digital page views, the second largest among all 
American online versions of newspapers (WashPostPR, 2016). The paper’s 
circulation range and readership demographics are indicators of its power and 
influence in setting political agendas and shaping public understanding of issues 
and debates (Byng, 2010). The Los Angeles Times is a metropolitan newspaper and 
ranks fourth in terms of circulation. In contrast to the other selected newspapers, its 
membership is more diverse (Peng, 2004). For example, nearly half a million 
Asians in the Los Angeles read the newspaper’s print or online version weekly 
(Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001). For that reason, the newspaper covers a wider range 
of Asian affairs (Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001) compared to other daily newspapers. 
Therefore, the newspaper is also elected for analysis. The Wall Street Journal is a 
daily paper offering news, analyses and commentaries that cover business and 
political affairs. It is America’s largest newspaper by circulation, counting more 
than 2.2 million subscribers (Agility PR Solutions, 2016). In addition, the 
newspaper has an Asian edition (i.e. The Wall Street Journal Asia), which publishes 
news and analysis targeted at readers in Asia.  
 
Mainstream media are controlled by a small number of powerful corporate groups 
(Kellner, 1990), which, in turn, influence media production. Bennett (2005) points 






out that media limit their coverage of events and issues to elite views. The four 
newspapers selected for this study are no exceptions. They possess the resources, 
power and influence to shape public perceptions of domestic and international 
affairs (Stokes, 2003), and play a significant role in the construction of reality by 
means of representation and discourse (Hall, 1978).  
4.2.3 Selection of the timeframe 
A general timeframe from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2016 is chosen for 
the case studies. The reasons for the selection are as follows. 
 
Firstly, this period coincides with the first four years of Xi Jinping’s presidential 
term, during which the Chinese economy has made considerable progress. For 
example, between 2013 and 2016, China became the second largest economy in the 
world. The devotion rate of Chinese economy’s to the world’s economic growth 
exceeded 30%, thereby surpassing those of the U.S, EU and Japan, and ranking first 
in the world (Dai, 2017). From the perspective of Chinese people and government, 
this achievement signifies national independence, self-determination, self-
strengthening and liberation from and a farewell to the colonial/semi-colonial 
history of foreign occupation, oppression and exploitation. The growth of China’s 
economy has increased its global presence and influence. 
 
Moreover, these four years have witnessed the efforts that China, under President 
Xi’s leadership, has made to strengthen China’s voice in the world, and enhance 
South-South cooperation. As of 2016, more than half of all President Xi’s state 
visits have been to developing countries. For example, President Xi has made three 
state visits to Southeast Asia, three state visits to central Asia, two state visits to 
South Asia, two state visits to Northeast Asia, two state visits to Latin America, 
compared with only two state visits to the U.S. In addition, China initiated a new 
programme for development, “yidai yilu (One Belt, One Road)” (also known as 
“Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road”), to boost economic 
cooperation and strategic partnership between China and its surrounding 






developing countries. Furthermore, in 2014, the China-CELAC Forum was 
established, and in 2015, President Xi attended the Asian-African Summit as well 
as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum summit in Johannesburg. All of these 
indicated that China is increasingly taking up its “right to speak” for herself and 
keen to strengthen the relations between developing countries in the hope of getting 
voices of non-Western nations heard in the world. Against this background, a flurry 
of reports on China in western media has appeared. Take the Wall street Journal for 
an example, which shows an increase in news reports on China, counting 9868 
reports in 2013 and 12541 reports in 20163. In fact, the number of news reports on 
China in 2016 is at a record high, surpassing those published in any year in the 21st 
century. Therefore, this four-year period is selected to examine American news 
coverage of contemporary China. 
 
It should be noted that since each of the three cases has its own background and 
context, each also involves a different and specific time frame within the wider 
timeline for data collection. The selection and justification of the timeframe for data 
collection with regard to each case is further elaborated in data collection section 
(see Section 4.3).  
4.2.4 Selection of the cases 
This study employs the term “case study” in line with Krippendorff (2004, p.98), 
for whom the term refers to a unit of analysis, which is “distinguished for selective 
inclusion in an analysis”. In my research, within the time period between 2013 and 
2016, three cases – the American mainstream media coverage of the 2014 “Occupy 
Central” event in Hong Kong SAR, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary 
against Japan’s fascist aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 
2016 – are under examination.  
 
                                                     
3 The data is collected from ProQuest (Wall Street Journal) newspaper database, using 
“China” as a keyword. 






This section offers a very brief introduction to each case before elaborating on the 
rationale for selecting them. The in-depth details of each case are mapped out in the 
introductory section of each analysis chapter. Briefly speaking, the “Occupy Central” 
event was plotted by a few western-trained elites, aiming to prevent the 
implementation of the Chinese central government’s policy on electoral processes 
in Hong Kong. The event started on the 26th of September 2014 and lasted for nearly 
two months, during which the elites instigated students and young people to occupy 
Hong Kong’s central business areas in the name of demonstrating for ‘democracy’ 
(see Chapter 5). The anniversary parade was held in Beijing on the 3rd of September 
2015. It aims to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese 
people’s resistance war against fascist Japan’s aggression together with the victory 
against Fascism and the end of World War II (hereafter referred to as WWII), with 
Chinese troops participating in the parade, and heads of state and high-ranking 
government officials from 49 countries participating in the anniversary event (Yang, 
2015) (see Chapter 6). China-Africa relations are related to economic and cultural 
interactions between China and Africa. The development of China-Africa relations 
indicates that China attaches great importance to enhancing South-South co-
operations (see Chapter 7). The reasons for the selection of these three cases are as 
follows. 
 
Firstly, not only are these three cases current, but the American mainstream media 
have intensively reported on them compared to other political or economic 
affairs/events that happened during the same time period in China. For example, 
the front pages of Western mainstream newspapers, such as the New York Times and 
the Washington Post, have covered the 2014 Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event 
between 26 September 2014 and 6 October 2014, i.e. the first nine days after it 
started. Similarly, Western mainstream newspapers have covered China’s 
anniversary parade on the front page of their online platform on the 3rd of September 
2015, the day when it happened (Zhang H., 2015). Moreover, in terms of China-
Africa relations, the year of 2011 saw a notable increase of reports on China-African 
interactions (Bognár, 2012). For example, since 2011, the number of news reports 
on China-Africa relations in The Wall Street Journal has risen to 800, compared to 






only 200 records in 2009. 4 Hence the three cases are selected as a result of their 
intensive coverage by U.S. newspapers, and the subsequent availability of large 
number of news texts on them.  
 
Secondly, all three cases are associated with (neo)colonialism historically and 
contemporarily in different geographical areas, and fit into a postcolonial 
framework. Post-colonialism (see Section 2.3) examines the power involved in 
culture and knowledge relations between the West and the non-West (Ahluwalia, 
2007), and is committed to “a radical critique of colonialism/imperialism and neo-
colonialism” (Prasad, 2003, p.7). In other words, postcolonialism is concerned with 
cultural and racial relations of extra-state rather than intra-state. The three selected 
cases, which involve the historical connectivities between China as a colonised 
nation and western colonialism and imperialism, are linked to the concept of 
postcolonialism. Specifically, the Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event is connected 
to the legacy of British colonialism in postcolonial Hong Kong. The anniversary 
parade is bound up with relations between China and Japan (a former colonial 
power in Asia), and the history of Japanese colonialism and fascism in China. The 
discussion of China-Africa relations cannot be separated from the discussion of 
Euro-America (neo)colonialism in Africa. These three cases, which involve 
colonial powers in Europe, Japan and Euro-America respectively, allow the study 
to examine and question taken-for-granted ‘truths’ and ‘wisdoms’ by establishing 
the historical connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and the 
West’s colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, these three cases are selected for 
analysis. 
4.3 Data collection  
For each case, the combinations of key words and time frames used to search for 
articles are slightly different, because they had to align with the case. The details of 
                                                     
4 I get the number of news texts based on the keyword search (i.e. using “China” and 
“Africa” as key words) in the ProQuest (Wall Street Journal) newspaper database. 






the key words and time periods selected for searching news texts on each case are 
as follows.  
 
For collecting data on the “Occupy Central” event, I selected the period between 
the 26th of September 2014, when the occupiers entered the Civic Square, and the 
6th of October 2014, when the occupiers began to retreat, schools reopened and 
government offices restarted to operate again. Western media and academic 
discourses of the event have hailed these nine days as the decisive stage of the 
“Occupy Central” event. During this time period, mainstream American 
newspapers have intensively covered the event on the front pages of online 
platforms, which is the reason for this period constituting the temporal focus. 
Before collecting the data, I scanned several Chinese and American news reports 
and websites on the event, in order to ascertain which key terms could be used to 
collect news reports. I found that the most neutral term for the event is “Occupy 
Central”. The more subjective terms “pro-democracy movement” and “umbrella 
revolution” were also widely used in American newspapers to describe the event. 
Therefore, the key terms “Occupy Central”, “pro-democracy movement”, 
“umbrella revolution”, “umbrella movement”, “pro-democracy” AND “Hong 
Kong”, “Hong Kong protest”, and “Hong Kong protesters” were employed to 
collect the data. 
 
For the anniversary parade, the seven-month time period was selected as the 
temporal focus, i.e. between the 2nd of March 2015, when China made the 
announcement on starting its preparations for the parade, and the 30th of September 
2015, the end of the month in which the parade was held. Following the initial 
announcement on the parade, the Western media paid great attention to the Chinese 
government and its preparations for the Victory Day commemoration (Zhang H., 
2015). Mainstream American newspapers intensively covered China’s 70th 
Anniversary event during this time frame. According to Hui Zhang (2015), a 
Google News search shows 170,000 records of news reports on the anniversary 
parade covering the period from 1st of September to 5th of September 2015. The 
majority of Western mainstream newspapers featured news about the parade on 






their front pages. Similar to the case of the “Occupy Central” event, scanning 
several Chinese and American news reports and websites on the event before 
collecting the data helped to ascertain the best key terms to use in collecting news 
reports on the anniversary event. While the Chinese newspapers used assertive 
terms such as “the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s war of 
resistance against Japanese aggression” and “China victory day parade” to describe 
the anniversary parade, the American newspapers used more insinuating terms, 
such as “military parade”, “military display” to represent it as “military”. Based on 
this, the data collection process employed a combination of these terms, such as 
“military parade AND China”, “70th anniversary AND China”, “parade AND 
China”, and “military display AND China”.   
 
With regard to the case of China-Africa relations, key combinations, such as “China 
AND Africa”, “China OR Chinese AND Africa OR African”, were used to search 
for news texts reporting on China-Africa relations. The temporal focus was the 
period from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2016. This four-year time span was 
chosen because it captures an increase in the number of news reports on China-
Africa relations. In 2013, President Xi Jinping chose Africa for his first foreign visit 
in his capacity as the president of China. During his state visit to African nations, 
he presented his plans for a cooperation policy with Africa, featuring sincerity, real 
results, affinity and good faith, and thus opening up a new chapter for cooperation 
between China and Africa (He, 2015). The time period chosen for data collection, 
witnessed an increase in Chinese political, economic and socio-cultural exchange 
and cooperation with Africa, which was documented by a flurry of news reports in 
the Western media. 
 
The tools used to collect the data included mainly the online databases LexisNexis 
and ProQuest, which were conducive to sifting through The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal in search of news reports on the three 
cases. Due to the fact that these two databases did not fully include news reports 
from the Los Angeles Times (the databases only included articles from the most 
recent 2 weeks), I also consulted the website of the Los Angeles Times in order to 






collect news articles. Articles from the Asian edition of The Wall Street Journal 
were also included. For each case, all news coverage (including both “hard” news 
and opinions discourses i.e. editorials, op-ed articles and guest columns) appearing 
in the sampled sources over the selected period as stated above formed the basis of 
analysis for the study.  
  
In order to ensure that themes or topics of the media coverage are closely related to 
each case, and to be able to narrow down the number of the news texts to a 
manageable range, all the news reports were carefully read, and a specific set of 
qualifying criteria was applied at this stage. The criteria are elaborated as follows. 
Firstly, news articles, which only had the key words in the headline but the articles 
per se are not relevant were omitted. Secondly, articles that only briefly mentioned 
the cases in passing were disqualified. Using these criteria, only those articles with 
a detailed discussion of the cases in question were included in the data sample. 
Articles, which featured an unrelated primary topic but still contained the key words 
in the main body, were excluded. Lastly, articles that were duplicated across the 
four newspapers were excluded from the analysis. These qualifying criteria served 
to ensure that all included articles concentrate on reporting the events. The 
application of these criteria to the data collection process for each case, generated 
47 news texts for the “Occupy Central” event, 48 news texts for the anniversary 
parade, and 61 news texts for China-Africa relations. In the end, this research study 
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Total number    156 
  
4.4 Data analysis: critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
Underpinned by Marxism (see Section 2.2), the theoretically-informed CDA is 
employed as a methodological framework guiding the analysis. In alignment with 
Marxist critical theories, CDA critically analyses social power, discrimination, 
dominance, and control which are manifested and legitimised by the use of 
language (Wodak, 2001). Accordingly, CDA “want[s] to produce and convey 
critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms 
of domination through self-reflection” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.7). As such, 
CDA chooses the perspective of those who suffer most from dominance and 
inequality, and critically targets the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, 
condone or ignore social inequality and injustice (Van Dijk, 1993a, Wodak, 2001).  
 
Language, which is composed of a variety of discourses, is not neutral but an 
instrument, with which ideology is transmitted and reproduced, and domination and 






hegemony are maintained and reinforced (Wodak, 2001). As Habermas (1977, cited 
in Wodak, 2001, p.2) argues, language “serves to legitimise relations of organised 
power. In so far as the legitimations of power relations […] are not articulated, […] 
language is also ideological”. Ideology serves as an important means of establishing 
and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2009). The powerful elites establish and maintain unequal power relations with the 
less powerful groups by using the discourse in different ways and by controlling the 
access to specific discourses or public spheres. Accordingly, discourses are 
produced and reproduced through representations to naturalise and universalise a 
particular view of the world and to shape people’s perceptions of reality (McEwan, 
2008). Applying the above insights on discourse and ideology to this research study 
implies that American media discourses on China are not neutral, and are produced 
within a certain context. Thus, critical discourse analysis enables us to examine 
hidden meanings, and reveal the ideology and power relations expressed in 
American media discourses. 
 
Critical discourse analysis perceives both written and spoken discourses as a form 
of social practice involved in a dialectical relationship (Fairclough and Wodak, 
1997, Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). On the one hand, situational and social-
political contexts shape and impact on discourses, while on the other hand, 
discourses are considered to be constituting and affecting discursive and non-
discursive social practices (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). To explore the 
connections between discursive practices and extra-linguistic social structure, CDA 
relies on an interdisciplinary approach and the principle of triangulation (De Cillia 
et al., 1999). The principle implies that various interdisciplinary, methodological 
and source-specified approaches are combined to investigate a particular discourse 
phenomenon. Accordingly, this study adopted an interdisciplinary approach, which 
combines CDA approach with a postcolonial perspective, in analysing the 
American mainstream media representation of China.  
 
Othering, which is defined as a critical discursive tool of discrimination and 
exclusion, is operationalised through the mechanisms of discourse and 






interpretation set by dominant groups (Boréus, 2006, Riggins, 1997). Drawing on 
previous critical discourse analyses of othering and discriminatory discourses (cf. 
Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012, Riggins, 1997), 
there are several discourse strategies. These discourse strategies, which are 
operationalised by specific linguistic techniques, are used by the media to reproduce 
and reinforce power, dominance, and discrimination.  
 
Negative Other-presentation 
Negative Other-presentation is regarded as an important form of discursive 
discrimination and a strategy for the justification of inequality (Van Dijk, 1993a). 
Such presentation is achieved by focusing attention on the “negative social or 
cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to ‘them’” (Van Dijk, 1993b, 
p.263). In other words, the strategy focuses on attributing negative and repugnant 
characteristics to the ‘Other’ group, and thus portrays the ‘Other’ as inferior to the 
‘We’ group (Flowerdew et al., 2002). Nomination is one of the tactics of negative 
other presentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Nomination is the “discursive 
construction of social actors” which means that it works to define the social role 
attributed to a social group (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p.95). By assigning and 
repeatedly using stereotypical names to refer to the minority groups, news reports 
stigmatise the minority groups as an ‘out-groups’ (Flowerdew et al., 2002, p.333). 
For example, derogative terms such as Negroes, rather than other neutral words, are 
used to refer to people with dark skin, which denigrates people of dark skin as 
‘Others’.  
 
Negative Other-presentation is also expressed through how people are described 
and what kinds of traits are attributed to them (Boréus, 2006). A semantic choice of 
words is used to denote other groups. Richardson (2007) emphasises the ideological 
significance of lexical choices in conveying society’s value judgments. The 
deliberate choice of words often has a pejorative/laudatory effect as it reveals 
“ideological affiliations” on the part of the speaker (Sykes, 1985, p.87), and reflects 
underlying attitudes, perceptions and judgments from the biased standpoint of 
certain cultural norms or social expectations (Chen, 2008). For example, negatively 






connoted words, such as “poor”, “uneducated”, “ignorant”, or “uncivilised”, are 
used to denigrate immigrants, attribute negative characteristics to this group, and 
perpetuate bias (Flowerdew et al., 2002, p.332).  
 
The use of negatively connoted metaphors constitutes another way of negatively 
presenting the ‘Other’ (Flowerdew et al., 2002). Metaphors carry different 
connotations, and are commonly used to imbue the meaning with a hidden 
understanding (Fairclough, 1989). Goatly (1997, p.5) points out that 
metaphor […] is not a mere reflection of a pre-existing 
objective reality but a construction of reality, through a 
categorisation entailing the selection of some features as 
critical and others as non-critical […] metaphors can 
consciously be used to construct […] reality. 
In other words, metaphors could be deployed to discursively and cognitively 
construct one’s own subjective realities, and shape people’s understanding of a 
situation. They are “chosen by [writers] to achieve particular communication goals 
within particular contexts” (Charteris-Black, 2004, p.247), with the aim of 
persuading others to accept their point of view, drawing attention to, and 
emphasising, specific meanings (Thomson, 1996). For example, metaphors of 
natural disasters, such as floods or big waves, are used to portray refugees applying 
for asylum (Boréus, 2006), which creates an analogy between natural disasters and 
refugees. The cumulative use of these negatively connoted metaphors denigrates 
the refugees as ‘threatening Others’. 
 
In this manner, negative traits are attributed to the minority group by deliberately 
selecting words and adopting negatively connoted metaphors, which will gradually 
result in the formation of stereotypes about the minority group, and fixate the group 
as the ‘Other’ (Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002). Thereby, a degraded image 
against the ‘Other’ group is created, which further leads to social isolation of the 
‘Other’ group (Flowerdew et al., 2002). 
 
 






Exclusion of voices 
Exclusion of voices refers to a process in which a group of people is excluded from 
taking part in debates that are of importance to them (Boréus, 2006). It works to 
deny the ‘Other’ his/her own voice, and deny him/her the opportunity to speak for 
him/herself, which is an essential feature of othering (Gabriel, 2012). Van Dijk 
(1986) describes the denial of voices as silencing. Silencing is a critical component 
of discourses. Johnstone (2007, p.10) argues that “in addition to being shaped by 
what is said, the worlds evoked and created in discourse also are shaped by silence: 
by what cannot be said or is not said”. Silences represent the absent information, 
ideas and perspectives, which are relevant to a topic but are selectively left out in a 
text (Huckin, 2002, Riggins, 1997, Van Dijk, 1986). For example, Boréus’ (2006) 
study shows that in the debate on the sterilisation law which is mainly designed for 
“mentally deficient” people, the voices of the “mentally deficient” people are totally 
absent from any of the discussions. Thereby, the “mentally deficient” people are 
rendered to be ‘intellectually incapable’, ‘subordinate’, and ‘inferior’ and without 
agency or voice. The exclusion of voices is regarded as a form of unfavourable 
treatment in that it serves to disempower a minority group, and functions as a means 
to outcast the minority group as outsiders (Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002). 
 
Scapegoating 
Scapegoating is the strategy of “blaming the victim”, which Wodak (1997) calls the 
“victim-perpetrator inversion”. It refers to the process by which the minority group 
is constructed as causing all kinds of problems, and thus constitue a burden to the 
majority group. Accordingly, the minority group is denigrated as the ‘Other’, who 
should be kept out or expelled. By putting all the blame on the victim or minority 
group, the majority group denies, and even shifts, the responsibility involved to the 
minority group. Thereby, the strategy of scapegoating serves to justify the 
discriminatory attitude of the majority towards the minority group (Flowerdew et 
al., 2002).  
 
The strategy of scapegoating is expressed in the way in which certain actions are 
represented as being related to individuals, with individuals being portrayed as 






actors or recipients of certain actions. Transitivity is a powerful linguistic approach 
in analysing “the content of a discourse in terms of what kinds of activities are 
undertaken, how participants in these activities are described, how they are 
classified and what they are composed of” (Mohamed, 2014, p.90). In other words, 
transitivity probes the way in which language represents a reality in terms of how 
the primary or dominant agents are constructed, what they do to whom and with 
what consequences (Chen, 2008). It serves to expose the ways in which writers use 
language to reflect their perception of reality (Bloor and Bloor, 1995, Halliday et 
al., 1994, Simpson, 1993). Given its focus on the transmission of ideas, transitivity 
can be used to reveal bias, manipulation, and ideology in discourse. 
 
Transitivity is a system composed of participants, processes, and circumstances. 
Participants are expressed by means of a noun phrase, process is realised through a 
verb phrase, and circumstances are expressed through the use of adverbial and 
prepositional phrases. The material process (the process of doing-and-happening), 
being one type of process in transitivity, is mainly adopted in this analysis, as it 
construes the notion of a participant (called actor) doing something to some other 
entity (called goal). By selecting a particular pattern of linguistic structure, the 
producer of a text chooses a specific ideological slant for presenting the world to 
the reader. The discursive choice that a writer makes in terms of describing an action 
has the effect of foregrounding certain meanings while suppressing or concealing 
others. People can be presented as actors or recipients of action, setting out an 
ideological ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. For example, in Flowerdew et al.’s study (2002, 
p.337), Chinese Mainland immigrants are activated as actors in association with 
material processes and goals, such as “led to the bloom of squatter areas”, or 
“causing a rapid increase in population and unemployment rate” in Hong Kong. 
With the help of these material processes (“led to”, “cause”), the newspaper 
deliberately constructs the Chinese Mainland immigrants as causing all kinds of 
problems, thereby putting all the blames on them. In that way, the Chinese Mainland 
immigrants are denigrated as the ‘Others’, who should be expelled. 
  






Another way of shifting responsibility is through the use of passive agent-deletion. 
The linguistic tool of passive agent-deletion functions as a means to manipulate 
agency transparency, which serves to construct a world of various responsibilities, 
and power (Hyatt, 2005, p.48). By transforming active constructions into passive 
forms, the agents in a particular process are elided, and thus responsibility for the 
actions is systematically backgrounded, or in some instances, the responsibility of 
others is strategically foregrounded (Hyatt, 2005). To sum up, by problematising 
issues related to the minority group and putting all the blame to them, the strategy 
of scapegoating works to induce society with fear of the minority group, generate 
panic among the general public, foment a collective hostile attitude against the 
minority group, and thus stigmatise the minority group as the ‘Other’ (Flowerdew 
et al., 2002).  
 
Distortion 
Distortion is a discourse strategy to present a distorted picture of the ‘Others’. 
Decontextualisation is one way of presenting a distorted picture. It refers to the 
process in which an element/behaviour is taken out of a specific context in which it 
was developed and continues to exist (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, Krumer-Nevo and 
Sidi, 2012). Certain behaviours are portrayed as having no reason or rationality and 
lacking complexity. Accordingly, behaviours and occurrences are reduced to 
constituting the generalised features of many, rather than the specific characteristics 
of, or specific responses to, particular circumstances, which further serves as 
evidence for the essential difference between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’(Krumer-Nevo and 
Sidi, 2012). Dehistoricisation is a manifestation of decontextualisation. 
Dehistoricisation refers to a focus on the present, which is based on detaching the 
particular history of an element/behaviour, and ignoring the implications of the 
history (Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). Thereby, dehistoricisation results into a 
distorted understanding of the present situation.  







This chapter has outlined the methodological design that guides the study, and 
presented a theoretical rationale for the approach to data collection. Due to the 
USA’s position as a main global hegemon and its dominant role in the international 
media and information flows, this study chooses to analyse representations of China 
in American newspapers. Four mainstream American newspapers, including The 
New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post (WP), The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 
and the Los Angeles Times (LAT), are chosen on the basis of their large circulation, 
greater coverage of international affairs compared with other newspapers, as well 
as their influence on public opinions and other media in the world. The study selects 
the period between 2013 and 2016 for its temporal focus. During this time period,  
three cases – the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the 2014 “Occupy 
Central” event in Hong Kong SAR, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary 
against Japan’s fascist aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 
2016 – are under examination. This chapter has also detailed the methods of data 
collection. Databases LexisNexis and Proquest are used to collect news texts on the 
three cases, facilitating the selection of a total of 156 news texts for analysis. 
Moreover, the chapter has introduced and explained the CDA approach that 
underpins the research. Guided by the conceptual framework that Chapter 2 
developed, this chapter has discussed various discourse strategies, such as negative-
Other presentation, exclusion, scapegoating, and distortion, all of which are useful 
in analysing the process of Othering. 
 
The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, combined with the methods 
presented in this chapter, will guide the analysis of the three selected cases, which 
will be detailed in the following three chapters.  Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are organised 
around the 2014 Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event, the 2015 China’s anniversary 
parade, and China-Africa relations respectively. These chapters critically examine 
the ways in which China and the Chinese are represented and discursively 
constructed, and uncover hidden ideologies and power relations. In addition to the 






deconstruction of the dominate discourse, the chapters provide alternative subaltern 








Postcolonial Deconstruction of Western Media Representation of 
the 2014 “Occupy Central” Event in Hong Kong 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In 2007, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) announced a policy on the 
voting procedure for electing the chief executive of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (hereafter Hong Kong SAR) which was to take place in 
2017. According to the policy, the chief executive will be elected through a ballot 
by all the Hong Kong citizens (Huang and Chen, 2014, Kong, 2014). Following the 
announcement of the policy, several figures representing the few elites including 
Benny Tai Yiu-ting (a UK-trained law professor of Hong Kong University), Chan 
Kin-man (a U.S.-trained sociology professor of the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong) and Chu Yiu-ming (a Baptist church priest) organised a small group of 10 
people who called themselves the group of the “Occupy Central” on 27th of March 
2013, and declared that their aim was to prevent the implementation of the Chinese 
central government policy on the electoral method. The group planned to obstruct 
the policy by occupying the central business areas of the Hong Kong SAR in 
October 2014 (Huang and Chen, 2014, Jiang, 2014). Since 2013, the small group 
of Western-trained elites have started plotting a series of activities to draw 
international, and in particular western, media attention, and they even organised a 
rehearsal of the “Occupy Central” event on the 2nd of July 2014 in the name of 
seeking ‘democracy’ (Li, 2015). This caused serious disputes and opposition from 
the majority of Hong Kong citizens. On the 17th of August 2014, an “anti-Occupy 
Central” signatory and demonstration were carried out by more than one million 
people in Hong Kong, aiming to fight against the “Occupy Central” plan, to support 
the implementation of the central government policy (Kurata, 2015), and to pre-
empt, as it will be analysed in this chapter, the real aim of the ‘Occupy Central’ elite 
group of annexing Hong Kong from China. Lacking support from the majority of 
Hong Kong citizens, the Occupy Central group made use of younger Hong Kong 
Chinese at middle schools and universities, instigated them to boycott classes and 






put them to the front to occupy several areas of Hong Kong while they themselves 
remained behind scenes. Against a background of increasingly divided public 
opinions and oppositions to the planned “Occupy Central” event, on the 26th of 
September 2014 the organisers staged the “Occupy” event with the students and 
young people starting to occupy the Civic Square of Hong Kong’s central area. On 
the 28th of September 2014, Benny Tai announced the formal start of “Occupy 
Central” event (Jiang, 2014, Kong, 2014). Over the course of the subsequent two 
months, Hong Kong’s central business areas were occupied with some places 
paralysed by frenzied youngsters aged between their lower teens and early twenties 
who claimed that they were demonstrating for ‘democracy’. The real purpose of the 
event organisers, as it shall be revealed in this chapter, however was to restore Hong 
Kong’s colonial status, at least in their imagination, which not only had nothing to 
do with the idea of ‘democracy’, but also was contradicting the very principles of 
genuine democracy5. 
 
It is this headline-grabbing event known as “Occupy Central” that catapulted the 
Hong Kong SAR into the media spotlight in the summer of 2014. Western media 
representation of the event, and subsequent academic discourses, have discursively 
constructed it as a “democratic movement” (cf. Bhatia, 2015, Davis, 2015, Kan, 
2013, Ortmann, 2015). While this construction (i.e. “democratic movement”), 
through hegemonic de-historicising, de-contextualising discourses, has become an 
unquestioned ‘fact’ and accepted ‘truth’ hailed by both the right and left in the West 
as an “umbrella revolution”, the voices of the majority (of both Hong Kong and 
mainland) subaltern Chinese have thus far been unrepresented, silenced and 
completely ignored.  
 
Guided by postcolonial and decolonial theories (see Chapter 2), this chapter applies 
CDA approach to examine a selection of 47 news texts on the “Occupy Central” 
                                                     
5 In his work Human Rights and Empire, Burke (2013) points out that democracy should 
be first of all under the condition of national self-determination and independence. In the 
case of Hong Kong, the prerequisite of democracy in Hong Kong should be that Hong 
Kong has always been part of China and no long been a British colony. 






event (see Section 4.3), and investigate the existing hegemonic construction of the 
event. Following the introduction, the chapter is organised into seven sections. The 
first five sections shed light on the data and expose the ways in which the media 
have employed discourse strategies to construct the event and its associated 
political and socio-cultural processes as a “democratic movement”. In Section 5.7, 
I interrogate the dominant discourse and provide alternative, subaltern voice and 
narratives of the event through historicising and contextualising it in relation to the 
specificities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present. 
Section 5.8 offers a summary of the main findings of this chapter. 
5.2 A binary of ‘democracy’ versus oriental ‘authoritarianism’  
Framing is one way to precipitate the ideological effects of media texts. Media 
frames play a central role in shaping audience’s perception of a given event or issue. 
Through using selected words, metaphors and phrases, the media frames tend to 
reflect a “specific ideology”, and set the “tone” of media coverage (Saleem, 2007, 
pp.134-135). The celebration of the views held by elites’ and denigration of those 
of others are indispensable to the process through which news media manipulate 
the way that readers make sense of the world. In the case of the American 
mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the “Occupy Central” event, it was evident 
that labels such as “authoritarian Beijing” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014) 
and “authoritarian Chinese Communist Party” (The New York Times, 3 October 
2014) were used to refer to the Chinese government. By repeatedly using these 
stereotypical labels to refer to mainland China, the media wittingly stigmatise 
Mainland China as an ‘out-group’. In contrast, the “Occupy Central” event was 
predominantly labelled a “student protest” for “democracy”, and a legitimate 
“insurgency”, rather than riots. Other labels to portray the “Occupy Central” event 
included “pro-democracy”, “democratic fervour”, and “fighting for freedom”. 
Correspondingly, occupiers were portrayed as “pro-democracy activists”. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (hereafter referred to as OED), “protest” 
is defined as “making a strong objection to something, especially a supposed 
injustice or offence”; “insurgency” describes “an organised rebellion aimed at 






overthrowing opposing authority through the use of subversion and armed conflict”. 
It could be argued that words such as “insurgency” and “protest” often contain a 
positive evaluation of the event being described, and therefore construct an 
impression that the event under consideration is a fight against injustice, and plays 
a central role in waking people up and inspiring people’s enthusiasm. By making 
sense of the event in these ways, news organisations function as, what Althusser 
(1971a) calls, the ideological apparatus of the State. By ignoring or suppressing 
terms, such as “Occupy Central” event, and riots, the Western media contributed to 
a situation in which an understanding of the real aim of the “Occupy Central” event 
is limited or reduced to a ‘democratic/authoritarian’ dichotomy. 
 
The Western media’s frequent use of the binary category (i.e. 
‘democratic/authoritarian’ category) in its news texts fostered an impression that 
the “Occupy Central” event was pro-democracy, and those who were not in or even 
opposed to it were undemocratic. The event was recontextualised as a struggle 
between democracy and authoritarianism. By framing the aim of the “Occupy 
Central” event in the language of human rights, particularly the values of 
democratic principles, the media attempt to build the event’s ‘reputation’, and 
redefine it as a “movement” ‘serving the interests’ of Hong Kong’s citizens. 
Moreover, the “democratic” frame not only shaped but also constrained the readers’ 
interpretative paradigm, so that discussions and debates concerning the event could 
not go beyond the pre-set ‘democratic’ frame.  
5.3 Media discourse of a ‘despotic’ and ‘savage’ ‘Other’  
A discourse of difference is often constructed by the media to maintain the privilege 
and hegemony of the ruling class, preclude certain groups from material and 
symbolic resources, and exclude these groups as ‘Others’ (Hall, 1992). Negative 
Other-presentation is a strategy which the media adopt to perpetuate existing 
stereotypes, or shape the formation of new negative attitudes towards dominated 
groups. The deliberate and strategic choice of words, metaphors, and sentences, 
enables the media to stigmatise the dominated groups, and construct them in ways 






that resonate with widely-known stereotypes, thus rendering these dominated 
groups as ‘inferior’. 
 
In the news coverage of the “Occupy Central” event, the media constructed a 
negative image of Mainland China by drawing on a range of Orientalist stereotypes 
and highlighting the words that ascribed negative attributes to the mainland China. 
As such, the media frame a ‘despotic’ Mainland China and categorise mainland 
China as an ‘out-group’: 
(1) Anger with the Chinese government runs especially deep among Hong 
Kong residents in their 30s and younger, according to polls. Younger 
residents feel squeezed by rising housing prices and living expenses and 
lack of upward mobility, and they often accuse the government of pandering 
to tycoons. “I think unfairness is spreading in Hong Kong, and because of 
the political system,” said Edith Fung, 21, a student of land surveying. “I 
don’t want Hong Kong to change to be like China, with corruption, 
unfairness, no press freedom, no religious freedom”. (The New York Times, 
28 September 2014) 
(2) “In the mainland, there’s no freedom; we have to defend our freedoms while 
we have them,” protester Gary Lam, 44, said. (Los Angeles Times, 27 
September 2014) 
(3) Pro-democracy groups and parties have said the Chinese government’s 
proposals betrayed promises that starting in 2017, Hong Kong’s leader, or 
chief executive, would be chosen by all voters, instead of the 1,200-member 
committee of elites loyal to Beijing that chooses the leader now. […] Quite 
a few said they had come to a daytime rally despite parental disapproval. 
“My mom supports me, but my dad opposed me,” said Oscar Mo Hau-chuk, 
a slight teenage boy at the protest, where the police gently herded the 
students behind barriers. “I told him this government is dark, is wrong, 
because it doesn’t listen.” (The New York Times, 27 September 2014)  
The news texts established a discourse of difference between the ‘demonic’ 
Mainland China and a ‘fair’ and ‘free’ Hong Kong (such as “we have to defend our 
freedoms while we have them”). Drawing on Orientalist stereotypes, pejorative 






words and phrases such as “corruption”, “unfairness”, “no press freedom”, “no 
religious freedom”, “dark” and “wrong” were deliberately employed to characterise 
Mainland China, and denigrate it as an ‘undemocratic’ and ‘despotic’ place. 
Additionally, Mainland China was portrayed as “controlling” the media (The New 
York Times, 1 October 2014) and “betraying” its promises. By assigning these sorts 
of negative attributes to mainland China, the media created a ‘degraded’ and 
Orientalist image of Mainland China, formed stereotypes towards mainland China 
and reduced everything about mainland China to those stereotypes (such as 
“corruption” and “no freedom”), which fixated mainland China as the ‘degraded’ 
‘Other’.   
 
In 1997, Hong Kong was freed from colonial rule and the PRC regained its 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. In line with the principle of “yiguo liangzhi (one 
country, two systems)”, Hong Kong SAR was to be subject to the authority of 
Central People’s Government, but would enjoy a high degree of autonomy (The 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). Hong 
Kong’s existing social, economic and legal systems were to remain unchanged, as 
were its way of life, and its status as a free port and an international trade and 
financial centre. The high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong SAR is not full 
autonomy, but it should put “one country” as a premise and be subject to the level 
of the central government’s leadership (The State Council Information Office of the 
People's Republic of China, 2014). In the news texts, the media distorted the “one 
country” principle, and inaccurately depicted the relations between China and Hong 
Kong SAR. Specially, the media portrayed Hong Kong SAR’s administration as 
“beholden to” Beijing (Los Angeles Times, 30 September, 2017). Thereby, the 
media sought to imply that Hong Kong SAR and China exist as two separate entities 
rather than one, and that Hong Kong’s government is ‘pandering to’ Beijing. 
Moreover, by denigrating Hong Kong government and its police as ‘force-oriented’ 
and ‘brutal’, the media furtively insinuated that the Central People’s Government 
was ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’. The news texts used negatively connoted words to 
portray Hong Kong’s public administration as a “despicable” and “brutal” 
government which tends to “use force” (The Wall Street Journal, 5 October, 2014) 






and “deploy tear gas against crowds” (The Wall Street Journal, 1 October, 2014). 
The Chinese government was portrayed as “endors[ing] the tough approach to the 
protests” (The New York Times, 29 September 2014). Through activating Hong 
Kong government as actors in relation to material processes and goals such as “use 
force” and “deploy tear gas”, the media highlighted the Hong Kong government’s 
readiness to adopt brutal measures in dealing with the occupiers. Hence, the media 
characterised the Hong Kong government as ‘brutal’ and ‘violent’, and stigmatised 
the government as ‘atrocious’ and ‘force-oriented’. The discourse of the ‘atrocious’ 
government is further reinforced by constructing a distinction between the ‘armed’ 
police and the ‘peaceful’ occupiers. For example: 
(4) Hundreds of young protesters faced phalanxes of police officers with shields 
whose warnings to disperse went unheeded. The nighttime standoff between 
hundreds of demonstrators and the well-prepared police force came at the 
end of a week of peaceful student protests over Beijing’s limited proposals 
for electoral change, released last month. (The New York Times, 27 
September, 2014) 
(5) Hours after the riot police sought late Sunday to break up the protest, large 
crowds of demonstrators remained nearby, sometimes confronting lines of 
officers and chanting for them to lay down their truncheons and shields. […] 
The heavy-handed police measures, including the city’s first use of tear gas 
in years and the presence of officers with long-barrelled guns, appeared to 
galvanise the public, drawing more people onto the streets. […]The 
confrontation threatened to tarnish Hong Kong’s reputation as a safe enclave 
for commerce, and immediately raised the political cost of Beijing’s 
unyielding position on electoral change here; Footage and photos of 
unarmed students standing in clouds of tear gas facing off with riot police 
officers flashed around the world on Sunday. (The New York Times, 29 
September, 2014) 
Here, the police is framed as “police officers with shields”, “riot police”, “officers 
with long-barrelled guns”, and “officers in riot gear”. Such a framing of the police 
insinuates unrequired aggression. Repetition of the terms “riot”, “riot gear”, and 
“shields” emphasises a heavy-handed approach in the police’s attempts to deal with 






the occupiers, and creates an impression that the police tends to deploy force in 
tackling issues of public concern. Moreover, the media attempt to illusively 
villainise the police through framing the occupiers as “unarmed”, “peaceful” and 
“good-mannered”. This sort of words, which are imbued with positive evaluations, 
are frequently used in American news reports to portray the occupiers. For example, 
the occupiers were represented as having “unexpected strength”, “enthusiasm”, 
“determination”, and “energy”. They were portrayed as being “nonviolent”, 
“assiduously polite”, “clean”, and “with fastidious attention to hygiene and good 
manners”. Attributes, including “young”, “passionate”, and “punctilious about 
obeying the law”, were used to personalise the occupiers. The media placed great 
emphasis on constructing ‘ideal’ qualities of occupiers. i.e., the occupiers are clean, 
polite, and peaceful, and framed the occupiers as ‘innocent’ and ‘nonviolent’. In so 
doing, the newspapers created an ‘attack’ versus ‘defence’ divide, which positioned 
the ‘riot’ Hong Kong police on one side and the ‘defenceless’ students on the other. 
Such a dichotomy underlined the ‘brutal’ characteristics of the police and 
degenerates the police as ‘force-oriented’. By purposefully stigmatising the Hong 
Kong government and its police as ‘atrocious’ and ‘force-oriented’, the media 
evoked long-existing colonial stereotypes held about non-Western cultures, and 
insinuated that the Chinese central government is ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’. In 
addition, through constructing the ‘attack VS defence’ divide, the “Occupy Central” 
event was recontexutalised as a violent incident between the police and the 
occupiers. In that manner, the news texts hijacked the readers’ attention, and 
completely bypassed the historical background behind the event. Thus, the event is 
dehistoricised. 
 
The case study newspapers produce and reproduce Orientalist discourses that are 
deeply rooted in Western cultures, and construct ideological representations of 
Mainland China as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘uncivilised’. The Orientalist constructions 
of the Chinese government consolidate false assumptions and stereotypes 
underlying Western attitudes towards non-Western nations and in particular China. 
Moreover, the stereotypical representations of China operate as “a kind of Western 
projection onto and will to govern over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p.95). A binary 






opposition between the ‘normalised’ West and ‘eccentric’ China is constructed. 
Such a dichotomy debases mainland China as an ‘inferior’ ‘Other’ which should be 
expelled, while justifying the Occupiers’ action as fighting for democracy. 
5.4 Discursive construction of China as a ‘threat’  
Media, through manufacturing and reproducing images and messages, provide 
guiding myths that shape people’s perceptions of the world and manipulate their 
reactions towards certain issues or events (Cohen and Young, 1973). Scare tacit is 
often adopted by media to cultivate and sustain prejudices held by dominant groups 
about certain minority groups, and cast these minority groups as ‘threats’ to the 
general public. Thus, the media generate panic and contribute to a collectively 
hostile attitude toward the minority groups (Flowerdew et al., 2002). The scare 
tactic could also be found in the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of 
China. In the news texts, the otherness of Mainland China is highlighted by 
constructing the country as a possible ‘threat’ to Hong Kong’s public order. One 
characteristic of the news coverage is that a war metaphor is used to frame the 
“Occupy Central” event as a fight between the mainland Chinese government and 
the occupiers. For example, occupiers are portrayed as being “targets” (Los Angeles 
Times, 29 September, 2014), and needing to “fend off” (The New York Times, 1 
October 2014) and “fight” (Los Angeles Times, 29 September, 2014) ‘iniquities’, 
and “defend[ing]” (Los Angeles Times, 28 September, 2014) themselves. The use 
of the war metaphor enables the media to encourage resentment against Mainland 
China as if the latter was an ‘invader’.  
  
As previously discussed in Section 5.2, the ‘authoritarian’ and ‘uncivilised’ frames 
denigrate Mainland China as an ‘inferior’ and ‘deviant’ ‘Other’. These Orientalist 
stereotypes tend to invoke “fantasies related to dirt, danger, deviance and crime” 
(Breen et al., 2006, p.11), and serve to construct mainland China as a rapidly 
escalating threat to Hong Kong. Playing on the frame of ‘authoritarianism’, the 
media forge the illusion that the ‘authoritarian’ Chinese government poses a threat 
to the ‘democratic’ Hong Kong. For example,  






(6) Several politicians and protesters at the demonstration said the government 
might try to clear away the protesters on Sunday, as tiredness took hold and 
the work week approached. Since Hong Kong returned to Chinese 
sovereignty in 1997, the former British colony has kept its independent 
courts and legal protections for free speech and assembly, as well as a robust 
civil society. But many democratic groups and politicians say those 
freedoms have eroded under mainland China’s growing political and 
economic influence. (The New York Times, 28 September 2014) 
(7) Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997, when China resumed 
sovereignty. Since then, it has operated under a policy of “one country, two 
systems”, which keeps its independent judiciary and many freedoms, 
including a robust tradition of free speech. But many democratic groups say 
that China has chipped away at those freedoms, and that the election law 
proposals were the latest, most infuriating example. (The New York Times, 
29 September 2014). 
(8) Lam said there were “credible reports” that the People’s Liberation Army 
garrison in Hong Kong, which has about 6,000 troops, had been put on alert. 
“If the Hong Kong police cannot disperse the crowd, there is the possibility 
of the PLA getting into the action,” Lam said. Such a step, if taken, would 
mark an unprecedented move by central Chinese government authorities to 
intervene in Hong Kong affairs. (Los Angeles Times, 29 September 2014) 
In the news texts, a discourse of ‘civilisation mission’ is used to gloss over British 
colonialism in Hong Kong, and implies that British colonial power has brought 
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ to colonial Hong Kong. The media construct a picture 
of a socio-politically ‘robust’, ‘democratic’ and ‘free’ Hong Kong in the 
postcolonial period, and imply that such a ‘robust’ Hong Kong is the result of the 
colonial ‘civilisation mission’. Such a construction distorts the history of British 
colonial rule in Hong Kong, and overlooks British colonial exploitation, power 
abuse, racial segregation, and land grabbing. The discourse of ‘British colonisers 
bringing civilisation to Hong Kong’ contains a Eurocentric narrative, which regards 
modernity and democracy as exclusive to the West. The West is seen as mapping 
out the future for all non-Western nations and cultures. Here, the superiority of 






Western cultures over non-western cultures is established. With the discourse of 
‘British civilisation mission in Hong Kong’, the media construct a racial and 
cultural hierarchy in which Britain is superior and Mainland China is inferior, and 
Hong Kong ranks somewhere in-between. Thus, the media position Hong Kong as 
part of ‘US’ pitted against ‘Them’ – Mainland China, and reiterate the superiority 
of Hong Kong over ‘backward’ Mainland China. Moreover, ‘inferior’ Mainland 
China is portrayed as “eroding” or “chipping away at”, freedoms, and “intervening 
in” Hong Kong affairs. These material processes carry a negative connotation of 
disturbing or hindering an action or development. The media make vivid 
predictions about various ‘threats’ that ‘inferior’ Mainland China might pose to the 
public in Hong Kong. A dichotomy between ‘threatening’ Mainland China and a 
‘democratic’ Hong Kong is established, which excludes Mainland China as the 
‘Other’.  
 
Moreover, the media justify the behaviours of the occupiers by using Mainland 
China as the scapegoat, and the news texts put all the blame on the Chinese. 
Mainland China and the Chinese are portrayed as causing a range of problems to 
the Hong Kong community; hence the imperative to keep them out. Accusations 
against mainland China and Chinese, as constructed in the news texts, are direct 
and far-reaching as illustrated in the following examples: 
(9) [U]nderlying Hong Kongers’ unhappiness is what they see as an unwelcome 
influx of mainlanders and an unresponsive city government beholden to 
Beijing. Locals in the former British territory, which returned to Chinese 
sovereignty in 1997, complain about a range of issues, including high 
housing prices and a growing income gap. “In the mainland, there’s no 
freedom; we have to defend our freedoms while we have them,” protester 
Gary Lam, 44, said. (Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2014) 
(10) Polls conducted by academic institutions over the past year have indicated 
that the most disaffected and potentially volatile sector of Hong Kong 
society is not the students, the middle-aged or even the elderly activists who 
have sustained the democracy movement here for decades. Instead, the most 
strident calls for greater democracy – and often for greater economic 






populism, as well – have come from people in their 20s and early 30s who 
have struggled to find well-paying jobs as the local manufacturing sector 
has withered away, and as banks and other service industries have 
increasingly hired mainland Chinese instead of local college graduates. (The 
New York Times, 1 October 2014) 
(11) Students have led the push for democracy in Hong Kong all summer, 
tapping into their generation’s frustration over soaring housing costs, an 
economy dominated by large conglomerates and competition from 
mainland Chinese for services such as education and health care. The 
protests come at the start of an important holiday week in China, when Hong 
Kong traditionally sees thousands of mainland tourists cross the border for 
shopping sprees. If the tourists are scared away, it could be a big blow to 
Hong Kong’s already sluggish economy. (The Wall Street Journal, 29 
September 2014).  
The media make use of the water metaphor in order to portray the mainland Chinese 
who came to Hong Kong. Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in the 
references to “an unwelcome influx of mainlanders”. This metaphor constructs the 
mainland Chinese as pouring into Hong Kong at a large scale, implying that such a 
considerable number of mainland Chinese would have a tremendously negative and 
unwanted social impact on Hong Kong’s community. The news texts contain 
various accusations of Mainland China being the source of Hong Kong’s problems. 
For example, Mainland China is accused of ‘changing’ Hong Kong’s political 
system, and also giving rise to income ‘inequality’ and economic ‘problems’ (Los 
Angeles Times, 27 September 2014). The Mainland Chinese are blamed for the 
‘increase’ in the unemployment rate, and for placing a ‘burden’ on public services, 
such as education and health care. In so doing, the media construct Mainland China 
as the scapegoat for high rate of unemployment, structural inequalities, and adverse 
impacts on education and housing. Historical and contemporary political, economic, 
and socio-cultural factors (such as the changing position of Hong Kong’s economy 
in Asia), which contribute to the territory’s problems and the occupiers’ discontent 
are ignored. The existing problems, which are the consequences of the interplay of 
different underlying factors, are recontexualised as resulting from the “influx” of 






Mainland Chinese. The “Occupy Central” event is decontextualised as being caused 
by a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’ – which is, in this case, Mainland China. 
By constructing Mainland China as constituting a burden and imposing a threat to 
Hong Kong, the media misled the public to believe that accepting Mainland China’s 
policies would lead to an uncontrollable situation, in which the interests and 
privileges of the local people are adversely affected. Thereby, the media’s efforts to 
marginalise Mainland China as the ‘threatening Other’ incited panic and anxiety 
among the Hong Kong public, and legitimised the occupiers’ fight against Mainland 
China.   
5.5 Recontextualising the event  
News media is considered as an effective vehicle for disseminating ideologies 
(Hartley, 1982). In order to produce news, which is intelligible to the readers and 
effective in disseminating particular views, the media manipulate the process of 
selecting materials as well as the way of presenting them (Murdock, 1973). Hall et 
al. (1978, p.54) points out that “the social identification, classification and 
contextualisation of unusual and unexpected new events in terms of background 
frames of reference is the fundamental process by which the media make the world 
they report on intelligible to readers and viewers”. Put differently, the need to make 
information intelligible to readers requires the media to situate events within 
frameworks that are already familiar to the reader.  
 
In the case of the “Occupy Central” event, the news texts link it to the “Occupy 
Wall Street” event occurring in 2011, thus presenting it in a very specific light. For 
example, 
(12) Despite adopting a name similar to Occupy Wall Street, the movement that 
began in 2011 with protests against economic inequality, the Hong Kong 
movement has focused on electoral demands, and many of its supporters are 
middle class, with a few from the city's financial elite. (The New York Times, 
September 27, 2014) 






(13)  The gatherings seemed to share some common elements with the Occupy 
Wall Street demonstrations of 2011, which attracted thousands of protesters 
to an encampment in a Lower Manhattan park. As in Hong Kong, the 
Occupy protesters eschewed a traditional leadership hierarchy but forged an 
ecosystem all their own, often organising their own medical care and food 
distribution. (The New York Times, October 1, 2014) 
(14) Police moved in early Sunday to surround the remnants of a pro-democracy 
demonstration as it morphed from a student-led protest into one spearheaded 
by the Occupy Central movement, which took its name and inspiration from 
the Occupy movement in the United States. (Los Angeles Times, September 
28, 2014) 
In the news texts, the case study newspapers detach the “Occupy Central” event 
from its historical context, and recontextualise it within the framework of the 
“Occupy Wall Street”. The relative recentness of the “Occupy Wall Street” event 
guaranteed that it still was both familiar and salient to the readers. At face value, 
the “Occupy Wall Street” event has all the apparent features of the “Occupy Central” 
event – name, street gatherings, people involved and fighting against injustice – 
conjuring up a dramatic image which allows the readers to make immediate sense 
of an ambiguous situation. The news process therefore establishes links between 
situations, which are not based on their underlying structures and processes but on 
their associations with immediate forms and images. Situations are identified as 
being the same if they look the same at the surface (Murdock, 1973). In that way, 
the historical context of the “Occupy Central” event was removed, leaving only the 
immediate image to go by. By these means, the American mainstream newspapers 
dehistoricised the event, and presented it as a ‘fighting against injustice’ for 
immediate popular consumption.  
5.6 Event twisting 
The media is closely related to power structures. Media products do not simply and 
transparently mirror reality, but instead they express the values of the ruling class, 
which turns them into powerful instruments for spreading false consciousness and 






maintaining social control (Chandler, 2016). Selection and omission are two of the 
easiest and most effective ways by which the media transmit dominant ideologies 
(Cirino, 1973, Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Certain stories are exaggerated and 
foregrounded. Stories or bits of information, which are not consistent with 
dominant ideas are played down or completely left out (Cirino, 1973). Hence, what 
finally ends up in the newspapers is only the result of a highly selective process 
(Cirino 1973). Decisions to select items as newsworthy or otherwise have the 
immediate effect of projecting a partial and dominant view of the world, and of pre-
empting the possibility of presenting a full picture of what has happened. The 
strategies of selection and omission are used in American mainstream newspapers 
to perpetuate the dominant discourses on the “Occupy Central” event and exclude 
alternative voices. 
5.6.1 Voice exclusion 
In the news coverage of the event, voices in favour of the “Occupy Central” event 
are magnified, whereas those discrediting the event are backgrounded and even 
silenced. In the news texts, the media employ metaphors and lexical choices to 
exaggerate the scale of the “Occupy Central” event, and frame it as winning 
considerable support from the public. A metaphor of an overflowing substance 
(such as fire, water) is mobilised by the media to frame the number of occupiers. 
The event is predicated as “engulfing” the city (The New York Times, 30 September, 
2014), with the occupiers “filling” (Los Angeles Times, 30 September, 2014), 
“flowing into” (Los Angeles Times, 1 October, 2014), “pouring in” (Los Angeles 
Times, 30 September, 2014), and “spilling onto” (The New York Times, 27 
September, 2014) main roadways. “[S]welling” occupiers (The New York Times, 28 
September, 2014) “storm” into the streets (The New York Times, 1 October, 2014) 
and are “clogging”  (Los Angeles Times, 29 September, 2014) and “choking off”  
( The Wall Street Journal, 30 September, 2014) parts of central Hong Kong. With 
the help of these metaphors, the media concretise the event into a tide, flood or fire, 
and exaggerate the number of people who participated in what seemed to be a large-
scale activity. The discourse of the ‘large-scale’ and ‘widely-supported’ event is 






repeatedly reproduced in the news texts, embedding such a representation as a ‘truth’ 
and ‘fact’. 
 
In reality, however, the “Occupy Central” event, with young students as its main 
participants and the western trained elites as behind-the-scene organisers, 
engendered serious disputes and opposition from the majority of Hong Kong 
citizens (Huang and Chen, 2014). During the time period when the “Occupy Central” 
event was staged, an “anti-Occupy Central” signature campaign and march was 
carried out, gathering about two million signatures and more than 190,000 
participants in Hong Kong, aiming to support the implementation of the PRC’s 
policy on the election of the chief executive in 2017 (Yin, 2014). This shows Hong 
Kong residents’ strong rejection of the planned “Occupy” activities, and indicates, 
as Kurata (2015) suggests, a lack of popular support among the majority of Hong 
Kong people. However, the American mainstream media have completely ignored 
the “anti-Occupy Central” campaign and demonstration, despite their scale and 
impact, as these did not fit the media’s Orientalist ideology and agenda when 
representing the ‘Other’. Exaggerating the scale of the “Occupy Central” event, and 
deselecting and silencing the “anti-Occupy Central” petition and demonstration 
enabled the Western media to construct the “Occupy Central” event as being 
overwhelmingly ‘popular’ in Hong Kong. It is argued therefore that what becomes 
news and what does not have, in the first place, been filtered with coloured lens, 
and determined by the hidden ‘rules’ and unwritten policies of media organisations, 
which, in the U.S. (as in many other western countries) tend to be controlled by 
practices of ‘professionals’ deeply embedded in ethnocentric values, norms and 
cultural prejudice (and ignorance).  
5.6.2 Information exclusion 
Critical media theories point out that the routine of news production is biased, and 
constrained by political, economic and ideological factors (Schlesinger, 1989). The 
mass media perform their job of “clouding people’s mind” with ideas that the ruling 
class wishes them to have (Berger, 2005). Different apparatuses are structurally 






linked to promote the dominant definitions of events. At the same time, sources that 
generate counter-definitions of the events are considered to be irrelevant. In so 
doing, an ideological closure – the prevailing ideology – is maintained (Hall et al., 
1977). Sources that generate counter-definitions of the events are often played 
down or ignored in the press. 
 
In the case of the “Occupy Central” event, while western media rushed to take the 
opportunity to interpret and construct the “Occupy Central” as a “democratic” 
“Umbrella Revolution” (cf. Ortmann, 2015, Veg, 2015), which could trigger 
imaginaries of other “regime-change” “revolutions”, the news sources that provided 
a counter definition of the event were entirely left out in the media coverage of the 
event. For example, the “Occupy Central” participants waved the former Empire 
flag in the name of ‘democracy’. They even openly called for a historical regression 
with Hong Kong ‘re-joining’ Britain under the terms of the 1842 Nanjing Treaty – 
the first unequal treaties– imposed on China by the colonial Empire following the 
Opium War in 1840. The participants also played the British national anthem and 
visited the British Consulate General in Hong Kong for backup (Figures 5.1-5.3). 
Such news sources reveal the colonialist nature of the event, which undermines the 
dominant interpretation of the event as a “democratic movement”. By suppressing 
or ignoring the sources that reflect the colonialist nature of the event, the media 
achieved an ideological closure, and maintained the dominant discursive 
construction of the “Occupy Central” (i.e. “democratic movement”) as an 
unquestioned ‘truth’. 
 







Figure 5.1 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: late 2014 the “Umbrella 
Revolution” participant openly waved the Empire flag seeking backup from the 
colonial/neo-colonial powers 
Source:  (EJ Insight, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: late 2014 the “Umbrella 
Revolution” ‘activists’ openly called for a historical regression with Hong Kong ‘re-
joining’ Britain under the Nanjing Treaty 
Source: (Xinhua News Agency, 2014).  







Figure 5.3 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: organisers visited the 
British Consulate General in Hong Kong seeking backup from the former colonial 
power 
Source: (Molihua Organisation, 2014). 
5.7 The Subaltern voice: historicisation of the event  
The mass media and popular culture are centrally important in spreading false 
consciousness, and leading people to believe that “whatever is, is right” (Berger, 
2014, Marx and Engels, 1976, Stokes, 2003). The mass media and popular culture 
form crucial links between the institutions of a society (and the superstructure in 
general) and individual consciousness, and are considered to be tools for 
manipulating people (Marx, 1976, Marx and Engels, 1976). By advancing some 
narratives and meanings at the expense of others, the media texts reflect the 
dominant modes of thinking or believing that permeate a society, and define the 
status quo of ‘common sense’. In the case of the newspaper coverage of the 
“Occupy Central” event, American mainstream newspapers dehistoricise the event 
and discursively construct the event into a ‘democratic movement’ by discursively 
constructing mainland China as an ‘authoritarian’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’, and 
ignoring certain aspects that reflected the colonial nature of the event. So, the 
question is whether the event was really a “democratic movement”? What would 
the event look like if we historicise it within the context of Hong Kong’s colonial 






past and postcolonial present? What is the real purpose of the “Occupy Central” 
elites? This section provides an alternative understanding of the event by taking 
into consideration the historical context of Hong Kong.  
 
Since the early 16th century, which was marked by an accelerating globalisation of 
capitalism, the British Empire, driven by economic and political ambitions (such as 
seeking expanded and cheaper sources of raw materials and finding new markets 
overseas), increasingly expanded its colonial efforts to the New World, aggressively 
plundering land, and massively exploiting labour and resources in the colonies, 
such as plantation system, slave trade, territorial annexation etc.(Potter et al., 2004). 
The British colonisation of Hong Kong in 1842 was not an exception. In order to 
open the Chinese market for imperial trade in opium, the British Empire started the 
First Opium War in 1839 which ‘opened the door’ of China by force, and imposed 
the first unequal treaty – the Treaty of Nanjing – on China in 1842 whereby the 
British colonial powers annexed Hong Kong Island (Carroll, 2007, Chan, 1996). A 
couple of decades later, in 1860, the second unequal treaty – the Treaty of Beijing 
– was imposed by the British Empire on China following the Second Opium War 
(1856 –1860), whereby the British colonial power took the Kowloon Peninsula 
from China (Chan, 1996). In the late 19th century, following the footprint of 
Japanese Imperialist power’s invasion of China between 1894 and 1895, Western 
imperialist powers such as Russia, Germany, France, Britain etc., came to China 
one after another and competed to carve up and occupy the territory of China. In 
the ‘carnival’ of the imperialist powers dividing and looting China in late 19th 
century, the British colonial powers imposed yet another unequal convention – the 
Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory – on China by force in 1898, 
and annexed the New Territories (north of the Kowloon Peninsula). Following these 
three milestone treaties, the British Empire brought Hong Kong into its imperial 
domain.  
 
When dealing with the history of Hong Kong, Henry John Temple, the British 
Foreign Secretary in 1841, described Hong Kong as “a barren island, which will 
never be a mart of trade” (Chan, 1993, p.457). Chan (1993, p.457) notes that “every 






British official and semi-official narration of Hong Kong history in the last century 
and a half has repeated one or another version of the ‘barren island’ remark”. 
Similarly, both the popular and academic discourses of the West deliberately 
downplay the colonial history of Hong Kong, along with the socio-economic, 
political, cultural and racial consequences of Britain’s colonial, and instead 
frequently reproduce the dominant colonial narrative that Hong Kong’s history 
began with the coming of the British in 1842, which is then constructed as a history 
of a benevolent governance and good policy of the colonial ‘civilising state’ (Ngo, 
1999, Woronoff, 1980). A compelling example of this kind of historical narrative is 
Robson’s (1992, p.1) The Potent Poppy, which announces on its cover that 
“[c]lippers laden with opium launched a golden age of adventure, trade and 
treachery for merchants and mandarins – and shaped the glittering prize of Empire: 
Hong Kong”. Such a narrative whitewashed, at a global scale, the brutality of 
colonialism and imperialism, the historical crimes that the invaders committed 
against the natives, colonised people of colour and their economies, societies, 
cultures and indigenous knowledges (Escobar, 2007, Grosfoguel, 2004, Lee et al., 
2015, Quijano, 2000, Quijano, 2007). By referring to Hong Kong in particular, such 
a colonial discourse has helped to construct British colonialism as a ‘transforming 
agent’, which brought ‘morality’, ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernity’ to an ‘uncivilised’ 
people, namely the HK Chinese, and turned the “barren-rock-island’ into a 
‘capitalist paradise” (Carroll, 2005, p.7, Ngo, 1999, p.120).  
 
However, when studying the history of Hong Kong, it becomes apparent that the 
British colonial powers had looted almost 473 million taels of silver from China in 
the name of ‘indemnity’ through unequal treaties: the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing 
(according to which 21 million yinyuan, amounting to 14.7 million tales of silver 
were looted from China), the 1860 Treaty of Beijing (according to which 8 million 
taels of silver were looted from China), and the 1901 Boxer Protocol (according to 
which 450 million tales of silver were looted from China). The so-called ‘indemnity’ 
stands out for its sheer size: based on the exchange rates at the time, 473 million 
taels equalled US$352 million gold dollars or GBP £63m (Esherick, 1987). 
Moreover, after the British Empire annexed Hong Kong, the colonial state 






undertook action to maintain a trade-dominated economy at the expense of 
industrial development in Hong Kong. The official accounts of Hong Kong’s 
economic history made little mention of the development of the manufacturing 
industry (Ngo, 1999). In the colonial period, British-owned enterprises controlled 
almost all the trading and their related businesses. Only manufacturing industry was 
left to the native Chinese. The entire colonial administration was designed and set 
up to facilitate trade. Any tariff or market protection measure which could have 
propelled industrial growth, was rejected for fear of creating trade barriers that 
would harm the interests of the British-owned trade enterprises. The colonial office 
rejected any request for assistance to the Hong Kong’s industry including “training 
facilities, developing industrial estates, selective subsidies, and improvements in 
the credit and banking system”, in order to prevent colonial competition with 
British industries (Ngo, 1999, pp.130-132). The resulting economic structure and 
policies, which favoured the interests of the British-related trade enterprises, 
engendered a metropolis-satellite relationship between the British colonial powers 
and colonial Hong Kong. Colonial Hong Kong served as an instrument for the 
colonial powers to suck capital and economic surplus out of both Hong Kong and 
Mainland China’s markets. The metropolis-satellite relationship served to maintain 
the exploitative relationship between the British and colonial Hong Kong, and the 
British colonial powers were able to promote their own development and enrich 
their ruling classes (Frank, 1966). As Joseph Esherick (1987) points out, 
colonialists advanced their own economic and political interests, including 
exploitation, territorial expansion, socio-cultural and racial domination and 
oppression of the indigenous people, which turned them into the agents of the 
imperialist states. Colonial encounters should not simply be regarded as “part of the 
process of ‘modernisation’” (Liang H., 2015, p.231). For Hong Kong, colonial 
discourses that highlight the ‘contributions’ of Britain to the modernisation of Hong 
Kong obscure the colonial realities of British imperialism in Hong Kong. Political 
and socio-cultural institutions, such as the educational system, language, 
knowledge systems etc. were established to universalise Western ideologies and 
justify a highly hierarchical socio-cultural structure in Hong Kong.   
 






During the colonial period, the colonial power ruled Hong Kong by means of a 
governmental system that included Governor, an Executive Council and a 
Legislative Council. According to the Letters Patent, which was issued by the 
British Empire on April 1843, Hong Kong was run by a governor, who was directly 
appointed by the British Crown (Carroll, 2007). The governor is “the single and 
supreme authority” of the colony (Miners, 1987, p.43). Miners (1987, p.43) 
commented on the highly dictatorial power of the governor as below: 
[w]ithin the colony the Governor was, and is, the head of the 
administration and all officials were bound to obey his instructions. He 
was obliged to consult with his Executive Council on all major policy 
decisions, but […] he was fully entitled to disregard the Council’s 
advice if he thought fit. The Legislative Council made laws for the 
colony, but more than half the members consisted of officials who were 
bound to vote as he directed. […] The Governor thus had virtually 
complete control of the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  
Clearly, in colonial Hong Kong, the British Empire established and entrenched its 
imperialist rule and domination over the colonised by directly appointing the 
governor who possessed absolute and authoritarian power, or in the words of 
Alexander Grantham, the governor of Hong Kong between 1947-1957, “in a Crown 
Colony the Governor is next to the Almighty” (Miners, 1987, p.43). The Hong 
Kong Chinese suffered under the colonial powers’ despotic dictatorship, and were 
deprived of any form of political power, their rights to elect the governor or defend 
their interests, freedom of the press. In other words, democracy was absent 
throughout the 150 years of the colonial rule. 
 
Hall (1981) discusses how imperialism operates in the colonies. According to Hall 
(1981, p.38), the idea of race is one of the fundamental axe underpinning colonial 
conquests, economic exploitation and imperialism, delineating the way in which 
“the [colonial] races have stood in relation to the ‘native people’ of the colonised”. 
The colonisers used race, which originated in the phenotypic differences between 
the colonisers and the colonised, to essentialise the differences between the two 






groups, situating the colonised as ‘inferior’ to the colonisers, and justifying their 
exploitation in the colonial conquest (Quijano, 2000). In Hong Kong, the imperialist 
domination was also cast in racial terms. British imperialism in the late nineteenth 
century was characterised by racial discrimination and segregation. The Hong Kong 
Chinese were racialised by the British colonisers as a ‘source of moral 
contamination’, and characterised by ‘moral defects’ (Law, 2009, Ngo, 1999). The 
Colonial Secretary Henry Laboucher’s words effectively capture this phenomenon: 
“[W]ith perhaps a few honourable exceptions, the Chinese of Hong Kong, like most 
members of the Chinese race, were very deficient in the most essential elements of 
morality” (Tsang, 1995, p.65). This kind of racialisation rendered phenotypic 
differences between white colonisers and the non-white native Chinese to be at the 
root of ‘inherent’ socio-cultural differences between the colonisers and the 
colonised, and imposed stereotypical qualities on the non-white native Chinese. In 
this manner, the colonisers created a boundary between ‘normal’ Europeans and 
‘abnormal’ Hong Kong Chinese, established racial superiority, and justified the 
racial segregation, hierarchical order and colonial brutalities of colonial Hong Kong.  
 
Hong Kong’s colonial society was characterised by a highly racialised hierarchy, 
which considered the white Europeans as superior to and strictly segregated from, 
the ‘inferior’ coloured native population (Eitel, 1895, Leonard, 2010, Wu, 1999). 
With regard to political institutions, the colonisers excluded native Chinese from 
the Executive Council and Legislative Council (Carroll, 2007, Wang, 1997). Later, 
in order to be able to exercise control over the native Chinese, alleviate anti-colonial 
sentiments, and ensure the allegiance of the colonised Hong Kong Chinese to the 
colonial powers, the British colonisers began to appoint several of Hong Kong 
Western-trained Chinese elite. However, the colonial powers never included these 
Western-trained members of the Chinese elite in their core circle of power. For 
example, in1880 Wu Tingfang was appointed to the Legislative Council as an 
unofficial member, following 40 years of British colonial control (Miners, 1987, 
Wang, 1997). Those members of the Western-trained Chinese elite who identified 
themselves with the colonial powers seldom spoke up for the colonised Hong Kong 
Chinese (Law, 2009). The majority of Hong Kong’s Chinese never enjoyed any 






right to being politically represented. Those members of the Western-trained 
Chinese elite, who identified themselves with the colonial powers, were considered 
to be superior to the broad masses of colonised Chinese, which contributed to 
ingraining a highly racialised hierarchy in colonial Hong Kong.  
 
Extending its policy of segregation also to the educational sector, the colonial 
government forced the Hong Kong Chinese and the Europeans to attend separate 
schools. This separation further reinforced the Europeans’ racial discrimination 
towards the non-white native Chinese. The 1902 Report of the Committee on 
Education evidences this discrimination in the most racist language: 
[t]he Education of the European children suffers very much from the 
fact that Europeans and Asiatics are mixed, and the European children 
had to be educated side by side in the same class with large numbers of 
Asiatics […] But the Chinese boys in the schools are numbered by 
thousands, large numbers of whom, be it noticed, come from the 
mainland, and are in no way connected with the colony; and the 
ordinary standards of truth, honour and morality amongst the masses of 
the Chinese people undeniably differ very widely from our European 
standards […] Constant contact with Chinese, both in class-room and 
play-ground must affect the formation of the character of the European 
boy (cited in Law, 2009, p.51). 
Clearly, the report denigrated the Mainland Chinese as the source of ‘moral 
contamination’. The colonial government went as far as to bar schools from 
enrolling native Chinese children, even if these schools had been set up by the Hong 
Kong Chinese themselves. In 1902, the colonial government forced the Kowloon 
school to only enrol European students, even though it originally had been built by 
the Hong Kong Chinese Ho Tung, who had intended it to be an English school open 
to all races (Carroll, 2005).  
 
The segregation between the Hong Kong Chinese and the Europeans not only 
solidified in government institutions and education, but also ubiquitously 
permeated every aspect of the colony’s social life (Endacott, 1973, Tsang, 2007). 






The Hong Kong Chinese lived as second-class citizens throughout the colonial rule 
of British. The colonial government passed various ordinances, which were 
designed to discriminate Chinese and deprive them of freedom. The institution of 
curfew was the most typical one. In October 1842, the colonial government issued 
a proclamation prohibiting all Chinese citizens, except for watchmen, from walking 
in the streets after 11:00 pm (Carroll, 2007). Later, in 1857, the ordinance of curfew 
required the Chinese to carry night passes after dawn, which had to be issued by the 
superintendent of the police. Moreover, the ordinance also allowed any European  
[…] acting as Sentry or Patrol at any time between the hour of Eight in 
the evening and sunrise to fire upon, with intent or effect to kill, any 
Chinaman whom he shall meet with or discover abroad and whom he 
shall have reasonable ground to suspect of being so abroad for an 
improper purpose, and who being challenged by him shall neglect or 
refuse to make proper answer to his challenge (Munn, 2001, p.285). 
The ordinance’s stipulation gave the Europeans the prerogative to dispose of the 
native Chinese at will. In 1896, more than 3488 Chinese were arrested on the basis 
of the curfew ordinance (Munn, 2001). The ordinance, which legitimised the 
Europeans’ discrimination towards native Chinese, greatly violated the freedom of 
Hong Kong’s Chinese. The so-called ‘freedom’ that Hong Kong stood for was never 
extended to the Chinese. The ordinance epitomised the colonial brutality, the racial 
discrimination and the unequal treatment that the Hong Kong Chinese experienced. 
When it came to leisure activities, none of the major European clubs admitted the 
Chinese, and Chinese citizens were not permitted to hold public meetings. The City 
Hall museums and libraries, which were open to the Europeans at any time, had 
special opening times for Hong Kong’s colonised Chinese (Carroll, 2005, Carroll, 
2007). The labour market was contingent on race, and thus only few employment 
opportunities were available for the Chinese. From the late nineteenth century 
onwards, the colonial powers granted superior status to a growing number of British 
and other European expatriates, which allowed them to fill the new and various 
posts in governance organisations, thereby further entrenching hegemonic 
dominance (Leonard, 2010). For example, senior positions in Hong Kong’s civil 
service (particularly, the Government Secretariat, the Legal Department, the 






Judiciary, the Police, and Departments related to buildings, engineering and lands), 
were manned almost entirely with British expatriates (Gaylord and Traver, 1995). 
The expatriates were hired to do jobs that could easily be done by the native Chinese. 
By 1990, 60% of the most senior staff in the Police still counted expatriates 
(Gaylord and Traver, 1995). Even as late as 1997, some 23% of the top 1130 
positions in the civil service directorate were held by expatriates (Potter et al., 2004, 
p.77). 
 
The racial discrimination and segregation were also reflected in spatiality. European 
businesses and residences claimed the better land and left the small huts for the 
Hong Kong Chinese to dwell in. The colonial government even enacted laws to 
preserve the racial segregation in spatiality. The 1904 Peak District Reservation 
Ordinance reserved the Peak (the exclusive hill district on Hong Kong Island) for 
European-style houses and European residents. No Chinese, except for servants, 
were allowed to live in the Peak. The racial segregation in the Peak was well 
described by Carroll (2005, p.90),  
[c]omplete with convenient facilities such as its own station and water 
supply which was pumped from below, the Peak had all the features of 
a quaint English town – English-style homes and villas, clubs, a hotel, 
a hospital, and an Anglican church – connected to the city below by the 
Peak Tran which opened in May 1888. No Chinese, except for the 
servants, cooks, and drivers in their special uniforms, were to live there. 
The colonial government’s efforts to separate the Hong Kong Chinese from the 
Europeans in terms of government institutions, education, social life and spatial 
areas testified to the colonial structure’s deep-seated racial discrimination (Carroll, 
2005). Kennedy (1987, p.189) argues that “the power to shape and control social 
identity, to determine the distinctions between [the white community] and others, 
was crucial to [the white community’s] predominance”. The colonisers established 
the racial segregation between the colonisers and the colonised Hong Kong Chinese 
in order to fix the boundaries between the white British/Europeans and the non-
white native Chinese, and justify a racial hierarchy in which the white colonisers 
were superior and the non-white native Chinese were inferior. The Chinese’s 






racialised socio-cultural segregation from the European communities persists well 
into the twentieth century after the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong 
in 1997. According to Wang et al. (2013), racialised spatial segregation continues 
to exist in contemporary Hong Kong, with British and other Western expatriates 
occupying prestigious residential areas at the higher end of the price scale. Places 
like Mid-level and Lan Kwai Fong where the former colonisers used to live their 
lives of privilege, are now populated mostly by British and other Western 
expatriates. The expatriate communities show no interest in learning the local 
language or mixing with the local Chinese population, and instead form a “society 
in the society” (Wang et al., 2013, p.80). Although the colonial era has long ceased, 
the racialised socio-cultural hierarchy continues. 
 
Quijano (2000) points out that based on the idea of race, a cultural system around 
Eurocentric hierarchy is established to naturalise the colonial relations between 
Europeans and non-Europeans, and strengthen cultural hegemony and racial 
hierarchy in the colonies. Raponi (2014) clarifies that cultural imperialism is a 
complex cultural hegemony, which is capable of exporting the most fundamental 
Western ideas and concepts in the name of promoting ‘civilisation’. For Hong Kong, 
British imperialism was not confined to a territorial conquest. British colonisers 
have paid considerable attention to the cultural aspects of imperialism. The cultural 
imperialist idea was effectively captured by a writer in the Edinburgh Review in 
1850 (cited in Eldridge, 1973, p.238): 
[i]t is a noble work to plant the foot of England and extend her spectre 
by the banks of streams unnamed, and over regions yet unknown – and 
to conquer, not by the tyrannous subjugation of inferior races, but by 
the victories of mind over brute matter and blind mechanical obstacles. 
A yet nobler work it is to diffuse over a few created worlds the laws of 
Alfred, the language of Shakespeare, and the Christian religion, the last 
great heritage of man. 
These discourses highlight the ‘contribution’ of the British colonisers to the 
civilisation of the Hong Kong Chinese. This notion of the ‘civilising mission’, as 
the subsequent discussion will reveal, serves to mask the colonial exploitation and 






brutality, and cannot not simply be regarded as part of ‘modernisation’. The British 
‘civilising mission’ has been the footprint of the British Empire’s expansion.  
 
During the middle of nineteenth century, Hong Kong first set up its educational 
system. An elementary-level Central School, which combined several schools 
together within the perimeters of Hong Kong’s metropolis, as well as Hong Kong 
University were established. Looking closely at the history of Hong Kong’s 
educational sector, it is not difficult to see its connections with the ideology of the 
British ‘civilising mission’, which aimed to establish cultural imperialism, create 
colonial hierarchy, produce subordinate citizens, and separate the colonisers from 
the colonised. Carroll (2005, p.75) describes colonial education as “[....] designed 
to shape and discipline both the body and the mind, from the inside out”. During 
the colonial period, an educational system, which was modelled on the British 
system, was established in Hong Kong. Colonial education was divided into four 
consecutive levels: three years of junior high school, two years of senior high school, 
two years of sixth form and three years of university (Yang, 2014). The colonial 
educational system has left its colonial legacy on the current Hong Kong 
educational system. Even after 1997, the educational system in postcolonial Hong 
Kong remained unchanged for 12 years. It was not until 2009 that this old colonial 
educational system was abolished. In 2009, Hong Kong adopted an educational 
system, which is similar to the educational system in Mainland China, that is, three 
years of junior high school, three years of senior high school and four years of 
university.  
 
During colonial times, expatriate teachers from the British Empire were hired to 
deliver classes at the intermediate level as well as college level education in Hong 
Kong. Lugard, the Governor of Hong Kong from 1907-1912, forced Hong Kong 
University to recruit staff members from Britain, asserting that “[i]n the Hong Kong 
University the staff will be wholly British, except perhaps for a few Chinese 
specialists” (Pennycook, 1998, p.120). Moreover, in 1984, an Expatriate English 
Teachers Scheme was introduced to ensure that a large number of expatriate 
teachers from Britain taught English in Hong Kong secondary schools. The 






dominant proportion of expatriate teachers remained unchanged in the educational 
system in postcolonial Hong Kong. In 2010, nearly 50% of the City University of 
Hong Kong’s faculty came from overseas (Liang H., 2015).  
 
The historical textbooks used in the colonial schools omitted accounts of the British 
Empire’s iniquities and encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. According to Kan 
(1996), the colonial historical textbooks replaced “the First Opium War” with “the 
First Anglo-Chinese War” was used to account for in historical textbooks in the 
colonial period, in order to gloss over the imperialist nature of the war, which only 
served the interests of the colonial authorities. It was not until 1996 that the colonial 
account of the Opium War was radically changed (Kan and Vickers, 2002). The 
large number of expatriate teachers in the colonial educational system, along with 
the dissemination of a colonial interpretation of history devalued and even 
discriminated against indigenous members of staff and their indigenous knowledge, 
and further reinforced the superiority of the Western knowledge system.  
 
Moreover, the colonisers prioritised English-language teaching in the colonial 
schools. According to Tong and Cheung (2011, p.58), language is a special tool in 
operating imperialism, as language is also the carrier of cultural identities. 
Dominant cultural identities, in this case, the British, are able to influence and even 
change non-English cultural identities by teaching foreign languages. The ambition 
to introduce the English language into colonial Hong Kong is evident in Legge’s 
(the initiator of the colonial education program in Hong Kong) presentation to the 
Legislative Council in 1861: 
[t]his plan [that appealed for full-scale teaching of English] makes the 
teaching of English a more prominent part of the education in the 
Government Schools than it has hitherto been. But I beg to submit to 
you that it ought to be so. It ought to be so in this Colony where the 
administration of justice is conducted in the English language. It ought 
to be so, that an influence may go forth from the Island, which shall be 
widely felt in China enlightening and benefiting many of its people 
(cited in Sweeting and Vickers, 2007, p.14). 






The Eurocentric discourse, which highlights the ‘civilising mission’ of English-
language teaching, racialises the whole indigenous educational system as being 
suffused with an atmosphere of ‘low’ morality, and again reiterates the superiority 
of Western culture and language. In 1862, the Central School, where English was 
the medium of instruction, was founded with the aim to carry out the imperial 
mission of promoting English-language instruction (Chan, 1996) and perpetuating 
the idea of British superiority (Law, 2009). In 1865, the colonial government forced 
all schools to make English-language teaching compulsory. Later, in 1878, the 
colonial government arranged an educational conference to discuss the policy on 
language-in-education policy, based on the premise that “the primary object to be 
born in view by the Government should be the teaching of English”. This resulted 
in the passing of an English-oriented policy to further privilege the English 
language (Evans, 2006). Accordingly, the daily number of hours devoted to 
teaching English at the colonial schools was extended to five, while the hours 
allotted to teaching the Chinese language were reduced to two and a half. The 
majority of indigenous schools found it impossible to implement the policy which 
afforded priority to the English language, because they received only minimal 
funding from the colonial government and their student bodies consisted mostly of 
members of the poorer classes. As a result of not being able to fulfil the 
requirements of the policy, indigenous schools were forced to shut down. Apart 
from that, the colonial government also passed other policies to undermine 
indigenous schools. In 1913, an Education Ordinance was passed to make school 
registration mandatory. The ordinance conferred unlimited power on to the colonial 
government to control the organisation and curricula of indigenous schools, in an 
effort to ensure close supervision of all Chinese schools (Pennycook, 1998, p.122). 
Furthermore, the colonisers tried to uphold the dominance of the English language 
in colonial Hong Kong by establishing language institutions and offering generous 
funds for language-related research. For example, a raft of language institutions 
were established to promote English language teaching. These were sponsored by 
British-related enterprises, such as the Centre for Professional and Business English, 
which was housed in the former Hong Kong Polytechnic (now the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University), and opened in May 1989; or the Language Resource 






Centre, which was situated in the Institute of Language in Education, and opened 
in May 1991 (Choi P., 2003). In 1990, businesses with British-linked interests also 
set up a Language Development Fund to support a “coherent programme of 
language-related research and development projects” (Choi P., 2003, p.684). Much 
of the funded research considerably influenced education policies in colonial Hong 
Kong. These research studies that promoted the colonisers served to privilege 
English language teaching (Choi P., 2003). In that way, the predominately English-
language education system was established, which undermined the indigenous 
language and culture, and remained unchanged for more than one and half century 
of colonial rule. 
 
Meanwhile, the colonial government employed an “English for success” rhetoric to 
establish the hegemony of the English language, which was further strengthened by 
high-profile propaganda activities. Since 1988, businesses with the British-linked 
interests have launched various language campaigns. In 1992, the language 
campaign displayed advertisements about Hong Kong’s need to have “plenty of 
good English speakers […] if it is to maintain its international competitiveness”. 
Major newspapers, such as “South China Morning Post, the Asian Wall Street 
Journal and Time magazine”, ran these advertisements in colonial Hong Kong, 
(Choi P., 2003, p.685). All of these newspapers and magazines offered their 
advertising spaces free of charge for an extended period of time. Also, the colonisers 
made efforts to invite guests to write, deliver speeches and conduct interviews in 
order to hammer similar messages into the public mind (Choi P., 2003). In so doing, 
the colonisers constructed discourse that conveyed the ‘unquestionable’, almost 
‘natural’, importance of the English language, thereby legitimising the 
subordination of all educational goals to the dominant goal of mastering English 
(Li, 2002). Taken together, the predominantly English-language educational system, 
along with the public rhetoric of English being the language for achieving success, 
assigned superiority and power to the English language, presented it as the 
‘universal’, only ‘rational’ and ‘civilised’ language, and legitimised its dominant 
position. Even after 1997, the hegemony of English remains unchanged in 
postcolonial Hong Kong. Not only is English the official language in the fields of 






law and business, but also all the 114 Brand I (the top 25%) schools in postcolonial 
Hong Kong have adopted English as the medium of instruction (Choi P., 2003). The 
“English for success” rhetoric continues to influence the Hong Kong Chinese in 
postcolonial Hong Kong. The continuity of English hegemony asserts a racial-cum-
linguistic superiority and ideology well beyond 1997, which contributes to the 
racialised socio-cultural hierarchy, according to which Western culture is superior 
and the Chinese culture inferior.  
 
A similar form of cultural imperialism can also be found in the field of law. In 1843, 
a justice system, which was modelled on the British system, was established in 
Hong Kong (Ngo, 1999). The ambition to introduce the British law system into 
Hong Kong is captured in Governor John Bowring’s (1854-59) words:  
[i]t is of the highest importance that native population especially should 
know that the administration of justice is held by us to be a sacred and 
responsible duty, and that every man’s life and liberty on British soil is 
intended to be most reverently protected by every security against 
wrong which legislation can provide (cited in Ngo, 1999, p.46).  
The discourse, which racialises indigenous justice systems as ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘backward’, highlights the ‘contribution’ of the Western colonisers by bringing the 
‘rule of law’ to the colonised. According to Lee et al. (2015), coloniality is 
constantly disguised under the notion of ‘modernity’ such as ‘civilisation’, 
‘progress’, and ‘development’. The rhetoric of the ‘rule of law’ masks the 
imperialist nature of British colonial rule in Hong Kong. 
 
While the British colonisers claimed to bring the ‘rule of law’ to Hong Kong and 
“apply the full apparatus of English law equally to all inhabitants” (Ngo, 1999, 
p.48), it is precisely this very justice system, which the colonial powers used to 
oppress the local population. As Munn (1997) argues, for the great majority of the 
Chinese population, the ‘rule of law’ in Hong Kong meant intrusive policing, racial 
and class discrimination, and repression of anti-colonial protests. Hong Kong’s 
Chinese suffered as a result of the local Europeans’ scorn and disdain, and were 
racialised as “a menacing construct, symbolically assimilated as the mirror image 






of the colonial (dis)order: barbaric, criminal, rootless, lawless, savage, and 
marauding danger” (Carroll, 2007, p.77, Wu, 1999, pp.153-154). Moreover, 
intrusive control was imposed by the colonial state on the innocent native Chinese, 
which included expanding the power of the police, tightening the curfew for the 
Hong Kong Chinese, and increasing the use of flogging, hanging, and deportation 
– “not only for convicted criminals, but also for beggars, lepers, and ‘dangerous’ or 
‘suspicious’ characters” (Carroll, 2007, p.51). The native Chinese were usually 
punished more severely than the Europeans. For example, public flogging was 
routinely applied to the native Chinese. Punishments such as caning, wearing the 
cangue, etc. were applied only to the Chinese (Carroll, 2007). Indeed, some of the 
tenets of the justice system, which disadvantaged and racialised the Hong Kong 
Chinese community, remained unchanged throughout the colonial period, and as 
Ngo (1999, p.9) puts it: “until the very last few years of British rule, all legislation 
and all court proceedings were in English, while residents were required to be able 
to speak English in order to serve as jurors, thereby excluding the majority of 
residents”. The justice system, which was hidden under the rhetoric of the ‘rule of 
law’, asserted a racial-cum-judicial superiority and ideology, racialised the Hong 
Kong Chinese, established the superiority of the colonisers, and strengthened the 
racial hierarchy in colonial Hong Kong.  
 
With the help of racial separation and cultural imperialism, the British colonisers 
established a highly racialised socio-cultural structure in colonial Hong Kong, 
which had a great influence on the identity formation of the Hong Kong Chinese. 
Using cultural institutions, such as colonial education, the British justice system, 
etc., the colonisers established their colonial cultural hegemony in Hong Kong. 
Western discourses and culture, which were based on the idea of race, were made 
to appear as ‘natural’, ‘universal’ and the only ‘rational’ ‘truth’. Indigenous cultures 
were marginalised. The Eurocentric constructs further strengthened the racial 
hierarchy between the colonisers and the colonised, with the Western colonisers 
being considered superior and the colonised Hong Kong Chinese inferior. Even 
after the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the cultural 
institutions continue to exert considerable cultural coloniality in postcolonial Hong 






Kong. For instance, English continues to be the official language in finance, legal 
systems, government business, and education. The educational system and some 
legal systems, including the jury system, judicial judgment system, and legal aid 
system, which were modelled on British systems remain structurally unchanged. 
Moreover, the colonial matrix of power continues to persist in every aspect of social 
life in postcolonial Hong Kong. The material fabric of the city, ranging from 
separated residential areas, right-hand drive vehicles, English-language street signs, 
double-decker buses and post offices, fire stations and hospitals built in a colonial 
British style, consistently generate the illusion that the colonial period is still 
ongoing, and that it is not coming to an end any time soon (Wang et al., 2013). This 
historically informed institutional continuity implicitly blurs the boundary of time 
and space between the colonial and the postcolonial, and presents the colonial past 
as cherished memories that distinguish Hong Kong from Mainland China. It thus 
contributes to maintaining the dominance of Western culture in the social fabric. 
Dominated by the highly racialised socio-cultural structures, in which Western 
cultures continued to be considered mainstream and non-Western cultures continue 
to be marginalised, the Hong Kong Chinese turn the Western discursive and cultural 
hegemony on the non-western cultures into new vision of superiority of the Hong 
Kong Chinese over the mainland Chinese (Yang, 2014). The Western cultural 
coloniality in Hong Kong perpetuates Western cultural hegemony, influences the 
identity formation of the postcolonial Hong Kong Chinese, and creates a racial 
hierarchy in which the Hong Kong Chinese are considered superior and the 
mainland Chinese are considered inferior. 
 
Moreover, using the rhetoric of modernity such as ‘rule of law’, ‘laissez-fairie’, 
‘English for success’, etc., the colonisers constructed Western culture as ‘civilising’ 
the ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ indigenous culture, thus masking colonial exploitation, 
iniquity and racial discrimination. By employing rhetoric of modernity to disguise 
cultural coloniality, the colonisers distorted the colonial history, and effectively 
turned the colonial trauma, which Hong Kong experienced under the imperial rule, 
into imperialist fantasies. The continuity of many colonial institutions, ideologies, 
hierarchies of race, nationality and language further produces and reproduces 






imperialist fantasies and consciousness, filtered identities, and has ultimately 
contributed to a colonial nostalgia and an associated identity anxiety and crisis in 
postcolonial Hong Kong SAR, particularly against a backdrop of the rapid rise of 
Mainland China.  
 
Since the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the Chinese 
economy has achieved rapid and sustained growth. While the rest of the world, 
including the Hong Kong SAR, has been struggling since the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2008, Mainland China not only successfully survived the difficult financial 
times, but in 2010 even surpassed Japan in becoming the second biggest economy 
after the U.S. (Gao, 2015). With the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone 
in 2013 and the establishment of international airports and harbors in Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou, Mainland China’s import and export has grown, and Shanghai has 
morphed into one of Asia’s remarkable financial, economic and cultural hubs 
(Huang, 2007). In 2014, Shanghai surpassed Hong Kong in the throughput of port 
containers, and became the biggest container port in the world (China Ports 
Association, 2014). Moreover, in 2007, the total value of the stock market in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen surpassed that of Hong Kong. The pillar industries in Hong 
Kong SAR, such as traditional port trade and finance, have been gradually losing 
their edges (Huang, 2007). Furthermore, the commencement of direct flights, 
shipping and post between Mainland China and Taiwan in 2008 has resulted into 
the Hong Kong SAR losing its lucrative role as the middleman in international trade 
(Huang, 2007).  
 
Against the backdrop of the Hong Kong SAR’s economic decline and its 
subsequently changing position in Asia, the continuity of colonial institutions, 
language, and ideologies contributes to a highly racialised socio-cultural hierarchy, 
which renders the former colonial powers superior and the mainland Chinese 
inferior, with the Hong Kong Chinese conceiving themselves as sitting somewhere 
in between. Adding to the mix is a small group of the Hong Kong Chinese, who are 
overcome by “colonial nostalgia”. The racialised socio-cultural hierarchy and 
“colonial nostalgia” are well reflected in some of the events that happened in recent 






years, such as the 2011 protest against Chinese language education, or the 2014 
overt discrimination and harassments of mainland Chinese tourists as ‘locusts’ 
(pronouncing as “huang chong” in Chinese, a homonym for ‘yellow worms’), etc. 
The “Occupy Central” event in the summer of 2014 is no exception, as this event 
too is the product of the coloniality of power in postcolonial Hong Kong.  
 
Burke (2013, p.474) discusses the genuine meaning of “democracy” by highlighting 
the correlation of “national liberation” and “human rights”. According to Burke, the 
term “human rights” should be understood to refer to racial equality that sees all 
individuals as equals. Self-determination, which is about the collective right of the 
people to determine their status and government, is its cornerstone, but also 
constitutes an essential prerequisite for all other human rights, such as democracy, 
human welfare, etc. National liberation enables individual freedom. Self-
determination and individual freedom are practically inseparable. Burke (2013) 
emphasises that the concept of human rights is incompatible with colonialism and 
imperialism. Under the guise of modernity, the colonial rule claimed to be “an 
efficient vector” for transmitting civil and political rights and advancing human 
welfare which held origins in Western civilisation (Burke, 2013, p.478). But 
realities of imperial rule “so frequently departed from these ideals that they were 
learnt much more in the breach than the observance” (Burke, 2013, p.478). The 
practice of colonial power eschewed the notions of equality, autonomy and personal 
freedom inherent in the concept of universal human rights. Human rights can only 
be respected within the context of national independence (Burke, 2013). In the case 
of the “Occupy Central” event, the real purpose of the small elite group, who 
organised the event, however was to restore Hong Kong’s colonial status, at least 
in their imagination. The real purpose of the event not only had nothing to do with 
‘democracy’, but also actively sought to erode genuine democracy, which requires 
first of all conditions of national self-determination and independence – in this case, 
of China which Hong Kong has always been part.   







Analysis of the media representation of the “Occupy Central” event reveals that the 
ideological manipulation of the meanings of the news reports is achieved by the 
discursive construction of Mainland China as the ‘Other’. By presenting the event 
in a ‘democratic’ frame, the media essentialised the understanding of the event in a 
binary construct of ‘authoritarianism’ versus ‘democratisation’. Thus, the media 
pre-empted and delimited the interpretation of the event within the pre-set 
‘democratic’ frame. Additionally, the media reproduced Orientalist stereotypes 
towards non-Western nations, and in particular China. Making use of linguistic 
tools such as lexical choice, the media attributed negative characteristics to 
Mainland China, and denigrated it as ‘despotic’ and ‘uncivilised’. These discourses 
played on deeply rooted Western stereotypes of China, and stigmatised the 
mainland China as the ‘Other’.  
 
Moreover, the discourse of Mainland China as a ‘threat’ to ‘democratic’ Hong Kong 
is constructed to justify the occupiers’ struggle against Mainland China. Drawing 
on the discourse of ‘civilisation mission’, the media glossed over British colonial 
exploitation in Hong Kong, and represented the ‘robust’ civil society and 
‘democratic’ institutions in postcolonial Hong Kong as the outcomes of colonial 
rule. In the same vein, the media established a socio-cultural hierarchy, in which 
the British colonial powers were superior, Mainland China was inferior, and Hong 
Kong situated in-between. Playing on the frames of ‘authoritarianism’ and 
‘inferiority’, Mainland China was constructed as the scapegoat, and received the 
blame for being the root of all problems in Hong Kong, about which the occupiers’ 
complained. The media completely ignored the interplay of historical and 
contemporary political, socio-cultural factors that have contributed to the problems 
in Hong Kong. Accordingly, the “Occupy Central” event was decontextualised as 
being caused by a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ Mainland China. The “Occupying” 
behaviours were legitimised by stigmatising Mainland China as the ‘threatening 
Other’.  
 






Furthermore, in order to make the event intelligible to the readers, the media 
situated the “Occupy Central” event within the old and familiar framework of the 
“Occupy Wall Street” event. In so doing, the media directed the readers’ attention 
to the form and image of the “Occupy Central” event (such as street gatherings, 
name, etc.), and eliminated the historical background of the event. In addition to 
the discursive construction of Mainland China as the ‘Other’, the media adopted 
techniques of selection and omission in order to reproduce dominant discourses of 
the event, and silence any information that could generate an alternative 
understanding. By omitting any information about the large-scale “anti-Occupy 
Central” petition and demonstration, and by silencing any news sources that reveal 
the colonialist nature of the event, the dominant interpretation of the event as a 
“democratic movement” is maintained as a ‘truth’.  
 
In addition, the chapter has problematised the media representation of the “Occupy 
Central” event, deconstructed such ‘facts’ and ‘truth’, and unveiled their natures as 
myths. Alternative, subaltern interpretations and narratives of the event were 
offered by historicising and contextualising it in relation to the particularities of the 
Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present, its relationships with the 
British Empire, the Chinese mainland and its changing position in Asia. The chapter 
argued that “Occupy Central” is a political, ideational and historical process rather 
than a discrete incident. It is the continuity of many colonial institutions, ideologies 
and hierarchies of race, nationality and language that have contributed to the 
perpetuation of highly racialised socio-cultural structures, persistently permeating 
the social fabric, producing and reproducing imperialist fantasies and consciousness, 
filtered identities, and ultimately, the colonial nostalgia and its associated identity 
anxiety and crisis in the postcolonial Hong Kong SAR. The discursive construction 
of the “Occupy Central” event into a “democratic movement” glossed over the 
racial divide and the very different forms of colonialism that Hong Kong has 
experienced under British colonial rule. The implication is, as this chapter has 
attempted to demonstrate, that the discursive construction of the “Occupy Central” 
event offered a way for several “occupy central” elites to unmoor themselves from 






the economic decline of Hong Kong into an imagined affinity with the former 









Media Discourse and Discursive Power: American Mainstream 
Newspapers’ Representation of China’s 2015 70th Anniversary of 
the Victory Day 
 
6.1 Introduction 
On the 3rd of September 2015, a parade was held in Beijing to commemorate the 
70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese 
aggression together with the victory against Fascism and the end of World War II. 
Chinese troops, including land, air, and naval forces participated in the parade, as 
did 300 Chinese veterans who bravely fought in the resistance war, as well as 17 
troops from countries who fought against the Fascist aggressions in WWII (Huang, 
2015). 30 countries’ heads of state and another 19 countries’ high-ranking 
government officials came to Beijing to participate in the anniversary event (Yang, 
2015). However, despite the Chinese government’s invitation, no heads of state 
from Western countries that were allies of the Chinese government during WWII 
participated in the Anniversary event, the reasons of which I will analyse below. 
Such an event means not merely a remembrance of those who laid down their lives 
in the war. The anniversary brings back to life collective memories of Chinese 
people’s struggle against Japanese invasion and occupation, and their fight for 
national independence and liberation, particularly against a backdrop of the revival 
of far right politics and militarism in Japan, and the U.S.’ interference in the East 
Asian region. For example, Japan has attempted to ‘nationalise’ the Diaoyu Islands 
(English: Senkaku Islands) since 2012 (Wang and Hou, 2015). In July 2016, Japan 
started a process of fundamentally altering its Constitution6, undermining the post-
1947 international order in East Asia that aims to rein in Japan’s right-wing forces 
and restore peace in Asia. Meanwhile, America has shifted its foreign policy focus 
to the Asian-Pacific region (Jia, 2015). Continuing its foreign policy of ‘containing 
                                                     
6 After WWII, a Constitution in which Japan was forbidden to maintain armed forces with 
war potential was made under the supervision of the Allied forces. The Constitution came 
into effect on May 3, 1947, aiming to maintain an international peace based on justice and 
order. 






China’ in the wider context of China’s rapid rise, the U.S. formulated and put in 
practice the so-called ‘strategic rebalance in the Asia-Pacific’ and increased its 
interfering in the region, with a view to expand the American ‘sphere of influence’ 
and its domination and hegemonic power in the East Asia region (Jia, 2015). Under 
such international circumstances, China’s 70th anniversary event brings to light the 
historical consciousness of maintaining international peace and security, and 
resisting the revival of neo-fascism in Japan and Asia. Such historical consciousness, 
which is generated by past experiences, contributes to consolidating national 
confidence and unity, catalysing the decolonisation of culture and epistemology, 
and strengthening national identities for current and succeeding generations.  
 
However, in contrast to the Chinese (who in the past have been colonised and 
oppressed by both Western and Japanese imperial powers), Western politicians and 
media alike interpret the anniversary event through an Orientalist paradigm. There 
is an all too predictable raft of political statements making noise about China’s 
‘military capabilities’ and ‘lack of human rights’, and discursively constructing the 
‘China threat’ image. As pointed out by the American journalist James Mann, “the 
media coverage of China tends merely to reinforce whatever is the reigning 
stereotype or image, or “frame”, of China in any particular decade or era” (cited in 
Pan, 2012, p.13). In other words, Western media discourses have been in full 
alignment with rather than independent from their politicians’ position. As this 
chapter will attempt to show, the U.S. media frequently distort the history of the 
Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Fascism, by re-interpreting 
and reconstructing the event as China ‘showing military muscles’, which resonates 
with the ‘China threat’ discourse (cf. Buckley, 2015, Rauhala, 2015).  
 
There has been a growing interest in studies on memorial landscapes and their 
histories. For example, Wodak and De Cillia (2007), in a study on Austrian 
commemorative events that took place in 1988, identify these events as discourse 
arenas in which dominant groups try to transmit their discourses of history to the 
public. Mininni et al. (2013), in a case study on Italian commemorative events, 
consider these as discursive resources of historical identity. While recent research 






extending the focus of such events to the people – who have witnessed and 
experienced the violence of war (and genocide), and enacted many individual and 
collective memories – is steadily growing (cf. Drozdzewski et al., 2016), however, 
it tends to attend to those in western countries and regions, such as Europe and 
Australia. Whereas the studies on memorial landscapes have explored war 
memories in association with places and identities, they tend to neglect questions 
about the nature of the place (the ‘Other’ place), memories and experiences, as well 
as the question of how the Other’s memories, experiences and commemorations are 
represented and constructed.  
 
When it comes to studies on WWII, the existing literature tends to be dominated by 
the so-called ‘standard’ historical narratives of WWII. These narratives locate the 
outbreak of WWII in the narrative of “Hitler’s and Germany’s invasion of Poland” 
in September 1939, and focus on the battles that happened in places, such as 
Dunkirk, Stalingrad, and Normandy, rather than on non-Western battle grounds, 
especially the Eastern front of China where the Chinese people battled against 
Japanese Fascism for 14 years from 1931 to 1945. (cf. Hart, 1999, Haruo, 2011, 
Weinberg, 1995). Current discourses and knowledge about WWII have shaped the 
formation, articulation, and memories, which, as Chakrabarty (2000b) argues, are 
Euro-American-centric. The WWII experiences, memories, narrations and 
understandings of non-Western nations – China, in this case – are marginalised, 
ignored and their voices remain unheard.  
 
This chapter seeks to address the lacunae in the current literature by critically 
examining the portrayal of China’s anniversary parade in the case study newspapers, 
with a view to deconstruct the Western media’s dominant discourses on China’s 
collective memories of WWII and its commemoration event, as well as make the 
collective memories and experiences of subaltern Chinese represented in world 
histories. Guided by a postcolonial perspective, this chapter examines the selected 
48 news texts on the anniversary event (see Section 4.3) by employing the CDA 
approach.  
 






The chapter is laid out in five sections. Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 zero in on the data 
and reveal the ways that discursive strategies are employed by American 
mainstream newspapers in their attempt to de-historicise China’s 70th anniversary 
event, and construct it in a highly racialised “China threat” narrative. Section 6.5 
problematises the dominant discourses on the anniversary event and interrogates 
the Euro-American-centric knowledge of WWII’s history by bringing back the 
collective memories and reconstructing the media’s distorted realities of the 
Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese Fascism. Section 6.6 summarises the 
main findings in the chapter.  
6.2 The ‘China threat’ narrative  
Constituting a key aspect of the “ideological state apparatus”, the news media are 
considered to be on a par with major political institutions, with a role to play in 
distributing the ruling elites’ ideology, shaping people’s conceptions of the world, 
and reinforcing and perpetuating prevailing patterns of domination (Berger, 2014, 
Curran and Seaton, 2010). Framing is one of the ways by which the media shape 
public perceptions of political events and issues. In terms of discourses on China in 
international relations, there is a dominant and recurring theme on China’s rise: ‘the 
China threat’ (Pan, 2004). The ‘China threat’ image and framing casts China’s rise, 
and its international implications, primarily in a negative, alarming, and threatening 
light (Pan, 2004), and offers a construct from the viewpoint of ‘Us’ versus the 
‘Other’. With the help of the schema of framing and discourse, the ‘fact’ of ‘China’s 
rise’ is turned into a ‘threat reality’, in a manner that conveys the authority and 
power of a “regime of truth” (Turner, 2011). This section analyses the ways in 
which the American mainstream newspapers constructed the event as a ‘China 
threat’ narrative. 
 
The proposition that China is a ‘potential enemy’ to the U.S.-led world security 
order is a central and recurring theme in the news coverage of China’s anniversary 
event. The media attempt illusively to construct a ‘threatening’ message about 
China by predefining the 3rd September anniversary parade as a “display of 






weaponry” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015), “a martial spectacle” (The 
New York Times, 2 September 2015), a “military parade” (Los Angeles Times, 1 
September 2015) and “militarism” (The Washington Post, 3 September 2015), thus 
discrediting China as a “bellicose” country. Adding to this impression of 
“bellicosity” is a reference to the parade as “China flexing its military muscle” (The 
Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015). Linguistic realisations of the ‘China is a 
muscle person’ metaphor can also be found in the references to “China’s expanding 
military muscle” (The New York Times, 4 September 2015) and the parade being 
described as “the latest display of muscle-flexing” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 
September 2015). The media personify China, and construct an impression of China 
as militant. The strategies of pre-definition, along with the muscle metaphor, place 
China in a conceptual frame of ‘warlikeness’. Such a conceptual frame serves the 
function of fixing discussions on the parade within the boundaries of ‘threat’, and 
thus insulates alternative perspectives on the parade. The parameters of the 
discussions on the parade are pre-defined, eliminating those aspects of the parade 
that are not of advantage to the West, in this case, the U.S and its alliance (Japanese 
Fascism). Within the context of the parade, the boundary of ‘threat’ shuts down 
discussions about the history of the Chinese struggle against Japanese Fascists and 
the horrors of Japan’s colonial exploitation. 
 
Moreover, China’s status of the ‘perfect enemy’ (Pilger, 2016) is rendered ‘true’ and 
‘real’ by establishing an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ division, and forming a discourse that 
resonates with the prevailing historical narrative and image of the ‘Yellow Peril’: 
(15) China celebrates a new national holiday on Thursday, honouring the 70th 
anniversary of the end of World War II with events across the country, a 
three-day holiday and a martial spectacle that will rumble through the 
ceremonial heart of the capital… Though billed as a commemoration of the 
war’s end, the holiday has been carefully conceived to project Mr Xi’s 
vision for a “rejuvenated” China: a rising military power that will stand up 
to rivals – most notably Japan and its main ally, the United States. (The New 
York Times, 2 September 2015) 






(16) Xi’s announcement [of military reduction] came near the start of the highly 
choreographed ceremonies in central Beijing, which included a military 
parade showing off a slew of new armaments… Pentagon officials warn that 
China’s rapid military modernisation is aimed at projecting power in East 
Asia and at raising the risks the U.S. faces if it intervenes in maritime hot 
spots, such as the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing has 
long-standing territorial claims. For that reason, they say, China has spent 
heavily on anti-ship cruise missiles, air defence systems, submarines and 
other advanced weapons in hopes of forcing U.S. aircraft carriers and 
fighters to operate farther away from the Asian mainland if a conflict broke 
out. (Los Angeles Times, 4 September 2015) 
(17) Beijing’s reading of history [referring to China’s Victory Day over the 
Japanese Occupation in 1945] is intended to serve two purposes: to 
emphasise the war guilt of Japan, China’s archrival, and elevate the role of 
the Chinese Communist Party in defeating Japanese militarism. Both 
support President Xi Jinping’s aspirations for China to throw aside the 
postwar order in Asia and assert itself more vigorously. That’s the message 
China will send next week as warplanes streak over Beijing and missiles, 
tanks and goose-stepping soldiers parade through Tiananmen Square. Mr. 
Xi is intent on challenging a regional security arrangement dominated by 
the U.S. and its military alliance with Japan. (The Wall Street Journal, 25 
August 2015)  
The media reframed the purposes of the anniversary event in a way that the event 
is predicated with “elevat[ing] the role of the Chinese Communist Party in defeating 
[the] Japanese” and “project[ing] Mr. Xi’s vision for a “rejuvenated” China: a rising 
military power”. Separating the word “rejuvenated” from the rest of the clause 
supports Ashley and Olson’s (1998) findings that quotation marks surrounding non-
speech draw attention to phrases that denote a negative connotation – in this case, 
a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ China. Moreover, the predications mentioned above 
implicate that the “Chinese Communist Party” failed to play a role in the resistance 
against Japanese imperialism; and that an ‘aggressive’, ‘expansionist’ China is ‘on 
the rise’. These implications not only distort the history of WWII (which Section 






6.5 will analyse), but also represent China as potentially ‘dangerous’. Moreover, 
derogatory and insinuating phrases are chosen by the media to construct the parade 
as “highly choreographed”, “carefully conceived” and “well-planned” (The 
Washington Post, 3 September, 2015). These phrases insinuate that the parade 
served China’s “ambition” to be a “military power”, rather than, as what China 
“billed”, “the commemoration of the war’s end”. These insinuations refute the 
intentions of the parade as a commemoration of the victory of WWII, and implicate 
that the parade epitomises a ‘rising’, ‘threatening’ and ‘militant’ China. 
 
In the news texts, the media activate China as an actor in relation to material 
processes and goals, such as “projecting power in East Asia”, “raising the risks the 
U.S. faces”, “throw[ing] aside the postwar order”, “forcing U.S. aircraft carriers 
and fighters to operate farther away from the Asian mainland”, and “challenging a 
regional security arrangement dominated by the U.S. and its military alliance with 
Japan”. The material processes (such as “projecting”, “throw[ing] aside”, “raising”, 
“forcing” and “challenging”) insinuate that China ‘stirs up trouble’. By deliberately 
associating China with negatively connoted material processes, the media portrayed 
China as the ‘Other’ – a ‘threat’ to the world and regional peace, which is ‘policed’ 
and ‘protected’ by the U. S. In that way, China was framed as ‘deviant’ or ‘Othered’ 
in a U.S.-centred world. Thereby, the media produced a division between ‘Us’ (the 
U.S., constructed as the ‘international peace-keeper’) and the ‘Other’ (China as the 
‘threat’ to ‘world peace’). The binary opposition between ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’, as 
Derrida (1972) explains, is positioned hierarchically, with one pole of the binary 
being dominant and the other pole being dominated. This kind of binary, 
oppositional way of discursive construction favourably presents the U.S. and its 
alliance (Japanese Fascism) as ‘peace-loving’ and ‘civilised’ while China is 
‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘risk’ and ‘dangerous’.  
 
In the same vein, the media reframed China’s reductions of military troops (which 
President Xi announced at the anniversary parade) by constructing a ‘provocative’ 
China versus the ‘defensive’ U.S. (although, in fact, the U.S. troops have travelled 
thousands of miles away to project their heavy military presence in China’s 






doorsteps of the East and South China Seas, and the Asia Pacific): 
(18) Many outside observers saw [the parade] as a display of the assertive 
posture China has taken in the region as territorial disputes have flared, 
prompting the United States to underline its military dominance of Asian 
seas. Rory Medcalf, the head of the National Security College at the 
Australian National University in Canberra, said the reductions [President 
Xi announced that China will reduce military personnel numbers by 
300,000, showing China’s commitment to peaceful development and the 
sacred duty of safeguarding world peace] were unlikely to ease regional 
worries about China’s growing military strength, because they were part of 
the modernisation program to shift the People’s Liberation Army’s 
resources from traditional land forces. “It would seem to be a pleasant 
surprise, because he’s clearly dressing it up as a signal of peace and good 
will … But China probably doesn’t need an army as large as it has.” (The 
New York Times, 3 September 2015) 
(19) Nor is the region keen to see America’s role diminished to accommodate a 
rising China. On the contrary, China’s assertiveness has triggered a clamour 
among its neighbours for America to beef up its military presence. (The Wall 
Street Journal, Aug 25, 2015) 
In the news texts, by citing “Rory Medcalf”, a member of a Western elite think tank, 
the media excluded the voice of China, and wilfully refuted what China says with 
regard to the military reductions. The U.S. media reframed the military reductions 
in a way as if it should read as a gesture by which China intentionally challenged 
the world or regional peace. Moreover, the media activated China as an actor in 
relation to material processes and goals such as “prompting the United States to 
underline its military dominance of Asian seas” and “trigger[ing] a clamour among 
its neighbours for America to beef up its military presence”. The selective choice 
of the material processes, such as “promoting” and “trigger[ing]”, enabled the 
media to portray China as a force that drove the U.S. to “beef up” and “underline” 
its military dominance in Asia. The U.S. intervention in Asia is constructed as 
responding to, or defending against, a “rising military China”. Thus, the media 
constructed a binary opposition between the ‘attacker’ and the ‘defender’. Within 






the ‘attack versus defence’ frame, the U.S. forces is represented as upholding 
‘international law’ and ‘order’ – thus ‘good’, and China is represented as the 
‘violator’ of the U.S.-set ‘rules’ and ‘world order’ – thus ‘evil’. Such a binary 
opposition denigrates China as the ‘inferior’ ‘Other’, and strengthens the persistent 
Eurocentric prejudices and stereotypes towards China. As such, the media 
represented China’s Victory Day anniversary event in a ‘China threat’ narrative, 
which correlates with the prevailing historical colonial narrative of the ‘Yellow 
Peril’. More importantly, the otherness of China serves as an implicit justification 
for the American heavy military presence, neo-colonial domination and hegemonic 
power in the East Asian region.  
 
The image of the ‘Yellow Peril’ can also be found in the discourse on the Chinese 
economy, with which the media attempted to associate the Victory Day parade. The 
conceptual metaphor “economy/finance is a patient” is used to frame China’s 
economy in a bad condition. The metaphor is evidenced by statements, such as 
China is an “anxious nation in economic trouble” (The New York Times, 2 
September 2015), a nation “experiencing various crises” and having “the raft of bad 
economic news”. China is concerned with “the weakening Chinese economy” (The 
Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2015). The commemoration event is, thus, an 
attempt to “divert domestic attention” from the “economic crisis” (The Wall Street 
Journal, 17 September 2015), and “boost national pride” (The Wall Street Journal, 
3 September 2015). In addition, an orientational metaphor is deployed by the media 
to express a state of crisis whenever the motion takes a downward direction: China’s 
economy is “plummeting” (The New York Times, 1 September 2015) or “slumping” 
(The New York Times, 2 September 2015). Furthermore, the metaphor of “China is 
a building to collapse through natural forces” are employed by the media to invoke 
a ‘China collapse’ thesis (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015): the Chinese 
markets are predicted to be in an “economic turbulence” or “economic squalls”, and 
will soon “collapse” (The New York Times, 22 September 2015; Los Angeles Times, 
6 September 2015;). Moreover, China’s President Xi’s agenda of change (including 
Xi’s announcement about the reduction of troops at the Victory Day parade) is 
portrayed as “faltering” amid “economic squalls and a grinding anticorruption 






campaign” (The New York Times, 4 September 2015). The parade is represented as 
“an effort to instil political loyalty” (The Washington Post, 3 September 2015). Such 
discourses imply that China is stricken with various economic and political crises. 
Moreover, the natural force metaphor implies that China’s ‘economic crisis’ is 
‘unavoidable’, and insinuates that the Chinese government’s efforts to change are 
‘futile’. Such a representation of China silences the fact that, in 2015, China’s 
economic growth, at a GDP rate of 6.9%, ranked second in the world amid the 
gloomy economic conditions of the rest of the world. By portraying China as 
experiencing ‘economic and political crises’ and as a ‘military threat’, the media 
frame the anniversary event in an Orientalist “China threat” narrative, which 
resonates with the historical narrative and image of the ‘Yellow Peril’, and creates 
the same image of the ‘uncivilised’, ‘aggressive’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’ – which 
is, in this case, China. 
 
Researchers have pointed out that the origin of the ‘China threat’ discourse can be 
traced back to the nineteenth century, when the ‘Yellow Peril’ metaphor prevailed 
in Western societies (Wu, 1982). This metaphor, as Chen (2012) argues, is a racist 
fallacy against numerous non-white Asian nations, particularly China. The 
Westerners’ racialisation of Asians, which the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse incorporates, 
is usually epitomised by vilified, debased and demonised fictional Eastern figures 
that can be found in popular Western culture, such as Fu Manchu, Madam Butterfly 
and Dragon Lady. In the English novel The Mystery of Dr Fu-Manchu published in 
1913, Fu was portrayed as 
a person tall, lean and feline, high-shouldered, with a brow like 
Shakespeare and a face like Satan, a close-shaven skull, and long, 
magnetic eyes of the true cat-green. Invest him with all the cruel 
cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, 
with all the resources of science past and present, with all the resources, 
if you will, of a wealthy government-which, however, already has 
denied all knowledge of his existence. Imagine that awful being, and 
you have a mental picture of Dr Fu-Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate 
in one man (Rohmer, 1913, p.11). 






Fu Manchu is constructed as a ‘sinister’, ‘evil’, and ‘aggressive’ embodiment of the 
‘Yellow Peril’, and thus completely different to the fictional ‘heroes’ of  the 
‘civilised’ West (Western civilisation is epitomised, for example, by Dr Livingstone, 
as an intrepid individual braving the wilds of Africa on his mission to bring 
European ‘civilisation’ to the benighted “dark continent”). Chan (2001, p.16) 
critically analyses the image of Fu Manchu, and points out that “Western male 
supremacy, as an ideological construct, is re-established as Asian men are 
ritualistically vilified in order to maintain a sense of superiority among white men”. 
In other words, the denigration of the non-Western nations in general, and Asian 
nations in particular, serves to strengthen the self-image of the West as superior. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 “Peoples of Europe, Defend your Holiest Possessions” by Hermann 
Knackfuss 
The painting was created in 1895. As pointed out by Lyman (2000, p.689), “in the painting, 
Archangel stood before the people from nations of France, Germany, Russia, etc., sword in 
one hand while pointing with the other towards a horrible spectacle in the East. High in 
the smoke of the burning cities of Europe a Chinese dragon, symbolic of destruction, 
emerged bearing a seated Buddha upon its back. Beneath the picture German Kaiser 
Wilhelm II placed the words: ‘Nations of Europe! Join in Defence of Your Faith and Your 






Home!’ The painting evoked the need for an Occidental alliance against the threat to 
Christian civilisation supposedly posed by the rising races of the Orient. It was this 
painting that called onto centre stage the present era’s stereotypes with the ‘Yellow Peril’”. 
Source: (Tchen and Yeats, 2014.) 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The image of Fu Manchu 
Source: (Tiexue net, 2015).  
 
Said (1978) argues that there is a feminisation of the Orient which is rooted in 
colonialism and imperialism. The images of Chinese femininity which are created 
by the West legitimise the Orient’s subordination. For instance, the American media 
created and perpetuated the “Dragon Lady”, which stereotypes Chinese women as 
‘deceitful’, ‘domineering’ or ‘mysterious’ (Wu, 2010, p.11). This is contrasted with 
the stereotypical representation of the submissive sexualised Asian female, such as 
“China dolls”, “Geisha girls” or prostitutes (Wu, 2010, p.11). These stereotypes 
represent Chinese women as ‘submissive’, ‘sexy’, ‘coquettish’, ‘manipulative’, and 
having a tendency toward ‘disloyalty’ or ‘opportunism’ (Wong, 2013). Such 
villainous images of the Chinese have continued to appear in films, TV series and 
other media representation to maintain racialised stereotypes and the image of the 






‘Yellow Peril’. During the turn of the 20th century and at the height of the ‘Yellow 
Peril’ discourse, the Chinese were portrayed as “by nature physically and 
intellectually inferior, morally suspect, heathen, licentious, disease-driven, feral, 
violent, uncivilised, infantile” (Marchetti, 1993, p.3), “opium and gambling 
addictive” and a potential threat to the white people (MacDonald, 1974, p.543).   
 
 
Figure 6.3 Chinese were portrayed as ‘opium addictive’ and physically and 
intellectually ‘inferior’ 
Source: (Tiexue net, 2015).  
 







Figure 6.4 ‘Yellow Peril’ Poster: “The Yellow Terror in all his Glory”, 1899 
Source: (Sharp, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Chinese were portrayed as an ‘evil’ which was driving the white men out 
of employment, hurling them from the windows and kicking them out of the doors 
Source: (Tiexue net, 2015).  
 






As Lyman (2000, p.687) points out, the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse, under the cover of 
“a guarded defence of the Occidental-under-siege”, positions the Orient in a racial 
hierarchy in which the non-Western people and in particular Chinese are defined as 
‘inferior’ to the ‘superior’ West. Chen (2012) argues that the ‘Yellow Peril’ 
discourse was closely associated with colonialism and imperialism in the 19th 
century. The essence and core of the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse lies in the justification 
of the West’s imperialist invasion of, and scramble for, China, its predation and 
looting of China’s resources, and its exclusion, oppression and discrimination of 
the Chinese on the basis of race. The contemporary ‘China threat’ discourse is the 
continuation of this historical process of colonial formations. The ‘China threat’ 
discourse is a discursive strategy of Othering, which is predicated on certain 
presuppositions found in the Western tradition of (neo)colonial desire and 
imagination (Pan, 2004). As Campion (2014) argues, the ‘China threat’ discourse 
reveals more about the West than about the country that it portrays. As this section 
will demonstrate below, the discourse reflects a power/knowledge nexus in the 
Western understanding of China’s rapid rise, and its impact on contemporary 
international relations. 
 
Pan (2004, 2012) offers a critical analysis of the ‘China threat’ narrative. He points 
out that ‘China threat’ is essentially “a specifically social meaning given to China 
by the West, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant West’s self-
construction” (Pan, 2004, p.351). According to Spivak (1988), the West 
authoritatively presents itself and its produced knowledge and ideas about the Other 
culture not as historically particular but as ‘truly universal’ and ‘objective’. This 
perspective constructs the West as the centre of the modern world against which the 
world is described, conceptualised and ranked. Such Eurocentric self-knowledge 
considers the West to be a mirror of the future for all the other societies and cultures 
(Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). Pan aptly captures this point as follows (2004, 
p.312):  
by envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at 
its apex, the West places other nations on a common evolutionary slope 






and sees them as inevitably travelling toward the end of history that is 
the West.  
In this context, those cultures and societies that are different from the West are 
marginalised as ‘Other’. The Western knowledge of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘China 
threat’ concepts is based primarily on the lingering Western/American colonial 
desire for “subjectivity”, i.e. the colonial desire about how the world should be run 
and about how history should progress (Pan, 2012). So the ‘China threat’ 
perspective is not a reality about China that the West has discovered, but instead it 
is a ready-made category of thought within the West’s self-imagination.  
 
The construction of China as the ‘Other’ is not only a product of the West’s self-
imagination, but also an instrument for the formation and maintenance of the West’s 
self-identity. A state’s identity cannot be fully conceived without understandings 
about its opposing others (Turner, 2011). As Said (1995, p.1) states, “the Orient has 
helped to define  Europe  (or  the  West)  as  its  contrasting  image,  idea,  personality, 
experience”. In other words, the ‘evil’ and ‘barbarity’ of the colonised Other are 
what makes possible the ‘goodness’ and ‘civility’ of the European self. By 
constructing the event in form of a ‘China threat’ narrative, and stigmatising China 
as the other, the media are able to reinforce the self-image of the U.S. as a ‘superior’ 
and ‘rational’ ‘subject’ capable of knowing the ‘hard facts’ of non-Western cultures 
and societies (Pan, 2004). Moreover, the construction of China as the ‘Other’ not 
only helps maintain the credibility of the allegedly “universal” path trodden by the 
U.S., but also serves to highlight the ‘indispensability’ of the U.S. (Pan, 2004).  
 
In conclusion, the ‘China threat’ discourse in the American news coverage of the 
anniversary event has nothing to do with China’s realities. As revealed here, it is a 
discursive construction closely linked with Western/American colonial desire for 
cultural and political dominance and hegemony in the postcolonial world, as well 
as the desire for reinforcing its self-definition as ‘superior’. Moreover, such a 
‘China-threat’ narrative deprives the anniversary parade of its historical meanings 
and memories, which are entangled with Japanese colonialism and imperialism in 
China and wider Asia.  






6.3 The ‘Anti-communism’ narrative and Cold War Mentality  
Said (1978) argues that Orientalist thinking (such as the notion of the Othering) 
provides the most essential epistemological foundation for the various hegemonic, 
if not imperialist, practices undertaken by the West against its imagined Oriental 
other. In his view, Orientalist discourse serves as a means “by which European 
culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, 
sociologically, militarily and ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively” as 
‘inferior’ to the West (Said, 1978, p.11). Such historically situated stereotypes can 
be found in the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China’s 
anniversary event. An ideological ‘communism’ frame has been widely used by the 
media to construct a sense of ‘Us’ versus the ‘Other’. Rooted in such frame, China 
has been portrayed as a ‘Communist Other’, harkening back to the Orientalist 
assumption of Western ideological ‘superiority’. 
 
In the news texts, the word “communist” is used to frame China and the Chinese 
authorities, for example in references to “Chinese Communists” (The New York 
Times, 9 May 2015), “Communist China” (The New York Times, 4 September 2015) 
and “the Communist-led government” (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015). 
Since the Cold War, the words “communism” and “communists” have been 
constructed in such a way that they have become synonyms with “tyranny”, 
“dictatorship”, and “totalitarianism” in Western societies. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the virulent “anti-communist” rhetoric of the Cold War era may 
have receded, but it managed to leave behind a stereotyped view of communism in 
Western consciousness, and forms an important element of latent public opinion 
(Naduvath, 2014). Defining China in a pre-set ‘communist’ frame rekindles the 
memory of the cold war fault-line between capitalism and communism, and 
constructs China in a ‘communist Other’ narrative. 
 
Moreover, the media try to construct China as the ‘communist Other’ by associating 
China with the heads of state who attended the Victory Day parade, especially those 
from non-Western countries. For example: 






(20) President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia topped the list of foreign attendees, 
and audience members in the stands clapped loudly when he was shown on 
TV in the square. The president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, indicted by the 
International Criminal Court on genocide charges, was the most prominent 
African leader in the stands. Mr. Xi welcomed him here on Tuesday as an 
“old friend of the Chinese people.” Though Beijing pressured Western 
European countries to send high-level officials, few promised to do so. The 
United States sent its ambassador to China, Max Baucus. (The New York 
Times, 3 September 2015) 
In the news texts, the media vilify China by representing President Xi as “the old 
friend” of non-Western state leaders such as Russian leader Putin, and Sudanese 
leader Omar al-Bashir (who was “indicted by the International Criminal Court on 
genocide charges”). In this context, the media lead readers in its implication of Xi 
Jinping as ‘hard-line’, ‘conservative’, ‘strongman’, ‘brutality’ as they’ve portrayed 
Russian leader Putin, Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir and other non-Western state 
leaders. By invoking the notion of international justice and law, a distinction 
between the ‘civilised’ West (America, in this case, as the safeguard of international 
law), and the ‘barbarian’ non-Western nations (China, in this case, as a ‘lawless’ 
‘outsider’), is established. Also, the media activate China as an actor in relation to 
material processes and goals, such as “[Beijing] pressured Western European 
countries to send high-level officials”. The material process “pressured” connotes 
force. The media imply that China (the ‘lawless’ ‘outsider’) tries to force the 
Western countries (‘safeguards’ of the law) to attend the parade in order to 
legitimise the parade. This construction not only strengthens the divide between the 
‘civilised’ West and ‘barbarian’ China, and marginalises China as the ‘Other’, but 
it also decontextualises the Victory Day parade and suggests that it was 
‘illegitimate’. Constructing the parade as “illegitimate” also enables the media to 
justify the absence of the Western leaders in the parade. In effect, the Western 
leaders’ absence, as this section will go on to show, reflects the West’s amnesia of 
China’s struggle and fight against Japanese Fascism, and the atrocities that Japan 
committed during the war.  
 






Naduvath (2014) points out that the ‘anti-communist’ rhetoric seeks to create a 
binary opposition of ‘Us versus Them’ by associating communist thought and 
practice with notions and ideas such as a party press, and a one-party rule, among 
others. In the case of the parade, the media play on the frame of the ‘communist 
Other’, and build narratives around themes of, economic, socio-cultural, and 
political deprivation, which perpetuates the discourse of difference, as outlined by 
Said (1978). For example: 
(21) In his third year in office, Mr. Xi is moving further along the spectrum. He’s 
pushing a resentful strain of nationalism that harps on China’s “century of 
humiliation” at the hands of Japan and the Western imperial powers starting 
with the Opium Wars, and he adamantly rejects liberal Western values. Talk 
of democracy is banned on college campuses. […] And Mr. Xi’s challenge 
to the West is growing more muscular. (The Wall Street Journal, 9 
September 2015) 
(22) They [authorities] have also ramped up media and Internet censorship ahead 
of the parade, according to a propaganda department circular leaked to the 
California-based news website China Digital Times. (Los Angeles Times, 2 
September 2015) 
(23) If China continues to ring-fence military spending, despite the economic 
slowdown, it could eat into outlays in other areas, such as health and 
education, presenting the leadership with tough choices it isn’t used to 
making, those experts said. (The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2015)  
(24) The extravagant military display comes as China has more than doubled its 
published annual defence budget and projected its armed forces’ growing 
capabilities farther from home with increasing assertiveness, particularly at 
sea, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. (Los Angeles Times, 2 
September 2015) 
From a postcolonial perspective, the media represent China in terms of the Western 
culture superiority. In the news texts, the word “published” is deployed by the media 
to describe the “annual defence budget”. Through the careful selection of the word 
“published”, the media implicate that there must also be some sort of 
‘unpublished/secret/hidden’ “military spending” in China. Moreover, China is 






predicated with “has more than doubled its published annual defence budget”, and 
“projected its armed forces’ growing capabilities farther from home”. These 
predications insinuate that the Chinese government is ‘stealthy’, ‘non-transparent’, 
‘aggressive’ and ‘sinister’. Furthermore, the news discourse constructs a contrast 
between ‘backward’ China and the ‘civilised’ U.S. The media activate China and 
its authorities as actors in relation to material processes and goals such as 
“adamantly rejects liberal Western values”, “ramped up media and Internet 
censorship”, “banned” the talk, “eat into outlays in other areas”, and “clamping 
down on drones” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2015). By using these 
material processes with a negative semantic field (such as “adamantly reject”, 
“ramp up”, “clamp down” and “banned”), the media portray China as ‘dictatorial’ 
and ‘lacking freedom’, and construct the nation as one, which is different from the 
‘liberal’ West. These findings align well with Peerenboom’s (2007, pp.1-2) 
argument, which points out that Western commentary routinely portrays a dark 
image of China as a “brutal authoritarian state that violently opposes its citizens […] 
arrests political dissidents, censors the internet, imprisons its courageous lawyers 
and [is] eager to attack Taiwan and suppress dissidence in Tibet”. These findings fit 
in with the Orientalist premise of civil superiority, which is regarded as exclusive 
to the West. 
 
In the news texts, the word “propaganda” is widely used to frame Chinese 
government departments and their activities, such as “propaganda department”, 
“propaganda officials”, and “propaganda activities” (Los Angeles Times, 1 
September 2015). The historical use of propaganda for dastardly purposes evokes 
an implied negative meaning of the word that goes beyond its literal meaning. 
Historically, propaganda was instrumental to the Nazis’ war effort and their project 
of “social engineering”, which involved murdering six million Jews, Roma, 
homosexuals and handicapped (Howington, 2012). The careful selection of the 
word “propaganda” enables the media to imply that China is as ‘tyrannical’ and 
‘repressive’ as the Nazis. In addition to that, the news texts allege that the Chinese 
President is “pushing a resentful strain of nationalism” and “whipping up nationalist 
fervour” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015), which are predications that 






imply irrationality. In so doing, the media discursively construct China as a 
‘backward’ and ‘uncivilised’ ‘Other’, and glorify the superiority of the Western 
culture. 
 
MecLeod (2000) points out that the Orient is frequently represented in a series of 
negative terms that serve to buttress a sense of the West’s superiority and strength. 
The Orientalist representation of non-Western nations (in this case China) posits the 
notion that Oriental people needed to be ‘civilised’ and made to conform to the 
allegedly higher moral standards upheld by the West. This ‘civilising mission’ can 
also be found in the media representation of the parade. Through carefully framing 
sentences, such as “[i]f China continues to ring-fence military spending, despite the 
economic slowdown, it could eat into outlays in other areas, such as health and 
education.”, and “China’s military don’t have the organisation or the culture they 
would need to actually become one [as effective as the U.S.] (Los Angeles Times, 2 
September 2015)”, the media implicate that the U.S. is a sort of  ‘civilising master’ 
who ‘should teach’ the ‘threatening’ and ‘barbarian’ Chinese how properly to act in 
its own (the ‘barbarian/uncivilised’) interests. Non-Western nations are orientalised 
as having no access to ‘reason’, ‘logic’ and ‘rationality’. In creating these 
stereotypes, the West (in this case the U.S.) justifies its interferences in non-Western 
nations by claiming that the latter needs saving from themselves.  
 
Moreover, the media portray China from a Euro-American-centric perspective, and 
celebrate Western knowledge production as privileged by introducing words 
associated with Western elites such as “those experts” and “Roger Cliff”. 
Grosfoguel (2012b) critically deconstructs the Euro-American-centrism and points 
out that the West camouflages its ‘provincial’ values as ‘universalist’ and ‘scientific’ 
ones. Meanwhile, the values of non-Western nations are marginalised. By carefully 
selecting sentences, such as “he adamantly rejects liberal Western values […] Mr. 
Xi’s challenge to the West is growing more muscular”, the media frame the Western 
liberal form of democracy as the only one that should be considered legitimate and 
accepted. Grosfoguel (2012b) points out that the West usually imposes its liberal 
form of democracy on non-Western nations by force, calling it ‘progress’ and 






‘civilisation’. Forms of democratic alterity – in this case Chinese culture– are 
orientalised as “backward” and rejected a priori. Yu (1998) observes that deeply- 
rooted prejudices, ethnocentrism and stereotypes influence a great number of 
American journalistic reportages on China. Within the frame of Western 
‘universalism’ and ethnocentrism, China is constructed as a ‘barbarian’ and 
‘threatening’ ‘Other’. Such construction not only maintains the superiority of the 
Western culture, but also justifies the West’s interferences in China’s domestic 
issues in the name of ‘civilisation’. 
6.4 Construction through distortion  
Wertsch (2008) points out that collective memory is a group’s shared narrative of 
the past, which organises how the group recounts and relates to, its past by 
embedding it in acts of commemoration, politics and customs. As a cultural practice, 
collective memory thus becomes collaborative, defined not so much as “memory 
of a group” but “memory by a group” (Wertsch, 2008, p.121). Various groups in the 
society compete for the one and only hegemonic narrative (Wodak and De Cillia, 
2007). Wodak and De Cillia (2007) identify commemoration events as discourse 
arenas, in which dominant groups try to transmit their discourses of history to the 
public. In the case of the Victory Day parade, the media discursively constructed a 
collective and consensual narrative of the parade that coincides with the Western 
interpretation of the history of WWII.  
6.4.1 Glossing  
In the news texts, the media try to essentialise the understanding of the anniversary 
event, and distort China’s memories of WWII by constructing a dichotomy between 
an ‘evil’ China as the enemy and a ‘peace-loving’ Japan as the ally of the West, for 
example: 
(25) Washington has expressed unease with the parade’s demonisation of Japan, 
saying it would prefer that China hold a forward-looking event that 
promotes reconciliation and healing. (The New York Times, 2 September 
2015) 






(26) Moreover, there’s little desire outside China to vilify a peace-loving and 
democratic postwar Japan (South Korea is a notable exception) or to 
celebrate China's military rise, which explains why so few world leaders 
plan to show up for the Tiananmen spectacle. […] Where does all this lead? 
Bitter disputes over wartime history roil the politics of Asia, and may sow 
the seeds of new tragedies. The rise of nationalism around the region 
exacerbates the dangers.  (The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015) 
(27) The parade was designed to serve as a reminder of China’s role as an allied 
power, and of the millions of its people who died during Japan’s 1937-1945 
occupation, say Chinese experts. (The Wall Street Journal, 29 July 2015) 
The news texts only address in extremely vague terms the brutal and bloody 
massacres and atrocities committed by Japan during its invasion of China between 
1931 and 1945, such as the abstract noun “tragedies” or the phrase “wartime history” 
in the above examples. Similar abstract nouns and phrases can also be found in 
other news texts, such as “unfortunate events of the past” (The Wall Street Journal, 
3 September 2015), and Japan’s “wartime behaviour” (The New York Times, 2 
September 2015). Such abstract nouns and phrases considerably belittle the murder 
and atrocities of Japanese Fascism. Also, noteworthy in the media are, among other 
features, the lexical means used to refer to the deaths of victims: “millions of its 
people died during Japan’s 1937-1945 occupation”; “14 million to 20 million 
Chinese died” during World War II” (The New York Times, 9 May 2015). The 
language used to portray the crimes of Japanese Fascism not only deletes the 
perpetrators, but also leads to a euphemisation of the death of those murdered in the 
massacre. The more accurate word, “massacre”, is only once explicitly mentioned 
in all the news texts. For example, “tens of thousands of unarmed civilians were 
massacred over several weeks in 1937” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015). 
However, through formulating the sentence in passive voice, the perpetrators 
escape being named. Such passivisation and agent-deletion, according to Wodak 
and De Cillia (2007), make it possible to keep the criminals obscured, and reinforce 
the impression that the events were ‘unavoidable’ and ‘fated’. 
 
 






In addition, an orientational metaphor (i.e. “Forward-looking is good”, “Backward-
looking is bad”) is deployed by the West to distort the history of WWII and gloss 
over the history of Japan’s fascist occupation. Linguistic realisation of the 
orientational metaphor can be found in statements, such as Western leaders urged 
China to hold “a forward-looking event that promotes reconciliation and healing” 
(The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015). The statement implies that looking back 
at the horrors is psychologically unhealthy as well as politically unhelpful, and the 
injustices of the past should be separated from the present and the future. This 
finding corresponds to what Waterton (2010) refers to as the trope of “moving on”. 
Waterton (2010) argues that the notion of “moving on” is a pervasive and persuasive 
attempt to mitigate or gloss over social inequities and reproduce a range of social 
disadvantages. By encouraging China to “move on”, the media gloss over the 
brutalities of Japanese Fascism in China.  
 
The use of the orientational metaphor also helps to imply that China has been 
‘backward-looking’, and it is China (rather than Japan) who has hindered 
“reconciliation” and “healing”. It is interesting to discover that a medical metaphor 
is also employed by the media to orientalise China and background the crimes of 
Japanese Fascism. Linguistic realisation of the medical metaphor can be found in 
the use of the word “healing”. By using the medical metaphor, the media conjure 
up a picture of China as the patient who has to be cured, or at least treated 
preventatively. The conceptual frame of “healing” also implies that, technically, it 
is possible to make China better. The medical metaphor liberates China of any free 
will – medicine takes over, and conscience fails to matter. The Orientalist 
construction of China can also be found in the narrative of “there’s little desire 
outside China to vilify a peace-loving and democratic postwar Japan. […] Bitter 
disputes over wartime history roil the politics of Asia, and may sow the seeds of 
new tragedies. The rise of nationalism around the region exacerbates the dangers.” 
Here, the media imply that China is the only one to ‘obsess over’ the “disputes over 
wartime history”. By portraying the disputes as “roil[ing] the politics of Asia”, and 
“sow[ing] the seeds of new tragedies”, the media insinuate that it is China that poses 
a danger to the Asian region. Moreover, the orientational metaphor – i.e. more is up; 






less is down – is deployed to portray an intense ‘nationalist fervour’ exerted by 
China (such as “the rise of nationalism”, “rising Chinese nationalism” (The New 
York Times, 2 September 2015)). These orientational metaphors enable the media 
to insinuate that China is ‘past-oriented’, and therefore ‘threatening’ regional peace 
and order.  
 
Furthermore, the media create a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ divide, which categorises China 
on the ‘bad’ side and Japan on the ‘good’ side, by portraying Japan as a ‘peace-
loving and democratic post-war’ nation and an “ally of the United States” (The New 
York Times, 2 September 2015). The binary construction allows the media to justify 
the West’s absence from the parade. In fact, such a construction glosses over Japan’s 
atrocities. During the Meiji era in the 19th century, Japan had launched a 
programme of “modernisation” modelled on the West, and declared its exit from 
Asian, and announced its intention to align itself with Europe (i.e. Japan’s “De-
Asianisation” or “Leaving Asia”). The programme aimed to transform Meiji Japan 
and its people just like the European countries and their people. The programme led 
Japan to mirror Europe’s development in such a way that Japan too commenced 
imperial invasion and occupation in Asia. By drawing a ‘fault line’ between Japan 
and China, the media paint a contrast between what is ‘authentically’ Chinese (i.e. 
‘authoritarian’) and what is ‘authentically’ Western (i.e. a unique combination of 
‘universal’ values such as democracy, and individualism) (Pan, 2012, p.53.). In this 
way, the cultural differences between China and the West become a fixed dichotomy 
of ‘deviance’ versus ‘universality’, which is a typical discursive construction of 
Orientalism and Euro-American-centrism. Euro-American-centrism assumes that 
modernity and rationality are exclusively European products and experiences 
(Quijano, 2000). The West presents its own experiences and its own interpretations 
of the world history as a ‘universal’ ‘truth’, and imposes it on the rest of the world. 
For Euro-American-centrism, the rise of the modern world is regarded as initiated 
and motivated by developments in Europe (Mahoney, 2016). Here, Japan followed 
in footsteps of the West, and is regarded as ‘democratic’ and an “ally” of the West. 
Meanwhile, China’s different historical trajectory, which is not rooted in linear 
Aristotelian logic, is orientalised as ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’, and marginalised 






as the ‘Other’. Japan, which perpetrated colonialism and genocide in China, is 
instead framed as the ‘victim’ of a ‘threatening’ and ‘past-oriented’ China by the 
media. Such narrative distorts the history of WWII, interprets the past from a 
Western-centric perspective, and glosses over the crimes of Japan’s colonisation 
and exploitation in China. 
 
Such a Eurocentric interpretation can be found in quite a few of major works on 
WWII. For example, in Parker’s (1989, p.74) analysis of Japan’s invasion of 
northeast China, he writes that “Japanese essential trade with China was threatened 
by Chinese nationalism. Japan desires to make markets secure by political or 
military action”. There is no mention here of the fact that the war on China had been 
pre-mediated and planned by Japan. Parker’s accounts offer a rather sanitised 
version of Japanese colonialism and exploitation. The violent and bloody conquest 
of China is presented as Japan’s orderly and regulated self-defence. These dominant 
discourses of colonial conquests have served as prime justification for the conquests 
of other subaltern cultures (Bhambra, 2016). Moreover, in most of the historical 
literature, the Chinese people’s resistance against Japan is termed “the Sino-
Japanese War”. The term manages to whitewash Japan’s bloody conquest of China, 
the expropriation and genocide of indigenous peoples, land grabbing, exploitation 
and oppression. It also elides the many mass struggles, violent and less so, that 
constitute the history of decolonisation. Miyoshi and Harootunian (1993, p.20) 
point out that there seems to be “a tacit accord among Western industrialised nations 
to be amnesiac about Japan’s past”. Western media and cultural products, such as 
Hollywood films, are dominated by the memories of the Western allies’ encounters 
with imperial Japan, such as Pacific War, the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the 
nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The heinous war crimes and brutal 
colonial atrocities that imperial Japan committed in Asian nations are completely 
erased (Weiner, 1994). Hence, the tribulation of Japanese colonies, which involved 
tens of thousands of Asians, particularly Chinese women who served as battlefield 
“sex slaves” in military brothels, innumerable massacres, and ruthless economic 
exploitation, have been relegated to oblivion (Choi J., 2003). In the following parts, 
I problematise the dominant discourses of WWII by connecting the history of 






Japan’s industrial capitalism with the history of its violent and bloody conquest of 
the Asian nations, in particular China, and thus provide an alternative understanding 
of Japan’s colonialisation in Asia and particularly China.  
 
Japan’s colonial ambitions can be traced backed to the nineteenth century, which 
was marked by industrial colonialism in the world. During the era of industrial 
colonialism, the dynamics of capitalism made manufacturers in Europe eager to 
expand by tapping into cheaper sources of raw materials and accessing new markets 
overseas. Capitalism led Europe to increase its territorial acquisition and resource 
exploitation in Asia. Against the background of global industrial colonialism, 
Japanese leaders looked to what they called “Euro-America” for the “prerequisites 
of ‘civilisation’” (Gluck, 1997, p.561), and launched a Western-inspired 
programme of “modernisation” in Japan during the Meiji era (1866-1912), with a 
view to “establish a new, European-style empire on the edge of Asia” (Myers and 
Peattie, 1984, p.64). In the Meiji era, the energies of the “restless samurai class” 
were deflected in the modernising project to make the Empire like the countries of 
Europe (Bush, 2006). Japan’s programme of “modernisation” increasingly adopted 
a military emphasis, with imperialist expansion being regarded as an inevitable path 
for a ‘vigorous and healthy’ polity that prepares to exit Asia and join Europe (Myers 
and Peattie, 1984). The establishment of a capitalist economy and the introduction 
of European technologies bolstered the expansionist ideologies and racist beliefs 
inherited from the pre-Meiji period. 
 
In 1894-1895, Japan waged a war against China, in which Japan annexed the 
Liaotung peninsula and Taiwan and Penghu Islands. Ten years later, following the 
Russo-Japanese War (fought out in northeast China), Japan further strengthened its 
position and presence in northeast China (Dai, 2015, Lary, 2007). The early success 
of Japanese imperialism, generated wartime profits, reparations, and the opening of 
new markets, and thus enabled the rapid advance of Japanese capitalism, especially 
for those large-scale companies, the Zaibatsu, which had strong government links 
(Beasley, 1987). At that time, Meiji Japan’s social base was an alliance between the 
military and the emerging bourgeoisie under the aegis of the monarchy. Japanese 






imperialism was characterised by “the concentration of power in the hands of the 
military”. The development of capitalism and the formation of monopoly 
enterprises, such as the Zaibatsu, were impaired by a lack of purchasing power in 
Japan. Moreover, social tensions and conflicts surfaced as social and political 
changes lagged behind. Older, militaristic values within the modern state resurfaced 
(Bush, 2006). An imperialism, which was based on “mythical military nationalism”, 
and “in symbiosis” with the need for overseas expansion as a valve for domestic 
tensions (Martin, 1986, p.71), led to Japanese imperialism and colonialism in Asia. 
 
In a 1907 policy statement, the Japanese army set forth its basic strategy for 
aggressive operations on the Asian mainland (Peattie, 2011). During this era of 
imperialism and colonialism, Japan, the only Asian imperialist power, regarded 
China as its source of resources for its industries, as a lucrative field for its capital, 
as its overseas market and as a springboard for further expansion and control of the 
entire Asian region (Hu and Han, 2005, Iriye, 1987, Peattie, 2011). During World 
War One (hereafter referred to as WWI), Japan rapidly increased its economic and 
industrial exploitation in China, especially in northeast China, Shandong, Shanghai, 
and Tianjin. Japan saw itself increasingly as “an imperial power, the Asian imperial 
power, moving toward and then beyond the status of one of the Western imperial 
powers” (Lary, 2007, p.4). At the end of WWI, Japan annexed the Shandong 
Peninsula, and imposed an unequal treaty known as the “Twenty-One Demands” 
on the Republic of China (Hebei Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015). 
The “Twenty-One Demands”, which greatly extended Japan’s control over 
Manchuria and gave it considerable control over the entire Chinese economy, lays 
bare Japan’s ambition to subjugate and colonise China (Hebei Provincial Party 
History Research Group, 2015). In 1927, Japan published a strategic planning 
document, known as “Tanaka Memorial”7, and pursued its colonial occupation and 
                                                     
7 In 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Baron Tanaka Giichi convened an infamous “Far East 
conference”, and planned to conquer China by force (Hu and Han, 2005; Dai, 2015). After 
the conference, Japan published a strategic planning document, known as “Tanaka 
Memorial” (Hu and Han, 2005; Dai, 2015). In the Memorial, Tanaka laid out a strategy for 
Emperor Hirohito to take over China and the world. Tanaka suggested to use force to 
occupy northeast China, which is known as his “blood-and-iron policy”. He assumed that 
if Japan could conquer northeast China, Japan could use that as a base to conquer the whole 






exploitation in China with greater urgency (Dai, 2015, Hu and Han, 2005). In 1932, 
Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in the wake of the Manchurian 
Incident of September, 1931. In November 1936 Japan signed an anti-Comintern 
pact with Germany and aligned itself with the Fascist powers in Europe (Hebei 
Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015, Kitchen, 1990, Peng, 2015). On 7 
July 1937, Japan waged a war at the Lugouqiao (English: the Marco Polo Bridge), 
and started its full-scale war of aggression in China (Hebei Provincial Party History 
Research Group, 2015, Peng, 2015). 
 
During its colonial occupation of China, Japan pursued a policy of “sustaining the 
war by means of war” (which refers to “Japan’s policy of ruthlessly plundering of 
the Chinese areas under its occupation to meet the expenses of its aggressive war”) 
(Mao, [1965] 2014, p.268). Japan tried to legitimise its imperialist aggression by 
arguing that it sought to establish a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ based 
on a Pan-Asian (or “Asia is one”) ideology. In effect, the concept emphasises the 
link between race and imperial power, and justifies Japan’s imperialism by asserting 
its racial superiority over the people it dominated. The colonial statement masks 
Japan’s atrocities that brought destruction and misery to China. Japan adopted a 
horrible strategy to strengthen its rule, which was based on terror, forced relocation, 
and plunder – known as the “sanguang zhengce” (three-all policy, i.e. “kill all, burn 
all, and loot all”) (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, p.39, Zhang, 2015). Japan’s terrible 
atrocities in China, particularly the Nanking Massacre of more than 300000 Chinese 
people in December 1937, epitomised the unfathomable brutality of Japanese 
fascism and colonialism, and the appalling hypocrisy of the ideology of Asian 
cooperation (Hu and Han, 2005, Zhang, 2015).  
 
By portraying Japan as “peace-loving” in the news texts, the media reconstruct a 
historical narrative that denies Japan’s brutal ambitions for colonial expansion, and 
the heinous atrocities and abominable racist genocide it committed. The absence of 
                                                     
of China. If Japan succeeded in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the 
South China Sea countries would fear and surrender to Japan (Peng, 2015). After the 
publication of the “Tanaka Memorial”, Japan sped up its paces of occupying China. 






Western leaders at the parade was not, as the West alleged, because the 
representatives of the state were “wary of being seen to support a growing Chinese 
military” (The New York Times, 3 September 2015), but instead, it reflects the 
West’s effort to gloss over Japan’s iniquities of the past. 
6.4.2 Silencing   
In addition to backgrounding Japan’s colonial exploitation and fascist aggression in 
the Asian nations and particularly in China, the American mainstream newspapers 
also deprived China of its own collective memories of WWII. As such, the Western-
centric interpretation of the history of WWII is universalised as ‘truth’ and ‘fact’, 
the voices, collective memories and experiences of the Chinese are silenced. In the 
news texts, the media marginalised the subaltern Chinese memories and 
expressions of WWII by orientalising China as ‘backward’ and ‘unable’ to produce 
thoughts worthy of being considered part of the world history: 
(28) Although China often asks Japan to take a “correct” view of history, many 
historians say the Chinese Communist Party itself takes liberties with 
history - playing down or ignoring the fact that it was Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalist forces, not Mao's guerrillas that took the fight to the Japanese. 
Xi's comments made no mention of this fact […]The version of history 
being crafted by Xi and his peers is of a country that triumphed under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and is being led forward by the 
party - ever stronger and more forceful, but still, as Xi stressed several times, 
committed to peace. (The Washington Post, 4 September 2015) 
The news texts represent China and interpret the history of the Chinese people’s 
resistance against Japanese Fascism from a Euro-American-centric perspective. By 
activating China as an actor in relation to material processes such as “take liberties 
of ”, “crafted”, “made no mention”, “play down or ignore”, and “manipulate”, the 
media imply that China is ‘uncivilised’ and ‘irrational’ and ‘cannot produce 
absolute theoretical insights’. This construction is a typical discourse of “epistemic 
racism”. Grosfoguel (2012b) critically analyses “epistemic racism” and points out 
that it assumes that “absolute knowledge” could only be achieved by white 






Christian-heterosexual-European men. Non-Western nations and people, which are 
considered ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, are not granted the capacity to produce 
thoughts worthy of being considered a part of the philosophical legacy of humanity. 
The West authoritatively presents itself and its produced knowledge about the other 
cultures as ‘objective’ and ‘universalist’, while the knowledge and philosophies of 
non-Western nations are deemed to be ‘inferior’. In terms of the American 
mainstream media coverage of the event, by orientalising China as ‘uncivilised’, 
the media refused to grant China the ability to produce ‘absolute knowledge’. 
Whatever knowledge China produces cannot be regarded as worthy of being part 
of world history. In so doing, the West maintains its privilege of knowledge 
production, and makes its own Euro-American-centric interpretation of the history 
of WWII appear ‘universal’ and ‘scientific’. The voice of China is silenced. The 
media further distorted the history of China’s resistance against Japanese Fascism, 
by making statements, such as: 
(29) “The Communists didn’t fight much, but they need to take credit for 
winning the war […]” Sun says. (Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2015) 
(30) “The Chinese Communist Party didn’t defeat Japan; this is very painful to 
see,” […] “During those eight years, it was us Nationalists who were 
fighting – the Communists were not doing battle with the Japanese.” (Los 
Angeles Times, 2 September 2015) 
“Communist Party” is activated as an actor in relation to material processes such as 
“didn’t defeat Japan”, “didn't fight much”, and “were not doing battle with the 
Japanese”. These material processes suggest that the “communist party” is 
‘backward’ and ‘non-resistant’. Such a construction downplays and silences the role 
of the Chinese Communist Party in fighting against Japanese Fascism. 
By constructing a division between an ‘evil’ China and a ‘peace-loving’ Japan, and 
orientalising China as ‘uncivilised’, the media interpret the history of WWII from 
a Euro-American-centric perspective and silence the memories of China of WWII. 
The media reconstruct a history that glosses over the atrocities and racist genocide 
committed by Japan’s colonial powers, and erases the ‘Other’, i.e. the Chinese 
people and the Chinese communist party, from the history of WWII with regard to 






their sufferings under resistance against Japanese militarism and Fascism and the 
overall global victory over Fascism. The amnesia of China’s suffering and struggle 
against Japanese militarism is embodied in the absence of Western leaders at the 
parade. .  
6.5 Restoring collective memories of Chinese people’s war against 
Japanese Fascism  
The American mainstream newspapers ignored the collective memories of China’s 
war against Japan’s aggression during the WWII, glossed over Japan’s colonisation 
in the Asian nations and in particular China, and thus represented the anniversary 
parade in a discourse of ‘China threat’. In that way, the media constructed the 
narrative of the parade in a way that is consistent with the West’s interpretation of 
WWII, and justified the privileges of the West in the production and distribution of 
knowledge on modern world history. Modern world history, especially the history 
of the Global War against Fascism, is Euro-America centric. In the field of 
historiography, the vast majority of the literature is written by, and about, only some 
of the Euro-American peoples and battles. Although centrally concerned with the 
WWII, historiography has paid little attention to the devastating wars which took 
place in non-Western nations – in this case, the Japanese colonial conquest of China. 
Also scant attention is being paid to the anti-colonial wars fought for independence. 
The existing body of knowledge on the WWII has overlooked the histories of the 
rest of the world. 
 
When dealing with the history of the Global War against Fascism, most historical 
accounts produced in Europe and the United States concentrate on the British and 
Americans fighting in Europe and the Pacific. The role of China’s War of Resistance 
against Japan’s invasion during the WWII has not been properly represented (Xie, 
2016). Despite the scale and importance of the Chinese people’s resistance in the 
Global War against Fascism, the names of legendary battles in China, such as that 
of Lugouqiao, Xuzhou, Pingxingguan – battles that were as critical in the conflicts 
that gripped the world in the late 1930s and the 1940s as Dieppe, Stalingrad, or 






Normandy – are hardly known to the world (Lary, 2007). The names of Chinese 
generals such as Zhang Zizhong, Tang Enbo, etc. – whose achievements during 
China’s war of resistance were on a par with those of Montgomery or Patton in 
Europe – are seldom mentioned in historiography (Lary, 2007). 
 
For example, in his History of the Second World War, Hart (1999) never mentions 
military operations in China. The overlook of battles and resistances in the China 
battlefield is not rare, and can be found in the majority of historical works. In 
Hattori’s (1953) Complete History of the Great East Asia War, only a couple of 
sentences in the background chapter are devoted to China battles (including fights 
and conflicts in China during WWII), even though the book claims to present a 
large-scale military history of the Pacific War. China’s battles are rarely accorded a 
similar status, that is, of being an essential part of world history, which contributed 
to the defeat of World War II’s fascists. Similarly, in volume ten of A global history, 
edited by the former Soviet Science Institute (1978), only ten pages are dedicated 
to describe Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression. Among the spate of 
books published on the World War II, scholars only pay scant attention to China’s 
war against Japanese invasion. Few histories on World War II have included the 
Chinese war experience in their sense making of the war. 
 
In historiography, the dominant narrative of WWII is that it all began with Hilter’s 
and Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 (cf. Weinberg, 1995). There 
is no mention of China having already resisted against Japan’s invasion in the 
northeast of China since 1931. In fact, given that Japan had begun its imperialist 
conquest of Northeast China already in 1931, China had been fighting the war 
against fascism 8 years before the outbreak of WWII in Europe in 1939. Following 
the Japanese occupation of Northeast China in the wake of “the September 18th 
Incident”, large numbers of Chinese volunteer armies fought against Japanese and 
Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) forces over wide areas of Northeast China (Liang Z., 
2015). In November 1931, a Jilin Provincial Kangri zhengfu (Anti-Japanese 
Government) was established to coordinate military resistance (Hu, 2015, Lary, 
2007). Ordinary Chinese, including peasants, workers, students, policemen, 






tradesmen, in addition to the well-to-do were willing to take up arms and join the 
anti-Japanese forces (Coogan, 1993). Coogan (1993, p.37) points out that “the 
volunteer armies were the main anti-Japanese force in Northeast China during 1932 
and posed a serious obstacle to Japanese attempts to dominate the country”. 
Moreover, Chinese Communists organised a Dongbei kangri lianjun (Northeast 
Anti-Japanese United Army), open to all who wanted to resist the invasion, and 
conducted a protracted campaign which threatened the stability of the Manzhouguo 
(Manchukuo)  regime, especially during 1936 and 1937 (Coogan, 1993, Wang, 
1995). 
 
By 1939, China had already been at war with Japan for 8 years. It makes China the 
nation who first started to fight against Fascism, which is well captured in Lary’s 
(2007, p. 1) words: 
[T]he all-out war that started in China with the Japanese invasion in 
1937 and lasted until 1945 was the longest conflict of any in the warfare 
that then engulfed the world – World War II. 
The Chinese people’s war of resistance, which started 8 years earlier (if using 1931 
as a start point) than the war in Europe and lasted twice as long as the Soviet-
German and the American-Japanese conflicts, has been deliberately downplayed 
and remained in the shadows of historiography (Mitter and Moore, 2011). The 
history of the Global War against Fascism is reduced to the history of Euro-
American war against Fascism. 
 
The Euro-American centric interpretation of the WWII, with its origins in the 
particular knowledge of European battlefields and wars, is devised to make sense 
of the behaviour of power and culture under Western capitalist modernity (Seth, 
2011). It is typically from such particulars that the statements about WWII have 
been produced. Through a deafness towards the world, the West camouflages its 
European interpretation of the history as ‘universalist cosmopolitanism’ and 
imposes it on the rest of the world as the ‘truth’. Considering that these statements 
about WWII are derived from a historically very peculiar, temporally very thin, and 
spatially very narrow slice of human history, they absolutely ignore the majority of 






Chinese experiences, and fail to help, if not even impede, people’s understandings 
of , what happened in the non-Western battle grounds, particularly at the Eastern 
front of China. Consequently, the Eurocentric construction of WWII results in the 
exclusion and silence of indigenous knowledge (Chowdhry and Nair, 2002). The 
Eurocentric construction of the world’s history reduces a complex phenomenon to 
a simple and patterned framework of understanding, which locates its origins in an 
exclusive representation of the West’s historical experience and is couched in 
orthodox Euro-American philosophical terms (Seth, 2011). 
 
The West-centric construction of knowledge about the global war against Fascism 
has given rise to a distorted view of the Chinese people’s struggles and resistances 
against fascism in WWII. In addition to the American media discourses, which 
downplay the role of China in the global war against Fascism, similar discourses 
can be found in the majority of major works on the WWII. For example, in 
discussing the strategic connection between the Pacific wars and China’s war of 
resistance against Japanese fascism, Haruo (2011, p.434) writes that 
the direction of the Japanese-American war could no longer be 
determined by the settlement of the Sino-American War. At the end of 
1943, it could be said that Japan was fighting two independent wars 
with marginal connections between them. 
He (2011, p.440) continues to point out that  
China was unable to make substantial contributions to the final result 
of the Asian Pacific War. Indeed, it was the U.S. Navy’s thorough 
destruction of Japanese shipping, the U.S. Air Force’s strategic raids 
launched from the Mariana Islands on Japan proper, and the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that crushed Japan’s economy 
and its ability to continue the war.  
Haruo attributes Japan’s surrender alone to the U.S. air forces and their atomic 
bombings. There is no mention of the Chinese people’s struggles. Echoing Haruo’s 
argument, Spector’s (2011) account of the “Sino-Japanese” war in the context of 
world history is a story of the West’s achievement, and also downplays (and even 
ignores) the contributions made by non-Western nations, such as China. Spector 






(2011, p.479) writes that 
rapid technological advances, especially in long-range heavy bombers 
and aircraft carrier task forces, diminished China’s value near the end 
of the war as a base to launch aerial assaults against the Japanese home 
islands. Yet the inability of the Japanese army to withdraw substantial 
numbers of troops by 1944 from the theatre to more critical battlefields 
elsewhere was due less to the danger posed by Chinese military forces 
than to the relentless American and Allied submarine and air attacks 
that destroyed Japan’s merchant marine fleet, leaving Tokyo without 
sufficient shipping to redeploy forces or move essential raw materials 
and finished goods. 
Both Haruo’s and Spector’s views of Chinese forces and the outcome of the war 
privilege Western military effectiveness. The Eurocentric view of the outcome of 
the war is echoed throughout Western academic works on the topic of WWII, 
whereby the Chinese resistances efforts are constructed as irrelevant to the outcome 
of the war, and China orientalised as “backward”, “corrupt”, “incapable” or even 
“unwilling to manoeuvre large numbers of units on the grand scale required and 
mount effective resistance against the Japanese invasion” (cf. Haruo, 2011, p.447, 
Hsiung and Levine, 1992, p.141). This view is problematic considering that it not 
only belittles China’s war effort, but also ignores the enormous suffering that the 
war caused, as well as China’s dogged resistance during the war. 
 
In order to counter Japan’s full-scale aggression against China, the Chinese 
Communist and Nationalist parties joint up to form a Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian 
(an anti-Japanese United Front) on the 8th of July 1937 (Zhang, 2015). The union 
saw China’s Communist and Nationalist parties cooperatively fight against 
Japanese Fascism on battlefields and behind enemy lines, and effectively foil 
Japan’s ambition to “invade China within three months” (Peng, 2015, p.50). In the 
battle behind enemy lines, the Chinese Communist party established Kangri 
genjudi (anti-Japanese base areas), such as the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base areas, 
Shanxi-Hebei-Henan base areas, and organised more than 1600 counteroffensives 
between July 1937 and October 1938 (Zhu, 2005). During the Pingxingguan war in 






September of 1937, China’s central army and the communist Balujun (Eighth Rout 
Army) annihilated a brigade of the Japanese Fifth Division (Drea and Van de Ven, 
2011, Wang, 1995). When defending Shanghai in October 1937, 40000 Japanese 
men were stuck in the China battlefield (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, Williamsen, 
1992). According to Drea and Van de Ven (2011, p. 35), “by the end of 1937 the 
equivalent of Japan’s peacetime army establishment of sixteen divisions and 
600000 men was struck in the protracted war in China”. In central China, Japanese 
imperial army forces had been worn down by heavy casualties, insufficient stocks 
of ammunition, and inadequate logistical support. Other significant Chinese 
counteroffensives in the war included the battle of Taierzhuang in March 1938 – 
April 1938, the battle of Xuzhou in April 1938, and the battle of Wuhan in the 
summer of 1938. Such counteroffensives impaired Japan’s ability to conduct large-
scale operations (Liang Z., 2015, Peng, 2015).  
 
In order to fend off Japan’s brutal colonial exploitation and occupation, Chinese 
Communists organised guerrilla wars to fight against Japanese plunder, and 
launched the Baituan dazhan (Hundred Regiments Offensive) in August 1940 
(Liang Z., 2015). Designed to sever Japanese road and rail communications, pin 
down Japanese armies, and destroy Japanese-controlled factories and mines, the 
wide-ranging, well-coordinated attacks struck a deadly blow on Japanese soldiers 
and their puppet troops ( Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, Liang Z., 2015, Zhu, 2005). 
In the same year, the Chinese people organised more than 20000 counteroffensives 
against Japanese forces (Liu 2015). When the Pacific war broke out in 1941, China 
had already singlehandedly been fighting against Japanese Fascism for 10 years. 
The scope and intensity of the Communist and Nationalist counteroffensives on 
Chinese battlefields meant a big blow to Japan, and terminated Japan’s policy of 
being able to “sustain war by means of war”. More importantly, the Chinese 
counteroffensives effectively broke up Japanese “North-forward” aggression 
against the Soviet Union and delayed Japan’s “South-Forward” plans targeting 
Southeast Asia Pacific (Hu, 2015, Peng, 2015). The significance of Chinese 
successes in fighting Japanese forces during WWII is well captured in the statistics 
in Mawdsley’s (2009, p.68) World War Two: a New Story: 






[o]ne estimate is that the Japanese lost (in deaths) 220000 personnel in 
China in 1937-9, and 100000 in 1940-1. (Reflecting the more static 
situation of later years, the Japanese would lose only 157000 men in 
China in 1942-5.). […] by contrast, in the Battle of France in 1940 - the 
costliest German campaign before June 1941 – German losses were 
45000 and French losses 90000.  
As a result of the Chinese people’s resistance, the Japanese army were forced to 
enter the war with Britain and the United States in 1941 with two-thirds of its 
ground forces still deployed on the Chinese mainland, including in northeast China 
(Peng, 2015). 
 
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japan attacked and occupied Guam, 
Manila and Singapore in rapid succession (Ch'i, 1992). In order to prevent Japan 
from occupying strategically important Burma, China reacted quickly, and sent the 
Chinese Expeditionary Army (hereafter referred to as CEA) to undertake a 
campaign in Burma in cooperation with the British (Ch'i, 1992, p. 158). During 
Burma’s war against Japan, the British dismissed Burma as a “‘disease-ridden 
country’ that was hardly a worthwhile objective” (Kitchen, 1990, p.163). Following 
the unannounced retreat of British units from the battle, the Chinese armies ended 
up fighting against the Japanese armies alone (Peng, 2015). Propelled on by their 
successful defence of Mandalay, the Chinese army made great progress in their fight 
against Japan in northern Burma. By January 1945, the Chinese army had recovered 
the strategic town of Myitkina, decimated the renowned Japanese 18th division in 
the process, and completely opened the Sino-India Road (Chi, 1992). The Chinese 
soldiers, who participated in the second Burma campaign, delivered devastating 
blows to the Japanese troops in one battle after another. According to the statistics 
in Chi (1992, p.162), “the Japanese suffered 48,850 dead, and 647 captured, along 
with the loss of a large quantity of weapons”. The Chinese forces not only saved 
their allies from a dangerous situation, but contributed to the liberation of South-
Asian countries.  
 






In the summer of 1945, when the global anti-fascist forces were on the verge of 
victory, Chinese armies started a great counteroffensive against the Japanese in the 
north, central, south and northeast of China. Chinese counteroffensives, combined 
with Soviet attacks on Japan’s Kwantung Army in the northeast of China and U.S. 
raids on Japan, resulted in the surrender of 1200000 Japanese armies in China (Hu, 
2015, Peng, 2015). It is evident that China’s War of Resistance against Japan’s 
invasion constitutes an indispensable component of the global war against Fascism.  
 
Regrettably, the collective memories of Chin’s struggles against Japan’s fascism 
have completely been silenced in the West-centric accounts of WWII. The media 
discourses of the anniversary parade reproduced the dominant interpretation of 
WWII, silenced the voice of China, and constructed the parade in a 
decontextualised way. The West imposed its own knowledge of WWII on the rest 
of the world as the ‘truth’, which further maintained and strengthened cultural 
inequalities between the West and China.  
6.6 Summary 
The CDA of the media coverage of China’s Victory Day parade has been the focus 
of this chapter. The analysis revealed that the media discursively constructed the 
parade in a decontexualised way, glossed over China’s traumatic experiences, and 
silenced China’s struggles against Japanese Fascism. The news texts established a 
dichotomy between a ‘threatening’ and ‘uncivilised’ China and a ‘peace-defender’ 
and ‘liberal’ U.S and its allies (in this case Japan), evoked historical colonial 
‘yellow peril’ stereotypes: ‘threatening’ and ‘aggressive’, strengthened the self-
definition of the U.S. and Japan as ‘superior’ and ‘civilised’, and justified the U.S. 
intervention in the Asian-Pacific region. The strategic use of metaphors such as 
muscle flexing, and negatively connoted words, enabled the media to construct 
China as a scapegoat for stirring up troubles in the Asian region, and denigrated 
China as the ‘military’, ‘warlike’ and ‘dangerous’ ‘Other’. In addition, the media 
adopted an ‘anti-communism’ frame to construct narratives around themes of socio-
cultural, economic, and political deprivation. Making use of linguistic tools such as 






transitivity and selection of negatively-connoted words, the media represented 
China in a ‘China collapse’ narrative, and stigmatised China as ‘totalitarian’ and 
‘uncivilised’. By playing on the discourse of ‘uncivilised’ China, the media 
denigrated China as an ‘irrational’ ‘Other’, who is incapable of producing thoughts 
that are worthy of being regarded as essential knowledge. It is in these ways that 
the otherness of China was effectively constructed. The construction strengthened 
the deeply-entrenched colonial image of China, and decontexualised the 
anniversary parade in a way that it was represented in an ‘attack’ versus ‘defend’ 
frame. In so doing, parade was decontextualised as a ‘means of showing military 
power’.  
 
In addition, this chapter has argued that the decontexualised representation of the 
anniversary parade not only whitewashed Japan’s colonial expansion and racial 
genocide in the colonised Asian nations, and in particular in China, but also silenced 
China’s various struggles against Japan’s fascism. The sum of these strategies 
allowed the media to construct a narrative of the parade that favoured the West’s 
interpretation of the history of WWII. By contextualising the discussion of the 
parade in relations to the history of China’s war against Japan’s fascism between 
1931 and 1942, the chapter deconstructed the dominant discourses of the parade 
and produced an increasingly comprehensive account of WWII that extends beyond 
the Eurocentric narrative. The chapter also pointed out that the Eurocentrism 
embedded in the Western culture continues to generate a hierarchy in the production 
of knowledge, whereby the West is presented as superior to non-Western nations. 
The West has constructed its own interpretation of the WWII by downplaying, if 
not ignoring, China’s contribution to the success of the war, and continues to 
impose the Western interpretation on the rest of the world as the ‘truth’, thus 













With the advent of globalisation, national economies are increasingly connected by 
means of international trade. At the same time, globalisation has intensified 
inequalities and polarisation between the global North and the South (Amadi, 2012). 
The core zones of the capitalist world economy overlap with predominantly Euro-
American societies, while peripheral zones tend to be found in previously colonised 
non-Western nations. The economic and political systems of the peripheral states 
are shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist world system organised 
around a hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1979, 1984, 
1995). The world system perpetuates the wealth of the “core” (global North) at the 
expense of the periphery (global South). Since the 1970s, the rise of China has 
fundamentally disrupted the existing “world order”. China’s economic role has 
gained significant prominence in a system once dominated by capital from 
developed countries. The increasing economic and political interactions between 
China and Africa mark a trend of declining dominance of the “core economies”. 
Since the beginning of the twenty–first century, China has made efforts to further 
strengthen its relations with Africa by convening several high-level summits 
between Chinese and African leaders, such as the convocation of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (hereafter referred to as FOCAC) in 2000, 2003, 2006, 
2009, 2012 and 2015 (Okolo and Akwu, 2016). Since 2000, Chinese investment in 
Africa has increased rapidly (Okolo and Akwu, 2016). Meanwhile, driven by the 
strategy of “Zouchuqu” (“going out”), Chinese enterprises have strengthened 
cooperation with Africa in a range of fields, including investment, trade, cultural 
exchange, etc. Moreover, the Chinese government has offered priority policies and 
commercial lending for outward investment projects in several sectors. This has 
encouraged economic cooperation between China and Africa, and resulted in many 






African countries gaining huge leverage and an enhanced position in the global 
economy. 
  
There has been some scholarly interest in the cultural exchanges and historical 
relations between China and Africa. Recent studies extend the focus to economy 
and development in China-Africa relations (cf. Alden, 2007, Amadi, 2012, Ampiah 
and Naidu, 2008, Lee, 2006, Taylor, 2005, Taylor, 2006). However, a critical review 
of this research shows that this body of work tends to be dominated by Euro-
American-centric perspectives, which consider China as the ‘Other’ threatening the 
established ‘sphere of influence’ of Anglo-Saxon and American powers. Thereby, 
China is portrayed as a ‘neo-colonial power’ in Africa. While there are occasional 
counter-narratives such as works by Sautman and Yan (2014, 2016) and Giese and 
Thiel (2014), they are more concerned with re-establishing ‘realities’ than engaging 
with theoretical debates. Current scholarship in the field ignores the importance of 
discourse in constructing national images and international relations and the 
ideology and power associated with the construction of international relations. 
Based on a selection of 61 American news texts on China-Africa relations, this 
chapter contributes to the current literature in a novel way by adopting a 
postcolonial theoretical perspective to 1) examine the frame that the American 
mainstream newspapers have used to construct China-Africa relations as ‘colonial’, 
and 2) reconstruct the story of China-Africa relations, and allow for the voice of 
China as a developing country, thus providing a counter-narrative to the hegemonic 
discourse.  
 
Additionally, the chapter contributes to the growing literature on postcolonial 
international relations (hereafter referred to as IR). Current studies on IR (cf. Brown, 
2012, Mandaville, 2003) are dominated by ideas produced in, and by, the West. A 
storyline of international order, which is derived from a particular representation of 
the West’s Post-Renaissance historical experience, is presented as the ‘universal’ 
and ‘true’ account of the world, and is imposed on the rest of the world. The voices 
and political thought of non-Western nations are marginalised and silenced. 
Although recent studies have extended their focus to non-Western regions, such as 






China and African countries, they tend to reproduce the same Western-centric 
framework. This chapter will argue that the existing Euro-America-centric 
theoretical concepts are inadequate for facilitating an understanding of what 
happened in non-Western regions. By examining the American mainstream media’s 
representation of China-Africa relations, this chapter deconstructs Western 
epistemologies, and explores how the American mainstream media position the 
West, particularly the U.S., in relation to China and Africa. 
 
The chapter is organised into six sections. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the 
history of China-Africa relations, and sets out the context in which current relations 
between China and Africa are to be understood. China’s strengthened relation with 
Africa is significant as it comes at a time when African countries remained marginal 
to the international trade system, and are frequently ignored in discussions and 
negotiations of global trade, commerce and politics. Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 
present the data and offer an analytical interpretation of the media’s representation 
of China-Africa relations. Section7.6 summarises the chapter’s findings and 
arguments. 
7.2 Contextualising China-Africa relations 
George (1994, p.ix) points out that the discipline of IR is related to a discursive  
regime of exclusion, silence, and intolerance that “reduces a complex and turbulent  
world to a patterned and rigidly ordered framework of understanding, derived from 
a particular representation of post-Renaissance European historical experience,  
articulated in orthodox Anglo-American philosophical terms”. In other words, the 
discipline of IR is an Anglo-American-centric social science, in which the voices 
of non-Westerners are silenced. The West projects its values of a Westphalian 
international society, articulated in a language of rights and authority, on to the non-
West in an effort to assimilate it. Otherwise, the non-West’s difference is translated 
as ‘inferiority’ and pathologised as ‘danger’. The silencing of the postcolonial non-
West is effectively materialised in the subsumption of decolonising moments under 
the ‘civilising’ tropes, such as the “expansion of international society”, or 






‘modernisation’ and ‘development’. The richness of political thought coming out 
of the non-West, particularly the cooperation and relations found within the “global 
South”, is yet to be fully understood and integrated into IR. Niang (2016) points out 
that the development of “global South” relations, particular China-Africa relations, 
provides an Asian-African approach to the provincial, if hegemonic, self-
understanding of IR, and presents a space where non-Westerners are able to present 
themselves, rather than being merely represented or spoken about. The following 
sections revisit China-Africa relations with a view to offer a small exploration into 
the paradoxical links between the expansion of IR and the marginalisation of the 
voices of the postcolonial non-West. The following sections situate China-Africa 
relations in the specificities of Africa’s colonial past and postcolonial present, while 
also considering the West’s historical and contemporary roles in Africa, and China’s 
changing position in the world.  
7.2.1 The West’s historical and contemporary roles in Africa 
The contact between Africa and the West began with the slave trade, which saw the 
capture and forceful transportation of millions of Africans across the Atlantic to 
work in plantations in the Americas (Alemazung, 2010). During the seventeenth 
century, the colonisation of America by Europeans fuelled the capture, transport, 
and enslavement of Africans in the Americas and the Caribbean. The Atlantic slave 
trade during Western colonialism represents the largest slave trade in human history. 
An estimated 2.75 million slaves were taken from West Africa to the Americas in 
the seventeenth century. The number rose further to a massive 7 million in the 
eighteenth century (Potter et al., 2004). A decree issued by Louis XIV of France in 
1670 (cited in Potter et al., 2004, p. 59) read, “there is nothing which contributes 
more to the development of the colonies and the cultivation of their soil than the 
laborious toil of the Negros”. The trade enabled Europeans to expand their 
settlement in the New World, but also earn substantial capital to finance the 
industrial revolution back in Europe. Inevitably, it caused an unparalleled number 
of human deaths as well as immense suffering for Africa and its peoples. The slave 
trade pauperised and depopulated the African continent, stealing its young and 






productive members and derailing the political history and economic development. 
In addition, the slave trade drew many parts and peoples of the non-European world 
into the capitalist system, consolidated the dominant-dominated relations between 
Europeans (mainly white men) and non-Europeans (the so-called coloured peoples), 
making racism the primary justification for full colonial exploitation of non-
European nations (in this case Africa) (Bulhan, 2015). 
 
The expansion of maritime and financial capitalism facilitated the peak of African 
slave trade, and was immediately followed by the colonisation of African countries 
in the nineteenth century. A systemic violence was inflicted upon Africa, which was 
not only integral to capitalism, but also coexistent with racism, cultural domination, 
and European economic, political and military aggrandisement (Bulhan, 2015). 
Biological differences were used to justify the notion of a racial (by extension, 
cultural) binary (white versus non-white; Western versus non-Western) and 
hierarchy (superiority versus inferiority) between Europeans and non-Europeans. 
Science, reason and civilisation were assumed to be exclusive to Europeans, 
whereas colonial Africans were defined as ‘primitive’, ‘poor’ and ‘savage’, and 
constituting an ‘inferior’ ‘other’. Said (1994) examines the centrality of alterity to 
colonialism, and exposes the ways in which the subtle and persistent Eurocentric 
prejudices against non-European peoples and their cultures have served as implicit 
justifications for Europe’s colonial and imperial ambitions. As Potter et al. (2004 
p.65) argue,  
The rationale for the colonial project itself was provided by a 
consolidation of the ideology of justifiable intervention and occupation 
of what had become either ‘uncivilised savages’ or traditional groups 
whose history was ignored and whose societies and activities were seen 
as either static or disintegrating. 
Western colonial projects were based partly on an imagination of the world which 
legitimised and supported the power of the West to dominate ‘Others’. The 
denigration of the oppressed, colonised peoples and their rendering as objects were 
crucial to the self-definition and assumed superiority of the colonisers (McEwan, 
2008). By representing colonial others, in particular Africans and the blacks, as 






‘backward’, ‘lazy’ and ‘irrational’, the West (the white man) project itself as 
‘advanced’, ‘adventurous entrepreneurial’, ‘rational’ with ‘work ethics’. The power 
to represent other places (to name, describe, publicise, claim and construct 
knowledge) was instrumental in establishing and reinforcing superiority and 
inferiority on the basis of superficial differences of skin colour, language, cultural 
practice, religion, and so forth between the West and non-West, the North and the 
South, and was subsequently utilised to justify imperialist military invasions and 
occupation, and later interventions in the name of development. With the help of 
the hegemonic discourse, Europeans created a “Western-style for dominating”, and 
invented the authority and legitimacy to subjugate and oppress non-Western 
peoples by means of colonialism (McEwan, 2008, p.131). The Europeans occupied 
the African continent, and implemented a series of economic and socio-political 
institutions that could help them to dominate and control different territories in 
Africa.  
  
Under colonialism, Western colonialists exemplified the concept of a biological and 
cultural hierarchy, which deemed Africans to be ‘not equal human beings’ but 
slaves. The colonialists established the division of labour on the basis of race, and 
naturalised work suitability by race-based inequalities. Africans were considered to 
be manual workers by nature, while Western colonialists were well-suited to be 
masters (Sautman and Yan, 2006). The colonial powers set up administrative 
apparatuses on the continent that virtually destroyed all indigenous political 
systems and established the colonial powers’ own networks of administrators 
(Wengraf, 2016-17). All top bureaucrats in Africa were drawn from the metropolis 
(Sautman and Yan, 2006). Slaves were denied almost all rights, and few colonised 
people were accorded citizenship. Racialisation of labour enabled Western 
colonialists to exploit African workers by paying lower wages under worse 
conditions than those for white workers. The colonial society was vertically 
stratified, and a racial hierarchy was established with Europeans on the top, and 
Africans at the bottom. The latter were employed in menial jobs and Europeans 
described African miners as their “tools” (Sautman and Yan, 2006). Moreover, there 
were huge differences in living standards between the colonisers and the colonised. 






Racial segregation characterised the colonial city. The institutional arrangement 
was such that railway lines, parks or gardens strictly separated from the dwelling 
places of the colonisers from the indigenous living quarters. Little face-to-face 
contact took place between the colonisers and the colonised, except within a 
dominant-subordinate relationship (Potter et al., 2004). By representing colonised 
Africa as the ‘savage Other’, the discourse of race and racial hierarchy proved 
central in legitimating colonial domination and expansion. 
 
Moreover, the colonisers used the discourse of race and “divide-and-rule” to 
differentiate, manipulate and control colonised peoples and countries. According to 
Shillington (1989, p.356), the colonial powers developed a “racial science” to 
stratify diverse ethnic groups. Such a stratification led to divisions within and 
between these groups, which enabled the colonial powers to weaken the opposition 
of the colonised Africa, and maintain the colonial domination. Shillington continues 
that, until then these groups had lived as a people speaking the same language, 
inhabiting the same area and following the same traditions. The colonisers created 
and amplified the differences amongst African people who live in the same nation 
even when these differences did not exist, only to serve their own goal of continued 
domination and exploitation (Alemazung, 2010). It is the colonial authorities who 
invented “tribalism” in Africa. The colonisers’ creation of, and insistence on, the 
racial differences between the peoples of Africa resulted in a hierarchy amongst 
different ethnic groups in one nation. The colonial creation of artificial racial 
divisions is at the root of much of the present-day tensions and civil strives in Africa.   
 
Said (1978, 1994) maintains that colonialism existed to impose the superiority of 
the European way of life on that of the Orient – it was a colonisation of minds and 
bodies as much as that of space and economies. In addition to the territorial 
occupation, the establishment of the administrative control, and the hierarchical 
order on the base of race, colonialism has at its heart the drive for economic profit 
(Potter et al., 2004). Employing politico-military means of control, the colonisers 
imposed a colonial monopoly complex – a systematic dominance – in every major 
sphere of colonial economies with a view to extract capital from the continent and 






ensure the profitability of European settlers’ factories, farms and mines (Campbell, 
2008). Within monopoly complexes, colonial regimes seized land from the Africans 
and gave it to settlers. In many parts of Africa, poll taxes and hut taxes were 
introduced to finance their administration, while “tax evasion”, according to Binns 
(1994, p.10), “was brutally discouraged and could lead to harsh punishment and 
forced labour”. Moreover, a new agricultural system was established in which the 
range of crops produced was narrowed to those commodities required by 
metropolitan industries, such as cocoa, coffee, and cotton (Potter et al., 2004). 
Colonies thus became associated with the production of one or two raw materials, 
and were forced to import whatever else was needed. As Binns (1994, p.10) points 
out, “economically, colonialism programmed [African] countries to consume what 
they do not produce and to produce what they do not consume”. During the decades 
of colonialism, the growth of cash crops (e.g. coffee, cotton) reached such an 
extreme that it resulted in monoculture in many colonies. Inevitably, the imposed 
cash crops and monoculture destroyed the bargaining position of colonised African 
peoples. Africa could only import products from the metropolis and had to maintain 
very low or no tariffs. The regime of monopoly commanded that colonial exports 
could be made only to the metropolis (Sautman and Yan, 2006). In order to maintain 
their monopolies, the colonial powers in Africa limited the amount and kind of 
investment by others, destroyed Africa’s existing trade, and curbed or banned 
indigenous industries that competed with those of the colonial power (Sautman and 
Yan, 2006). Manufacturing was relatively limited in colonial Africa. Existing 
manufacturing activities were largely concerned with the preliminary processing of 
products. Most of the more sophisticated processing (and thus profit-making) 
occurred within the industrial areas of the metropolitan countries. Colonial rule and 
its institutions ensured the absence of conditions that were necessary for 
industrialisation and genuine development in Africa. More importantly, these 
conditions ensured that the colonised suffered double, first by having to the labour 
in the cropfileds, and then subsequently by having to  purchase the manufactured 
goods at exorbitant prices (Potter et al., 2004, p.68). Effectively, Africans were 
discriminated against in most areas of economic life and wages were kept very low, 
while the profits from the exploitation of African labourers went directly to 






European bankers and trading companies. The raw materials and other natural 
resources were ruthlessly exploited by the colonial powers. 
 
The discourse of ‘otherness’ was also a critical element in constituting ‘the White 
man’s burden’ of ‘civilising’ the Other (in this case Africa). This ‘civilising mission’, 
as the chapter shall reveal below, masked the colonial exploitation and brutality, 
and should not simply be regarded as part of the process of ‘modernisation’. While 
the colonisers claimed to bring the ‘rule of law’ to colonised Africa and apply the 
law to “safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual” 
(Alemazung, 2010, p.67), it is precisely by judicial means that the colonial powers 
oppressed the local population. In reality, the colonial administrations failed to 
implement the so-called ‘rule of law’ in their colonies. According to Shillington 
(1989), the colonised enjoyed neither property, nor citizens’ rights, and in most 
cases, were even denied the right to citizenship. In many cases, colonial laws gave 
free reign to colonial administrators to “imprison any African subject indefinitely 
and without charge or trial” (Shillington, 1989, p. 355). The discourse of 
‘civilisation mission’ can also be found in the colonisers’ investment in Africa. 
Contrary to colonial propaganda, which involved colonisers’ claiming to invest in 
the ‘well-being’ of the colonised, the limited colonial investment went towards the 
military or the colonial administration rather than on projects to transform and 
improve local productive capacity. In addition, colonial policy actively suppressed 
education for the majority. Technical education was introduced only in rare 
instances. For example, Congo had only sixteen secondary school graduates at the 
time of independence, out of a total population of thirteen million. Likewise, not 
one doctor was trained in Mozambique during the 500 years of Portuguese colonial 
rule (Potter et al., 2004). Even if there was some limited investment into the 
colonised, it went into extractive industries or the infrastructure to facilitate 
extraction. The priority of resource-extraction decisively shaped how the 
infrastructure was developed. For example, the investment into setting up electricity 
grids and power stations was heavily geared towards digging mines and wells. In 
the same vein, the laying of railroad tracks and the digging of harbours were done 
for the purpose of moving African raw materials abroad (Wengraf, 2016-17). Most 






of these attempts at developing an infrastructure served to meet the economic needs 
of the colonial powers and had little to do with the contemporary needs of 
independent states. As Rodney (1972) argues so succinctly, “colonialism had only 
one hand – it was a one-armed bandit”. Colonialism left destruction and ruin in its 
wake: life expectancy plummeted, and ecological devastation spread across rural 
areas that received minimal social services (Wengraf, 2016-17).  
 
Although, Africans finally ‘won’ their fight for liberation and were ‘freed’ from 
colonial rule, the ideologies of colonialism, which are disguised with the discourse 
of ‘development’, continue to present. Grosfóguel (2009) points out that modernity 
and coloniality are closely related to each other, with coloniality being the darker 
side of Western modernity. Following independence, the ex-colonial powers 
continued imposing, what they called, development politics on the ex-colonies, 
driven by the desire to secure the control of the ex-colonies’  economy, politics, and 
resources, as well as a sense of superiority, in what became known as neo-
colonialism (Alemazung, 2010). Since the 1980s, the structural adjustment 
programmes of the WB and the IMF have imposed liberal economic policies and a 
wide range of conditions on the poor countries that have sought financial help 
(Potter et al., 2004). Economically, the U.S. extended its influence through global 
financial institutions, such as the WB and the IMF (founded in 1944 with heavy US 
support), which have used private and public loans to impose their financial terms 
on the rest of the world, and open up new markets on terms favourable to the West. 
Shrouded in the discourse of ‘aid’ and ‘development’, the terms of these global 
financial institutions belied the intentions of extending the subordinate role of 
African economies into the new era (Wengraf, 2016-17). The chapter returns to 
deconstructing the discourse of ‘aid’ and ‘development’ in Section 7.5. 
 
A consequence of neo-colonialism is the patron-client relationship, which in some 
cases still exists between the ex-colonial powers and the African governments. As 
resource-based economies, which is propagated and supported by neo-colonialism, 
African states are rendered permanently dependent, unable to assert their 
independence and develop their nations. The patron-client relationship between the 






ex-colonial powers and the ruling neo-colonial elite constitutes a foundation for the 
West’s performance of neo-colonial control in Africa (Alemazung, 2010). For 
Porter (1995), the ideologies of both neo-colonialism and development are 
underpinned by “master metaphors”. This is complemented by a parent-child 
metaphor, which is often expressed vividly by the image of the “mother country” 
and her fledgling colonies, and also employed to shape and reproduce the neo-
colonial relations between the West and Africa. These discourses give rise to a 
modernist theme, a universal process of change, which is clear and predetermined 
by the West (Potter et al., 2004). In conclusion, Africa suffered great economically, 
politically, social and human losses under the exploitative and brutal colonial rule. 
Colonialism and neo-colonialism have left African states with a weak economy, 
limited control over territory, and regimes that rely on ethnic divisions, a centralised 
authority, and a patronage systems inherited from colonial rule. 
7.2.2 Postcolonial orders and decolonial visions  
Against the background of six centuries of exploitation, genocide and slavery 
formally instituted through colonialism, China-Africa relations disrupt the linear 
narrative of the “expansion of international society” (Seth, 2011, p.169), and focus 
our gaze on the relations between North and South, the colonised and the 
decolonised. During the colonial period when the majority of the ‘darker nations’ 
had not yet gained independence, anti-colonial sentiment was the glue, which 
bound Africa and Asia. International relations, as Pasha (2013, p.146) argues, “has 
failed to recognise decolonisation as rupture”. The political awakening of the ex-
colonial world (in this case China and Africa) has been silenced or excluded in any 
accounts of the established norms and practices of the international, which instead 
continues to be anchored in European political and economic thoughts. This section 
offers a broad purview of China-Africa relations from a decolonial perspective. 
Contemporary economic cooperation and socio-cultural communication between 
China and Africa are not new but locate their roots in policies pursued by China 
since the mid-1950s as well as earlier historical precedents. The historical girders 






that uphold this relationship have proved enduring in defining the current norms 
and principles of China-Africa relations.  
 
Contact between Africa and Asia dates back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In 
the early days of the Ming Dynasty, a mighty armada of 62 ships commanded by 
Zheng He8 crossed the China East and South Sea, and ventured West to South Asia, 
the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa (Lou, 2005). Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng 
launched eight great expeditions, making calls at more than 30 countries and 
territories, including what is now Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania (Li, 2010). 
This maritime activity, which took place about half a century before Columbus’s 
voyage to America in 1492, was different from the latter. As Lou (2005, pp.13-14) 
explains,  
Columbus’s voyage was driven by an ambition to occupy new 
territories, expand colonies, exploit resources and expand new market. 
The voyage was characterised by colonial exploitation, and aimed to 
achieve the primitive accumulation of capital. […] Unlike Columbus’s 
voyage, Zheng He’s maritime activities were characterised with equal 
commodity exchanges, and aimed to develop cultural communication 
and establish diplomatic relations with nations in South Asia and Africa. 
[…] What Zheng He has brought to other nations were China’s silks 
and porcelains; however, what Columbus has brought to other nations 
were swords and diseases. 
China’s historical engagement with Africa was distinguished from the historical 
contact between Europe and Africa which was marked by the experiences of 
European conquest, plunder and destruction in the wake of the transatlantic slave 
trade and large-scale colonisation of the African continent during the second wave 
of colonialism (Campbell, 2008; Potter et al., 2004). The earlier contact laid the 
                                                     
8 Zheng He (1371-1433) was a Chinese mariner, explorer, diplomat, fleet admiral, and court 
eunuch during China's early Ming dynasty. Zheng commanded expeditionary voyages to 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. His voyages 
have greatly contributed to economic and cultural communications between China and 
nations in Asia and Africa. 






foundation for present-day cultural, social and economic exchange and diplomatic 
ties between China and Africa.  
 
Contemporary relations between China and Africa have their origins in the 1950s. 
The Bandung Conference (also known as Asian-African Conference), held in 
Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, was a milestone in the history of contemporary China-
Africa relations. The Bandung Conference took place at a time when African 
countries were concerned with independence projects (Phạm and Shilliam, 2016). 
It was the shared memory of colonial oppression that bound the delegates from 20 
Asian and African countries in Indonesia’s Bandung to confront colonialism and 
introduce anti-colonialism and anti-racism as constitutive principles of a new world 
order (Phạm and Shilliam, 2016). The Bandung Conference enunciated an anti-
colonial project by aiming its efforts at cultivating deeper relationships with other 
colonised peoples not just in Asia and Africa but also in Latin America (Weber, 
2016). At the conference, Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai inspired the African 
representatives with his messages of solidarity and encouraged them to forge ahead 
with their struggles for the decolonisation of the continent, as well as economic 
self-reliance (Mu, 2015). Cultivating deep relations with other colonised peoples 
was considered important not merely for political and strategic reasons, but also 
because of an awareness of its intrinsic value for recovering human dignity and the 
strength of solidarity (Weber, 2016). A major achievement of Bandung was to 
banish ideology as a pretext to subvert sovereignty. Undergirding this feat was the 
acceptance of the principles of non-interference and diplomacy to advance state 
sovereignty. Premier Zhou proposed Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 
international relations, i.e. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence (United 
Nations, 1954). The principles have continued to be the basis of China’s foreign 
policy in general, and its relations with African states in particular (An, 2009).  
 
From a de-colonial perspective, Bandung remains a defining moment in twentieth-
century international relations, although it is being marginalised in IR’s self-






accountings (Shani, 2016). According to Shani (2016), IR is marked by an 
exclusion and silencing of marginalised nations. Hegemonic self-accounting of IR 
believes that the West is the maker of history, perpetuating the idea that the world 
has a permanent geographical centre and a permanent periphery: an ‘Insider’ and 
an ‘Outsider’, with the former leading, and the later lagging. The Bandung 
Conference provides an opportunity to recover some of the subaltern thoughts and 
imagination, and the right for the Global South to exercise a voice. According to 
Niang (Niang, 2016, p.165), 
this desire [to exercise a voice] was grafted onto the possibility of an 
Asian-African approach to international relations – embedded in the 
desire of the formerly colonised to bring about a new political order in 
which to recalibrate the imperial footprint and to promote postcolonial 
ideal that transcended alienation and victimhood but also hubris and 
conceit as the unthought foundation of Western knowledge. 
In other words, the ascendancy and consolidation of neo-liberal orthodoxy on a 
global scale marginalise the postcolonial world in IR. The Bandung conference, and 
the values and ideas of solidarity and brotherhood that it proclaimed, led to durable 
changes in the provincial and hegemonic self-understanding of IR. For many newly 
independent countries, Bandung was the first event where they were able to present 
themselves rather than being merely represented or spoken about.  
 
Particularly for African countries, Bandung provided an impetus for a reinvigorated 
politics of emancipation. The Bandung impulse could be found in various political 
and socio-cultural co-operations between China and Africa between the 1960s and 
1970s, focusing mainly on the shared purpose of struggling against imperialism and 
hegemony. In 1956, China established diplomatic relations with Egypt, which was 
the first country on the continent that established diplomatic ties with China. 
Between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s, China channelled economic assistance to 
agriculture and light industries, contributing US$ 2.5 billion to 36 African countries 
(Adebajo, 2008). China funded a range of direct and unconditional projects in 
Africa, covering sectors as diverse as animal husbandry, textiles and energy, 
transportation, public and civil construction, education and health. One of the grand 






projects funded by China was the 1860-km Tanzania-Zambia Railway (hereafter 
referred to as TAZARA), which was completed in 1975 (Huang and Lang, 2010). 
The TAZARA was an impressive feat of engineering that took five years and more 
than 50,000 workers to finish, and has greatly facilitated trade in local products 
across previously isolated communities (Huang and Lang, 2010). China provided 
long-term, interest-free loans to complete the project after the World Bank, 
Washington, London and Ottawa had turned down requests from Zambia and 
Tanzania to fund the project (Zhang X., 2009). The most profound symbol of the 
China-Africa axis was when China, supported by African countries, assumed its 
seat in the UN Security Council in 1971 (Zhang X., 2009). 
 
Weber (2016) points out that hegemonic accounts of global development begin with 
narratives of liberal internationalism, which result in a disconnection from prior 
colonial history and its legacies – a history that enables and sustains ‘development’ 
experiences of the Western states not least through plantation labour and the social 
suffering of many in the Global South. Bandung provided an insight into the politics 
of development in the global social and political context, and constituted an 
alternative archive of knowledge, one that provided a distinctively different account 
of global development. The Bandung conference redressed the (economic) legacies 
of the colonial development architecture, and addressed concerns relating to the 
colonial (international) division of labour that new independent (and soon to be 
independent) states had inherited. The “values of Bandung” not only disrupt the 
ahistorical understanding of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, but 
importantly also restore colonialism and its legacies in the analysis of development 
(Weber, 2016, p.154).  
 
The concerns and concrete strategies for development, which were cultivated at 
Bandung, gathered momentum and guided China-African cooperation, against the 
background of the West’s neo-colonial rule.  The West’s colonialism had left Africa 
with a weak economy, unstable political situations, and a plethora of civil wars. The 
former colonial powers were reluctant to invest in Africa to redress the colonial 
legacies, and intended to continue their neo-colonial exploitation of Africa. Africa 






was, and still is, occupying a subordinate position in the international division of 
labour. Under these circumstances, China has been concentrating on addressing the 
adverse effects of economic globalisation, improving the mechanics of South-South 
partnerships and bridging the North-South divide. Within the context of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up Policy, initiated in the late 1970s, China 
prioritised its domestic economic development, focused on a strategy of promoting 
trade and investment to strengthen its economy, and adopted a policy of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” (Adebajo, 2008, p.229). China’s economic shift, 
combined with the Western countries’ considerable reluctance to invest in Africa, 
allowed China to develop key political and economic relationships with African 
countries. Following the astounding growth of China’s economy, the country has 
attached great importance to offering official loans with government-subsidised 
interest rates in order to facilitate the development of joint ventures between African 
and Chinese companies (Yan, 2013). China has outlined the long-term goal of 
China-Africa cooperation to be the development of commercial and trade 
interactions, with private industries from both sides becoming the main actors in 
economic cooperation, thereby creating a paradigm shift in globalisation that 
favours Africa and China alike, and opens new avenues for South-South interaction 
(Grion, 2007, p.145, Shelton, 2007, p.104). The growing economic ties between 
China and Africa were further strengthened in the 21st century. The Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation, established in Beijing in 2000, provides a new 
institutional base and mechanism for dialogue in consolidating and broadening 
China-Africa cooperation (Pan, 2008). Since the first China-Africa Forum in 
Beijing in 2000, more than 40 agreements were signed, doubling trade to more than 
$ 20 billion over four years (Grion, 2007, p. 145). By the end of 2015, China’s trade 
with the African continent reached US$ 1491.2 billion. China has been Africa’s 
single biggest trading partner (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Republic of Kenya, 2015). In December 2001, China joined the World Trade 
Organisation (hereafter referred to as WTO). In concert with other developing 
countries, China has paid great attention to confronting the asymmetries that exist 
around issues of access to trade and markets, and has sought to address the 
marginalisation of African countries in the global trading system (Zhang X., 2009).  






Trade, investment and improved infrastructure are but parts of a whole that define 
China-Africa relations. Social development also forms an integral part. Between 
1961 and 2015, 40,000 students from 52 African countries studied in China, while 
more than 20,000 Chinese medical personnel have been working in 50 African 
countries and over 10,000 agro-technicians from China have been sent to work on 
some 200 agricultural projects in Africa (Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Republic of Kenya, 2015). The Chinese National Overseas 
Engineering Corporation has built two pharmaceutical plants in Africa for the sole 
purpose of manufacturing artemisinin, which is very effective in treating malaria. 
In 2014, when Ebola broke out in Africa, 1200 Chinese doctors and nurses were 
sent to the affected countries to help fight the disease alongside African medical 
staff (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 2015). 
At the 2015 FOCAC summit, President Xi Jinping also announced China’s support 
for building malaria-prevention and treatment centres in Africa, and cooperating 
with 20 African hospitals over the next three years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2015). By 2018, the number of government 
scholarships awarded to African students to study in China is expected to increase 
to 30,000, which also facilitates socio-cultural cooperation between China and 
Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).  
 
Guided by the “spirit of Bandung”, China-Africa relations have presented a 
challenge to a ‘normalised’ world order. Such the ‘normalised’ world order has 
abandoned the question of racial equality and inclusion of marginalised populations 
with a view to favour a fictitious “totem pole” of development (Shani, 2016, p.147). 
Historically, China’s relations with African countries have been grounded in a 
shared experience of political and economic dominance by Western colonial powers. 
The historical-political dynamic provides the foundation for the contemporary 
nature of China-Africa communication. By strengthening cooperation and 
consultation between China and Africa, China aims to strengthen the negotiating 
place and the collective voice of developing countries in formulating a multilateral 
economic and trade system. In so doing, China and Africa are equipped jointly to 
move towards establishing a fair and reasonable international economic order.  






7.3 The ‘neo-colonialism’ narrative 
The political and economic underpinnings of China-Africa relations receive a great 
deal of attention in the academic literature (cf. Alden, 2007, Amadi, 2012, Ampiah 
and Naidu, 2008). Studies on the China-Africa relations have been dominated by 
the concern as to whether China is a neo-colonial power in Africa. The discourse of 
‘China’s neo-colonialism in Africa’ casts China as a ‘threat’ to the interests of both 
Africa, and the West, which clads itself as the international community. In the 
American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the China-Africa relations, the 
critical discourse analysis reveals a central theme: ‘China as a plunder of resources 
in Africa’. This section analyses the ways in which the American mainstream 
newspapers construct China as a ‘plunderer’, and thus a ‘neo-colonial power’.  
 
Driver and Yeoh (2000) point out that the West has used binaries to differentiate 
itself from the non-West. The identification of the West as the ‘norm’ and the non-
West as climatically, geographically and morally ‘Other’ was deeply entrenched in 
imperial and colonial discourses. Such binaries became part of an enduring 
imaginative geography, which continues to shape the production and consumption 
of knowledge in the twenty-first century world. The binary oppositions have also 
shaped the ways in which the American mainstream newspapers represent China-
Africa relations. The media deliver the ‘China threat’ image by framing China in a 
stereotypical way, as ‘authoritarian’, ‘backward’, and ‘aggressive’, constructing it 
as a ‘threatening’ and ‘Orientalist’ ‘other’. In the news texts, China is represented 
as “challeng[ing] Western security partnerships that have underpinned the world 
order since 1945” (The Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2016). China is “expanding 
the geographical reach of its armed forces” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 
2015), “projecting power far into the Pacific and Indian oceans and the 
Mediterranean” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2015), and “having its 
ambitions to become a global maritime power” (The New York Times, 27 November 
2015). Moreover, China is portrayed as “encroaching” into Africa (The Washington 
Post, 17 January 2016), exerting “unbridled influence” on Africa (The New York 
Times, 18 September 2013), and treating Africa “rapaciously” (The Washington 






Post, 17 January 2016). In addition, drawing on Orientalist stereotypes, the media 
represent China as a nation full of “inequality” (The New York Times, 5 August 
2014), with an “authoritarian system”, “corrupt” officials (“abus[ing] power”) and 
a ‘backward’ culture (such as “China consumes tons of ivory every year, and mixes 
[ivory] into holistic medicine with no proven value” (The Washington Post, 9 
October 2015)). By representing China with negative descriptors and terms, a 
dichotomy between ‘Us’ (i.e. the West as the ‘defender’ of the world order) and 
‘Them’ (i.e. China as the ‘menace’ to the world order) is established. The media 
define China in terms of its difference from the West (Western security 
partnerships), which is a dichotomy informing the representation of China. By 
framing China in terms of its difference from the west, the media naturalise and 
universalise a particular negative view of China, and reproduce the colonial 
discourse of an ‘Orientalist’ China that render China ‘threatening’. 
 
The ‘China threat’ image is further strengthened by framing China as ‘resource-
hungry’. The media adopt a “Desire is Hunger” metaphor to construct China as 
‘avaricious’. Linguistic realisations of the metaphor can be found in references to 
China’s “insatiable” or “ravenous” “appetite for raw materials” (The New York 
Times, 3 December 2015), and “China’s thirst for South Africa’s natural resources” 
(The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014). By means of this hunger metaphor, China 
is portrayed as a monolithic ‘beast’ and ‘predator’ with an ‘avaricious’ desire for 
resources, hence implying that China is eager to expand its influence and exploit 
resources in Africa. Moreover, China’s investment is concretised into liquid 
material that floods into Africa. For example, China “pumped in $600 million in 
Zimbabwe 2013” (Los Angeles Times, 2 December 2015), and China “has poured 
billions of dollars into infrastructure in in Kenya and elsewhere” (The Washington 
Post, 16 April 2016). The small-scale mining activities of the Chinese “have 
flooded into Ghana's gold-producing regions” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013). 
Similarly, the Tanzanian government “open[s] the floodgates to Chinese petty 
traders” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). Metaphors with references to natural 
disasters, such as flood, establish a negative image of China in Africa as hefty, 
unwanted, dangerous and disastrous. Furthermore, China’s investment in Africa 






tends to be framed as ‘unsound’, ‘frantic’ and ‘irrational’. For example, China is 
portrayed as “getting unsound deals [in Africa] by handing over bags of cash” (The 
New York Times, 17 May 2014). China is “throwing money at anyone who would 
take it” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014), and“[making] a lot of strange 
decisions” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014). The “irrational China” frame is 
further consolidated by referring to China’s domestic social-culture as ‘weak’ and 
‘backward’. For example, China is portrayed as a nation with “underfunded health 
and education systems” (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015), 
“atmospheric pollution” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013) and “poverty” 
at home (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015). China is facing a “growing 
burden of an aging population”, and a “large volume of both public and private debt 
throughout the economy” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013). Moreover, 
China is portrayed as having “sluggish Chinese car sales”, “fewer new apartment 
buildings”, and “diminished appetite for gadgets”. China is in an “economic turmoil” 
(The Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2015), with its economy growing 
“slowing[ly]” and having a “slack demand” and “slash revenue” (The Wall Street 
Journal, 17 August 2015). Accordingly, China’s government is portrayed as “not 
[being] accountable to” its domestic economic and socio-cultural development (The 
New York Times, 30 July 2015). By framing China in negative descriptors and terms, 
the media represent China as ‘irrational’ and ‘irresponsible’, which resonates with 
the Orientalist discourse of the ‘uncivilised’ ‘other’. The discourse of “irrationality” 
not only orientalises China as a ‘deficient’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’, but also 
implies that ‘deficient’ China should be ‘taught’ by the ‘civilising’ West. The media 
imply that China should follow the same trajectories as Western economies in order 
to ‘catch up’, both in economic terms and in terms of ‘civilisation’.  
 
Playing on the conceptual frames of China as ‘resource hungry’ and ‘exploitative’, 
the media further vilify China by constructing a ‘resource extraction’ narrative: 
(31) In Africa, Beijing’s particularly broad involvement has generated political 
friction. China’s aid has focused on infrastructure investments, such as dams 
and roads, which some African experts and politicians have said has paved 






the way for resource extraction on terms detrimental to host nations and the 
environment. (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015) 
(32) The summit meeting, a mix of plenary sessions and elaborate dinners that 
also included leaders of major American corporations, was a determined, 
and splashy, initiative by Mr. Obama to stake a claim for the United States 
against other countries doing business there, especially China, which is 
investing heavily in infrastructure projects and using Africa as a source of 
vital oil and metals. (The New York Times, 11August 2014) 
(33) The loan from state-owned China Development Bank was meant to finance 
infrastructure projects, including building a pipeline to bring gas to Ghana 
from an offshore project. The loan was collateralised by Ghanaian crude 
production. (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014) 
In the news texts, the elites’ discourse such as the words of “some African experts 
and politicians” are quoted to frame China’s investment in Africa in terms of 
‘resource exploitation’. The voices of the majority of Chinese investors and African 
workers (who are the main actors in China’s projects in Africa) are excluded. The 
media further materialise the frame by selectively foregrounding the relations 
between China’s investment in infrastructure projects and ‘resource extraction’. 
Other aspects of China’s investment in Africa, such as China’s investment in 
education, health, and the role of China’s investment in encouraging African local 
development are backgrounded, and even silenced. The media activate China and 
China’s investment in Africa as actors in relation to material processes (such as 
“focused on”, “investing heavily in”, “was meant to finance”) and goals (such as 
“infrastructure investments/projects”), which imply that the trading and investing 
relationship between China and Africa is basically restricted to infrastructure 
projects. The media frame the purpose of China’s investment in African 
infrastructure projects in a way that Chinese funding is predicated with “pav[ing] 
the way for resource extraction on terms detrimental to host nations and the 
environment”, “using Africa as a source of vital oil and metal”, and “[being] 
collateralised by Ghanaian crude production”. These predications orientalise China 
as an ‘opportunistic’ and ‘egoistic’ ‘Other’, and insinuate that China only invests in 
industries which could facilitate China’s “extraction” of African natural resources. 






These insinuations silence the role of infrastructural projects in encouraging local 
development and an improvement of Africa’s industrial and competitive capacity, 
and imply that what China does in Africa only serves to extract African raw 
materials. Moreover, China is marginalised as the ‘Other’ by establishing a division 
between a “determined and splashy” U.S. who calls for ‘initiatives’ to protect Africa, 
and a ‘threatening’ China who “exploits” African resources. The media’s binary 
oppositions not only obscure the West’s role in the “scramble for Africa” during 
colonialism, but also reproduce dominant interpretations that see the West as an 
embodiment of democracy, liberty, and universal rights, as opposed to “a colonialist 
product which guards its comparative wealth carefully” (Danewid, 2017, p.1681). 
The construction of China as a ‘resource-grabber’ in Africa is rather a myth than a 
truth. As Brautigam (2009, pp.279-280) argues, the “roads, bridges, sewer systems, 
and power plants built with Chinese finance in places such as Botswana, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Madagascar, Mauritius, and so on, do not map out some kind of master 
plan for resource extraction”. Similar to Brautigam, Rotberg (2014, cited in Haslam 
et al., 2015, p.877) further argues, 
few African countries have failed to benefit from China’s willingness 
to build dams, hydroelectric facilities, and thermal power plants; 
construct roads; elect stadiums, hospitals, and party headquarters; 
renovate railways; refurbish ports; and upgrade mining projects. 
In fact, the World Bank has identified poor infrastructure as a major endogenous 
factor inhibiting Africa’s growth. For decades, developed countries have been 
largely unwilling to fund infrastructure projects due to the low profits rate (Sautman 
and Yan, 2006). China’s investment in infrastructure projects has paved the way for 
African economic growth (Sautman and Yan, 2006). As Edinger and Pistorius (2011, 
p.505) highlight, the “biggest opportunity and advantage for Africa represented by 
China’s engagement in the mining section” is China’s commitment to providing the 
“much needed supporting infrastructure”, considering that Africa has “the highest 
transport cost per unit in the world” and will “benefit greatly” from improved 
transportation networks. Rather than extracting resources in Africa, China’s 
investment in infrastructure projects has benefited Africa. 
 






The media further construct China as an emerging ‘colonial power’ in Africa by 
framing the China-Africa trade relations in a way that is reminiscent of the 
economic relations between colonising and the colonised nations during the 
colonial period: 
(34)  [Lamido Sanusi, who was recently suspended as Nigeria’s central bank 
governor] wrote: “In much of Africa, they have set up huge mining 
operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they 
have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without 
transferring skills to local communities. So, China takes our primary goods 
and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.” 
[…] In Ghana, an estimated 50,000 new migrants, most of whom are said 
to have hailed from a single county in southern China, showed up recently 
to conduct environmentally devastating gold mining. (The New York Times, 
17 May 2014) 
(35) Some African officials have voiced fears that China’s dominance as an 
exporter of cheap garments, appliances and other goods, and its appetite for 
unprocessed raw materials, have skewed economic ties and undermined 
African hopes to advance into industrial prosperity. (The New York Times, 
26 March 2013) 
Again, the news texts employ the words of African elites (such as African officials) 
to portray China-Africa trade as asymmetric. China is portrayed as the one 
importing resources, raw materials and unprocessed products from Africa, while 
simultaneously exporting manufactured goods and daily necessities to Africa (see 
reference to “China’s dominance as an exporter of cheap garments, appliances and 
other goods, and its appetite for unprocessed raw materials”). Moreover, other 
descriptors in the news texts refer to China’s role being ‘dominant’, ‘superior’ and 
‘advantageous’ in China-Africa economic relations. For example, China is 
portrayed as “dictat[ing] the schedule”, “mak[ing] the rules” and “hav[ing] the 
upper hand” (The New York Times, 12 September 2014) in its deals with Africa. 
“Trade balance vastly skewed toward China” (The New York Times, 12 September 
2014). Accordingly, the China-Africa relationship is “in China’s favour” (The New 
York Times, 5 December 2015). The media continue to communicate a sense of 






‘certainty’ with regard to China’s superiority by using the modal verb “will”. For 
example, “[t]he distribution facilities for Chinese imports will be built first, and 
facilities for the export of Tanzanian goods will be constructed later” (The New York 
Times, 5 December 2015). Such portrayal resonates with the colonial discourse of 
‘subordinate’ Africa in colonial trade. The discourse of ‘subordinate’ Africa is 
further materialised by personifying China as a ‘master’ who “takes us [African] 
primary goods” and “sells us [African] manufactured ones”. As such, the media fix 
a division between China (as an exporter of manufactured products) and Africa (as 
a supplier of raw materials and a consumer of manufactured products) in terms of 
international division of labour. China is framed as the ‘exploiter’, who enjoys her 
superiority and benefits from international trade at the expense of Africa (i.e. the 
‘victim’). The media further strengthen the division between China and Africa by 
using the pronoun “they” to refer to China, in contrast to ‘Us’ – Africans, and 
thereby marginalise China as the ‘Other’. Moreover, the “business is war” metaphor 
is adopted to portray the economic relations between China and Africa as 
conflicting. Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in references to 
African nations as “unconditional surrenders” (The New York Times, 18 September 
2013) when they conduct business with China. Allegedly, African nations find 
themselves “hostage” (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015) to China’s 
economy. African nations are “in constant struggle with the Chinese” when it comes 
to the oil business (The New York Times, 18 September 2013). Reports of Chinese 
companies’ ‘misbehaving’ in Africa provide African nations with “ammunition” 
(The Washington Post, 9 October 2015) for their business negotiations with China. 
By conceptualising economic relations between China and Africa in terms of 
warfare, the media represent China and Africa as two supposedly hostile sides in 
the trade. In addition, the war metaphor implies that one side’s gain is possible only 
at other side’s expense. In that way, the adoption of the war metaphor enables the 
media to imply that China’s gain in the trade is achieved at the expense of African 
countries. As a result, Africa is portrayed as a ‘victim’ (“surrender”, “hostage”) in 
the trade relations between China and Africa. The media construct an unequal and 
hierarchical economic relation between China and Africa, and again orientalise 
China as a ‘threatening’ ‘Other’.  






Furthermore, the media adopt derogative words or phrases to denigrate China in 
Africa and strengthen the discourse of ‘Other’. For example, by activating China as 
an actor in relation to material processes, such as “showed up to conduct”, “skewed”, 
“undermined”, and goals, such as “environmentally devastating gold mining”, 
“economic ties” and “African hopes”, the media construct China’s trade with Africa 
in an ‘exploitative’ narrative. The media imply that China’s trade with Africa does 
not reshape Africa’s position in the international division of labour, but is instead 
harmful to the African economy. The media deliberately frame the economic 
relations between China and Africa in a way that makes no difference between the 
exploitative activities of the former Western colonial powers, and frame China as 
‘neo-colonial’. Sautman and Yan (2006) argue against this China-as-colonialist 
discourse by pointing out that the asymmetries of China-Africa economic relations 
should not be mispresented as colonialism. According to them (2006, p. 55), “raw 
material/manufactured goods trade has long characterised developed countries’ 
exchanges with both colonised and non-colonised less-developed lands, as well as 
urban-rural exchanges”. The trade of raw material and manufactured goods indicate 
not a colonial relationship, but is a constant feature of capitalism. Colonial 
economic dominance featured more than exploitation of raw materials or exchange 
for manufactured goods. It was a systematic privileging of colonisers in every major 
aspect of colonial economies, and excluded any third parties (Sautman and Yan, 
2006). The sale of raw materials under colonialism was often based on forced 
labour and involved colonial government or state-chartered company monopolies.  
 
Junbo and Frasheri (2014) deconstruct the ‘neo-colonial’ discourse concerning 
China-Africa economic relations by pointing out that the media deliberately silence 
alternative voices in the representation of China-Africa economic relations. 
According to them, although China imports raw materials and resources from 
Africa and exports manufactured products there, the prices of the merchandise are 
agreed by both sides as well as being determined by the international market; they 
are not only decided by China. In other words, the China-Africa trading relationship 
is equal in terms of pricing. In fact, the increasing demands of China (and other 
emerging powers) for materials and resources, has resulted in a remarkable rise in 






the prices of many goods and materials, like mineral stones, metals and woods. 
Meanwhile, inexpensive Chinese goods are being exported to Africa, and not only 
promote the living standards of African people, but also meet the basic 
technological and material needs of fledging local industries. Obviously, the China-
Africa trade, which is based on the prices made by both sides in an equal status, is 
a fair business, and has nothing to do with colonialism and neo-colonialism.  
 
Drawing on the ‘neo-colonialism’ frame, the media construct China’s growing role 
on the African continent as a ‘threat’ to the interests of Africa and the international 
community. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) deconstruct such a ‘neo-colonialism’ frame 
by pointing out that the ‘neo-colonialism’ frame is a manifestation of the ‘China 
threat’ discourse. The ‘China threat’ discourse is considered to be a co-product of 
Eurocentrism which remains dominant in the field of IR (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). 
Acharya and Buzan (2007, p.293) argue that “the main ideas in traditional IR are 
deeply rooted in the particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of 
the West to world power, and the imposition of the West’s own political structure 
onto the rest of the world”. The built-in Eurocentrism of IR theory has resulted in 
the West being considered “the only power whose national identity is defined by a 
set of universal political and economic values” (Huntington, 1993, p.32). The 
European regional order is, thus, conceptualised as a product of ‘rationality’ and 
‘liberty’. Such Eurocentrism interprets the expansion of the European regional 
order in the nineteenth century as an event where “Europe expands outwards and 
graciously bequeaths sovereignty and Europe’s panoply of civilised and rational 
institutions to the inferior Eastern societies” (De Carvalho et al., 2011, p.745). In 
other words, the West presents its own values as international ‘norms’, and impose 
them on the non-Western nations. The Eurocentric perspective on the expansion of 
international society is a sanitised version of “expansion”. The history that includes 
the bloody conquest of the African continent, the transatlantic slave trade, the 
expropriation and sometimes genocide of indigenous peoples, wars of conquest, 
land grabbing, exploitation and oppression, is elided (Seth, 2011). Kayaoglu (2010, 
pp.195-196) points out that the Eurocentric narrative of the expansion of global 
order “allows for the continued imagination and invention of Europe’s intellectual 






and political superiority, treating the West as a perennial source of political and 
religious tolerance”. In other words, the Eurocentric line of thinking has generated 
a partisan interpretation of global order, in which the West’s domination is 
considered to be ‘progressive’ and thus “the only form of hegemony that matters 
historically and normatively” (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014, p.451). The Eurocentrism 
of IR, which has an exclusive focus on the historical period of Western dominance, 
ignores the long periods in international history, in which the West interacted with 
non-Western people and polities (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). Therefore, the rise of 
non-Western nations (in this case China) are poorly theorised and considered to be 
a ‘threat’ (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014).  
 
With regard to the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China-
African relations, ‘neo-colonial’ discourse, which is a manifestation of the ‘China 
threat’ discourse, implies that China is considered to a threat to the West’s 
traditional dominance in Africa. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) argue that the ‘neo-
colonialism’ narrative surrounding China-Africa relations is not a concern over 
China posing a ‘threat’ to the interests of African peoples. Rather, it implicitly 
reflects deep anxieties held by the West about its traditional dominance in Africa 
being overturned by a non-Western power (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). Junbo and 
Frasheri (2014) point out that current Africa-Western relations are still influenced 
by the colonial legacy. The soft power of the West in Africa has far-reaching 
influence. As an ex-colonised region, the economic, socio-political and religious 
systems in many African countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), were 
established by modelling their previous Western suzerains, and remain unchanged 
in the postcolonial era. According to Haslam et al. (2015), African mass media 
highly depend on Western media. In a study of 543 news stories on Africa published 
in Ghana’s newspapers, Sautman and Yan (2009) find that 64% news stories are 
from the BBC. Moreover, the West continues to maintain its ‘old’ relations with 
Africa by means of political penetration, such as attaching special economic and 
political conditions to its aid and investment projects in Africa. The implication of 
these special conditions, which are attached to aid and investment, is that to some 
extent Africa’s economy and politics are still deeply influenced by the West. 






Disguised with the rhetoric of ‘protector’, special ‘partner’ and ‘international 
Philanthropist’, the West engages with the African continent by means of huge 
financial investment and aid with political conditions. Traditional economic 
relations between the West and Africa remain unchanged, such as the West’s 
investment in raw materials, and export of manufactured goods to Africa. In reality, 
the West and Africa failed to build a relationship on equal terms when the colonial 
system collapsed. For Africa, the adjustment from a colonising-colonised to a 
donor-recipient relationship after de-colonisation has not fundamentally changed 
the West-African relational nature. The unequal relations between the West and 
Africa remain. Africa is still regarded as the West’s the backyard for sourcing raw 
materials. 
 
As Campbell (2008, p.96) notes, Chinese investment in, and trade with, Africa 
challenge “USA global hegemony”, and has enabled “Africans to defy the 
conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions”. The growing status of China on 
the African continent challenges the entrenched notion of the Western ‘Self’. As 
Mawdsley (2008, p.512) notes, “Western political imaginaries of itself in relation 
to Africa remain dominated by an enduring notion of trusteeship, despite a long and 
ongoing history of exploitation, and lack of sufficient action to address systemic 
inequalities and injustice”. Therefore, the narrative concerning ‘China’s neo-
colonialism’ in Africa could be considered to be a debate about the West’s own 
deeply-rooted anxieties, rather than about what China is, and is not, effectively 
doing in Africa (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). The ‘neo-colonial’ discourse or the 
‘China threat’ discourse in the context of Sino-African relations is nothing but a by-
product of Western anxieties about the loss of its hegemony and power in Africa. 
7.4 The narrative of ‘China’s racialisation of Africa’ 
In the wake of China’s rapid economic development and its growing role in Africa, 
there are increasingly heated debates around the world on how China affects Africa, 
and specially Africans. Popular representations in the Western media concerning 
China’s growing role in Africa often suggest that there is a Chinese ‘racialisation’ 






of Africans on the continent (Cook et al., 2016, Liu, 2007). The colonial concept of 
“racialisation” is evoked by the media in order to construct China as ‘racialist’. Omi 
and Winant (1994) point out that racialisation extends racial meaning to social 
groups and their practices. The mode of racialisation, as Banton (2005) argues, is a 
way of designating groups to be subject to the relative privileges and dis-privileges 
on the basis of earlier misrepresentations of their biological distinctiveness. The 
concept of racialisation is exemplified by Western colonialists’ racialisation of 
Africans in terms of division of labour (see Section 7.2.1). In the news coverage of 
China-Africa relations, the colonial concept of “racialisation of labour” is employed 
to frame employment relations between Chinese workers and African workers, and 
orientalise China as a ‘racialist’ in Africa.  
(36) Pulling up in his white Mercedes S.U.V., Liu Youbin shouted over the din 
of the construction site where Chinese supervisors in red uniforms and 
helmets watched over a couple of dozen Zambian workers. He vaunted the 
speed of Chinese construction crews, later handing out a pamphlet that read, 
“Dollar Hill Shopping Mall, Wholesale City & Amusement Park. Coming 
Soon!!!” (The New York Times, 3 December 2015) 
(37) Below Mr. Gado’s (Niger’s oil minister) seventh-floor office, reached 
through a dark stairwell because there is no working elevator, his fellow 
citizens are living in mud-brick houses without electricity and washing their 
clothes in the river. Oil production in Niger began nearly two years ago but 
has yet to make a dent in living standards […] Seven hundred miles away 
in the oil-producing region, Chinese refinery workers and engineers massed 
boisterously at a crumbling and otherwise unused airport for their quarterly 
holiday flights out, one of the many costs that Mr. Gado said Niger, at the 
bottom of the United Nations human development index, could not afford 
[…] In return, the Chinese got access to untapped oil reserves in the remote 
fields on Chad’s border on terms that still make Oil Ministry officials here 
wince. Beyond that, local residents have protested that the Chinese presence 
has brought few jobs, low pay and harsh working conditions. (The New York 
Times, 18 September 2013) 
The news texts adopt a ‘master’ frame to construct China-Africa employment 






relations in a ‘brutal master’ versus ‘obedient subject’ division. For example, 
Chinese workers are activated as actors in relation to material processes such as 
“shouted over” and “watched over”. These material processes suggest that Chinese 
workers are ‘oppressive’ in their dealings with African workers. The media portray 
Chinese workers as the ‘ruthless’ ‘supervisors’ in Africa who are standing with their 
arms folded, and ‘supervising’ Africans to do the hard labour. In so doing, the media 
construct a relation between Chinese workers and African workers in which the 
former are superior over the latter. The media further strengthen this alleged 
hierarchy between Chinese workers and African workers by contrasting African 
workers’ impoverished living conditions with the Chinese workers’ luxurious life. 
African workers are portrayed as “living in mud-brick houses without electricity 
and washing their clothes in the river”, while Chinese workers are portrayed as 
“massing at a crumbling and otherwise unused airport for their holiday flights out, 
one of many costs that Niger could not afford”. By describing African airport as 
“crumbling and otherwise unused”, the media implicate that African are unable to 
afford the costs for flights. Moreover, through activating China in relation to the 
material process, such as “has brought”, and the goal, such as “few jobs, low pay 
and harsh working conditions”, the media imply that ‘the Africans are being 
mistreated by the Chinese’. The media reinforce the ‘Africans are being mistreated 
by the Chinese’ frame by portraying Chinese companies in Africa as ‘brutal’. 
Chinese companies in Africa are framed by their ‘ruthlessness’ and ‘inequality’. For 
example, Chinese-run operations in Africa are portrayed as offering “unequal pay 
and brutal treatment” to local workers (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), and 
being guilty of “the systematic violations of workers’ rights” (The New York Times, 
7 June 2013), because Chinese operations “make Chadian workers remove [crucial 
oil in ditches] with no protection” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013). The 
media portray the labour relations and practices of Chinese companies as 
“unacceptable” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013). Making use of negative 
descriptors and terms, the media attribute racialisation to Chinese firms, and 
represent Chinese employers as ‘disregarding human rights’, and being ‘indifferent 
to’ labour conditions. By referring to the notions of Chinese ‘cruelty’ and their 
‘disregard for human rights’, the media evoke memories of the racial exploitation 






of African slaves during the colonial period, and insinuate that the increasing 
presence of Chinese firms in Africa can be seen as a new trend toward the process 
of racialising Africa. Thereby, the discourse of ‘racialisation of Africans at the 
hands of the Chinese’ suggests a ‘threatening’ image of China.  
 
Sautman and Yan (2016) argue against the discourse of ‘racialisation of African at 
the hands of the Chinese’ by pointing out that the existing concept of racialisation 
of labour, which locates its origin in the North-South interactions, should not be 
extended to explain the dramatically different employment relations in South-South 
interaction. According to Bonacich et al. (2008), racialisation of labour is conceived 
as whites benefitting by denying rights to peoples of colour. The concept of 
racialisation of labour has its origins in the Western colonialism and was devised to 
make sense of the behaviour of power and culture in the context of Western 
colonialism and capitalism (Sautman and Yan, 2016). The concept of racialisation 
of labour fails to facilitate an understanding of South-South interaction (Sautman 
and Yan, 2016). By evoking the concept of “racialisation”, the media impose the 
Western views of Africans onto China-Africa relations. In other words, the 
discourse of “racialisation of Africans” reflects the West’s representation of Africa, 
rather than the realities of China-Africa relations. In fact, Giese’s (2013, p.151) 
study of relations between Chinese traders and their Ghanaian employees concludes 
that “Chinese traders rarely engage in active racial discrimination. This is 
demonstrated in their almost egalitarian behaviour towards employees and 
members of the lower social strata, such as female head porters”. Sautman and Yan 
(2016), based on an ethnographic study of Chinese enterprises in Africa, point out 
that unlike the West’s colonial powers in the colonised Africa, Chinese in Africa do 
not deny the political and labour rights to Africans on the basis of the biological or 
meta-cultural differences. The Chinese in Africa tend to live among Africans and 
work together with Africans. As is described by a Namibian journalist in von 
K'Orinda-Yimbo’s (2008, p.5) study,  
 the Chinese are indeed not living in mansions with an arm of African 
domestics. They dig, shovel, saw, clear and carry away the rubble 






themselves, instead of standing around raving sharp orders to African 
workers.  
However, as Miller (2005) argues, racialisation does influence many non-Chinese 
workplaces. For example, senior positions in the white-owned South African 
supermarket chain Shoprite (a ubiquitous supermarket in African countries) are 
mainly occupied by the white. The ‘superiority versus inferiority’ hierarchy, which 
scholars of racialisation of labour have identified at the West-owned enterprises in 
the Global South, does not exist in the relationship between Chinese and Africans.  
 
In conclusion, the West’s racialised view of African labours, which is derived from 
North-South interaction, is simply imposed on South-South interaction. By evoking 
the concept of “racialisation”, the media ignore the realities of Chinese activities in 
Africa, and reproduce a colonial discourse of China that misrepresents the Chinese 
in Africa as a racialist. The narrative of Chinese activities in Africa is part of the 
‘China threat’ discourse, which the Wet has spread since the nineteenth century. 
7.5 ‘Weak’ Africa, ‘rogue’ China versus the ‘ethical’ West  
Hirono and Suzuki (2014) point out that the assumption underlying the Western 
studies of China-Africa relations is that of the Orientalism, which casts Asian states 
as entities which are different from the West by nature. Any sort of influences in 
Africa other than Western ones, are considered to be ‘unethical’ and ‘undesirable’. 
Such Orientalist thinking could also be found in the American news coverage of 
China’s loans to, and investment in, Africa. Unlike major international lending 
institutes, such as the IMF or the WB, China’s loans to African countries are not 
contingent on socio-political conditions because it promotes a strict policy of non-
intervention in the affairs of recipient states. The media have used an ideological 
‘rogue aid’ frame to construct China as a scapegoat, and orientalise China’s aid in 
Africa as a ‘threat to healthy and sustainable development’ in Africa. 
 
In the news texts, the media adopts the metaphor of “China is a Dependee” in order 
to construct a “dependee VS dependant” relation between China and Africa. 






Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in statements such as “China 
has quickly become its most important patron, building its roads and pumping its 
oil” (The New York Times, 25 July 2015), and “Beijing coddles the continent’s 
authoritarian rulers” (The New York Times, 5 December 2015). The metaphor 
generates the impression of Africa being ‘dependent’ and ‘childish’. Such portrayal 
of Africa jibes with traditional and longstanding Western stereotypes of the 
‘uncivilised and childlike’ Africans. A particular prevalent negative image of 
Africans during the nineteenth century was their representation as indolent children 
(McEwan, 2008). Images of ‘infantilism’ and general ‘incompetence’ were used to 
legitimate colonialism and imperialism under the guise of paternalism. Cairns 
(1965, p.95) points out that the child analogy reflects and strengthens the idea that 
African cultures do not represent worthwhile achievements. The analogy serves as 
a justification and sanction for the West’s control and intervention in Africa. The 
“dependee” metaphor enables the media to impose the West’s racist image of 
Africans on the portrayal of China-Africa relations. A hierarchical relation between 
China and Africa is constructed, in which China is regarded as ‘superior’ over 
Africa. Moreover, by associating China with “the continent’s authoritarian rulers” 
(The New York Times, 5 December, 2015), the media imply that China is not the 
‘guardian’ of ‘childlike’ Africa. The cumulative effect of these metaphors and 
statements not only generate the impression of  China ‘imposing its authority’ on 
Africa, but it more importantly, also transforms Africa into a predetermined 
universalised figure in need of the West’s protection, thereby, reproducing the 
narrative of the West’s (in this case the U.S.) ‘goodness’ and ‘benevolence’. 
 
Doty (1996, p.161) points out that scholarly discourse on North-South relations in 
international relations “becomes imbued through and through with the imperial 
representations that have preceded it”. There are striking similarities between 
representations of Africa in the nineteenth century and popular representations 
today. In the coverage of China-Africa relations, the media have adopted a 
discourse of ‘crisis’ to construct African countries as suffering from China’s 
decreasing demand for resources in Africa, thus framing China as the ‘culprit’ who 
is causing the African economic crises. Narratives around the theme of economic 






deprivation in Africa are built, perpetuating the ‘dependent versus dependee’ 
discourse. The news texts make use of an orientation metaphor to illustrate the 
considerable state of crisis which Africa is suffering under: African nations have 
watched growth and currencies “plummet” or “plunged” or “fell” this year as 
China’s demands for raw materials have decreased (The Wall Street Journal, 2 
December 2015; The Washington Post, 12 January 2016). Moreover, a coldness 
metaphor is adopted to describe African sales to China as having “cooled” (The 
Washington Post, 12 January 2016). Such discourse implies that Africa is stricken 
with various crises due to its excessive reliance on China. The metaphor enables 
the media not only to frame China-African relations in a ‘dependent’ frame, but also 
allows the news to imply that it was this ‘dependent’ relation between China and 
Africa that has led to the economic crisis and underdevelopment in Africa. These 
partial, stereotypical and de-contextualised accounts convey a dominant image of 
Africa being a place of ‘misery’ and ‘chaos’. Echoing nineteenth century imperial 
discourses, African governments and individuals are seen as ‘incapable’ of 
harnessing Northern notions of law and order, and establishing markets that are 
considered the prerequisites to development (McEwan, 2008). By selectively 
foregrounding the discourse of crisis, the media create an impression of African 
‘weakness and vulnerability’ and Chinese ‘ruthlessness and threat’. Juxtaposed with 
this impression is the notion that the presence of Europe and the U.S. in Africa is 
strategically necessary to ‘save’ Africa from China, based on an ethical concern for 
postcolonial Africa (McEwan, 2008). The media’s demonisation of China not only 
silences China’s role in encouraging African development, but also exculpates the 
West, and dismisses the structural inequalities it perpetuates. 
 
The media further construct China as the ‘Other’ by drawing on the ‘dependent’ 
frame, and presenting China’s investment in Africa wrapped in a ‘rogue aid’ 
narrative. The media adopt the strategy of personification to denigrate China as 
‘egocentric’ and ‘uncivilised’. Here, China is personified as a “free-rider” (The Wall 
Street Journal, 28 September, 2015) in the global system, who “touts” (The Wall 
Street Journal, 21 October 2014) its cash and contributions in Africa, and does not 
have an “environmental bone” in its body (The New York Times, 31 December 2016). 






With the help of such personification, the media evoke the West’s deep-seated 
stereotypes towards non-Western nations, and orientalise China as the ‘backward’ 
and ‘opportunistic’ ‘Other’. Constructing China in an ‘Othering’ discourse allows 
the media to imply that such an ‘opportunistic’ China is ‘dangerous’. Moreover, the 
media adopt denigratory descriptors and terms in order to frame China’s investment 
in Africa as ‘destructive’. The news texts define Chinese investment by its ‘opacity’. 
For example, China is portrayed as making “shady arrangements” in its political 
system (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). Its contracts with Africa are greased 
with “monetary bribes and other enticements” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). 
China “does not release data on its annual foreign aid” in Africa (The New York 
Times, 27 September 2015). The deals between China and Africa are “unpublished” 
(The New York Times, 18 September 2013) and “isn’t clear” (The Wall Street 
Journal, 8 October 2013). Chinese investors are represented as “not good” and “not 
satisfactory” (The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2014). Moreover, Chinese 
companies in Africa tend to be framed by their ‘illegality’. For example, Chinese 
companies are portrayed as “disregard[ing] for local laws, customs and labour 
rights” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), “flout[ing] contracting rules” (The Wall 
Street Journal, 6 January 2014), “involve[ing] in rhino horn smuggling” (Los 
Angeles Times, 6 November  2014), “sneaking ivory” (The Washington Post, 9 
October 2015), “colluding with corrupt Tanzanian officials” (The New York Times, 
5 November 2014), [engaging in] “unauthorised small-scale mining” (The New 
York Times, 7 June 2013), and other “illegal activities that threaten marine resources” 
(The New York Times, 21 May 2015). Furthermore, negative attributions such as 
‘environmental-unfriendliness’ is assigned to China. Chinese companies in Africa 
are portrayed as “engag[ing] in ecologically ruinous bottom trawling”, having 
“environmental missteps and mismanagement” (The New York Times, 18 
September 2013) and “a downside, environmentalists allege” (Los Angeles Times, 
6 November 2014), and causing “devastating environmental cost” (The New York 
Times, 5 November 2014) and “environmental damage” (The Wall Street Journal, 
8 Oct 2013). In addition, negatively connoted words such as “gouging, polluting or 
hogging valuable tracts” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013) and “bloated 
costs and unfair charges by the China National Petroleum Corporation” are used to 






portray Chinese companies as ‘predatory’ in Africa. The media stigmatise China as 
a ‘destroyer’, which strengthens the West’s underlying stereotypes towards China. 
As such, the media frame China in a discourse of alterity, and construct China as 
the ‘Other’, who ‘threatens’ African political, economic and socio-cultural 
development.   
 
The media strengthen the ‘threatening’ frame by referring to the Chinese people in 
Africa as ‘intruders’. The news texts portray the Chinese people who come to Africa 
as “proliferating” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014) and grow[ing] exponentially 
every year” (Los Angeles Times, 16 October 2015). Adding to the impression of the 
“proliferating” Chinese people is the reference to the presence of Chinese migrants 
in Africa as a ‘problem’. Chinese people in Africa are defined by their illegality and 
criminality. Negatively connoted labels such as “illegal migrants” (The New York 
Times, 17 May 2014), “overstaying visas” (The New York Times, 11 June 2013), 
“arrested Chinese miners” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), “Chinese criminal 
networks in Mozambique” (Los Angeles Times, 13 July 2016), “Mafia-style gangs 
from southern China” (The Washington Post, 7 November 2014) are used to assign 
‘illegal’ or ‘illegitimate’ attributes to Chinese people. The Chinese in Africa are 
portrayed as “sneaking into the country” (The New York Times, 11 June 2013) 
“through ‘unapproved routes’” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), and conducting 
“low-level commerce” The New York Times, 17 May 2014), “environmentally 
devastating gold mining” The New York Times, 17 May 2014), and getting involved 
in “illegal wildlife trade” (The Washington Post, 9 October 2015). The deliberate 
selection of negative descriptors, such as “low-skill”, “sneaking”, “unapproved 
routes”, “environmentally devastating” and “illegal trade”, enables the media to 
construct an image of the Chinese that is ‘secretive’, ‘unethical’ and ‘dangerous’. 
Such representation reproduces the stereotypes of the ‘Yellow Peril’ , which present 
the Chinese as ‘inscrutable’, ‘immoral’ and ‘devious’, and stigmatise them as an 
‘out-group’.  
 
Moreover, the media construct a division between a ‘threatening’ China and a 
‘victimised’ Africa to further orientalise China as the ‘Other’. In the news texts, 






China is activated as an actor in relation to material processes (such as “accelerate”, 
“disregard”, “hollow out”, “stall”, “miminise”, and “suffocate”) and goals (such as 
“environmental destruction”, “labour rights”, “local industry”, “the continent’s 
democratisation”, “the boost for [African] local economies”, and “African efforts 
to nurture industry and jobs”). The media imply that China’s investment in Africa 
has ‘undermined’ good governance, and is a ‘threat’ to African environment, 
economy and politics. The media orientalise China as a ‘rogue’, who has brought 
disasters to Africa. Reference to Africa as “experiencing environmental damage 
from aggressive Chinese mining and related operations” (The Wall Street Journal, 
8 October, 2013) adds to the impression of a ‘rogue’ China. The media deliberately 
construct a division between a ‘destroyer’ (China, in this case) and a ‘victim’ 
(Africa, in this case). China is orientalised as the ‘Other’, i.e. a “rogue creditor” 
practicing opportunistic lending. In framing the African economic and socio-
political crisis as a result of China’s ‘inhumane’ and ‘rogue’ policies, the media 
obscure and dehistoricise the West’s role in having created the conditions under 
which Africa suffers today (which will be analysed below). By divorcing the 
ongoing African crisis from the West’s long history of colonial exploitation and 
racial violence, the media turn questions of colonial plunder into matters of China’s 
‘inhuman’ policies. 
 
Furthermore, the media seek to essentialise the way China’s investment in Africa 
should be understood, and distort China-Africa relations by constructing a binary 
opposition between an inherently ‘immoral’ China and an ‘ethical’ West in Africa: 
(38) Mr. Obama, speaking to the BBC, said China had been “able to funnel an 
awful lot of money into Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that 
are being extracted from Africa.” “What is certainly true is that the United 
States has to have a presence to promote the values that we care about,” he 
said. (The New York Times, 25 July 2015) 
(39) Whether [Mr. Obama] has succeeded in this mission remains to be seen. But 
at all of his stops, he laid out the case that Africa should be wary of China’s 
appetite for oil for its own use and instead embrace an American relationship 
that seeks to foster economic growth, democracy, health care, education and 






electrification. […] “But economic relationships can’t simply be about 
building countries’ infrastructure with foreign labour or extracting Africa’s 
natural resources,” he said. “Real economic partnerships have to be a good 
deal for Africa. They have to create jobs and capacity for Africans.” “That,” 
he added, “is the kind of partnership America offers.” (The New York Times, 
30 July 2015) 
McEwan (2008, p.122) points out that the notion that the ‘Self’ is defined by 
constructing the ‘Other’ is central to Western philosophy. Binary oppositions have 
shaped Western knowledge forms. Far from being innocent, these binaries are 
bound up in a logic of domination and have material consequences. In terms of the 
case study newspapers’ representation of China-Africa relations, the newspapers’ 
construction of a binary contrast between the U.S. (the ‘drive of Africa towards 
independence and democracy’) and China (the one who ‘thwarts the drive’) serves 
to demonise China’s role in Africa. For example, by portraying China’s investment 
in Africa with references to “exchang[ing] for raw materials”, “extracting Africa’s 
natural resources” and “only using China’s labour”, the media implicate that there 
is an unequal economic cooperation between China and Africa. Contrary to the 
portrayal of China as ‘exploitative’, the media activate the U.S. as an actor in 
relation to material processes such as “promote”, “foster”, “offer”, and goals such 
as “values”, “economic growth”, “partnership”. These material processes, such as 
“promote”, “foster”, and “offer”, are suggestive of cooperation and equivalence. 
The media construct the U.S. as the one who brings ‘civilisation’ and ‘democracy’ 
to Africa. By invoking notions of development and humanitarianism, the media 
construct a divide between ‘Us’ (the U.S., in this case, as the ‘safeguard of 
democratic values’) and the ‘Other’ (China, in this case, as the ‘destroyer’ of 
African good governance and development). China is represented as an 
‘authoritarian’ regime that has been let loose on Africa and ‘threatens’ its 
‘development’ and values (such as ‘rationality’, ‘humanitarianism’ and 
‘democracy’), which the West is trying to protect in Africa. By orientalising 
Chinese investment as ‘rogue aid’, the media position the West as a model of 
‘morality and correctness’ in the field of global development policies, and thus 
justify the West’s new imperialism in Africa. Such a ‘new’ imperialism is couched 






in terms of a new ‘civilising mission’, and the West (in this case the U.S.) uses the 
discourse of development to narrative itself as ‘civilised’, ‘developed’ and ‘modern’.  
 
The media reproduce the discourse of the ‘civilised’ and ‘ethical’ West by 
constructing a divide between a ‘civilised’ West and a ‘backward’ Africa. The news 
texts portray Africa as a “young” (The Washington Post, 17 January 2016), and 
“fragile” continent (The Washington Post, 17 January 2016). Stereotypical labels 
such as “unrest” (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2014), “civil wars and 
military coups” (The Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2014), “instability” (The New 
York Times, 11 August 2014), “extreme poverty” (The New York Times, 31 
December 2016), “faltering economy” (Los Angeles Times, 2 December 2015), 
“famine” (The New York Times, 11 August 2014), “relatively low-paid workers” 
(The Wall Street Journal, 30 November 2015) are repeatedly used by the media to 
construct Africa as ‘volatile’ and ‘weak’. References to Africa being a ‘backward’ 
continent with “authoritarian governments” (The New York Times, 3 December 
2015), “dictatorial leaders” (The New York Times, 11 August 2014), “pervasive 
corruption” (The New York Times, 31 December 2016), “a weak justice system” 
(Los Angeles Times, 13 July 2016) and “checkered human rights records” (The New 
York Times, 30 July 2015) are also common parlance. Making use of stereotypical 
labels and negatively connoted words, the media represent Africa as a ‘savage’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ ‘Other’, and frame Africa in discourses of ‘hazard’ and 
‘vulnerability’. Bankoff (2001, p.19) argues that “tropicality, development and 
vulnerability form part of one and the same essentialising and generalising cultural 
discourse that denigrates large regions of the world as disease-ridden, poverty-
stricken and disaster-prone”. Western societies tend to portray the rest of the world 
as ‘dangerous’ places for ‘Us’ and ‘Ours’ (i.e. the whites) (Bankoff, 2001), and 
orientalise the non-whites as the ‘Other’. Feagin and O’Brien (2003) point out that 
underlying the discourse of the ‘Other’ is a discourse of whiteness that functions as 
the invisible norm against which non-Whites are judged, a norm that serves to 
maintain Whites in positions of power. By representing the South, particularly 
Africa, as steeped in ‘backwardness’, ‘corruption’ and ‘economic chaos’, the media 
evoke discourses of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, construct a sense of cultural 






differences, centring on a ‘civilised’ West and a ‘weak’ Africa. More importantly, 
the media imply that ‘savage’ Africa is in dire need of salvation by Northern 
‘benevolence’, and thereby justify Western interference and interventions in 
Africa’s affairs. Any responsibility for creating underdevelopment and poverty 
within the context of colonialism and global capitalism is effaced by positioning 
the West as the ‘benevolent’ hand that will ‘lift’ the impoverished out of their state 
of degeneracy. Furthermore, the role of the Western world in Africa’s colonial past 
is concealed by using the strategy of nominalisation, as in “decades of hard lessons 
about heedless resource-grabs”. Through employing the nominal “resource-grabs” 
– rather than the sentence “the West grabbed resources in Africa” – to refer to the 
West’s colonial exploitation of Africa, the media obscure the perpetrators of 
colonial exploitation, which works to de-emphasise the negative portrayal of the 
West, and exculpate it from its colonial plunder. To sum up, by constructing China 
in the discourse of ‘unethical’ and Africa in the discourse of ‘primitive’, the media 
dehistoricise the West’s colonial past and its neo-colonial present, and reconstruct 
the African crisis as a matter of ‘China threat’, thus obscuring the systemic and 
underlying causes for African underdevelopment. 
 
Frank (1989) challenges the discourse of development by pointing out that existing 
theories and knowledge on development as well as corresponding development 
policies have located their origins exclusively in the historical experiences of the 
West’s (and in particular European and North American) developed capitalist 
nations, and thus entirely fail to reflect the past of the emerging parts of the world. 
Euro-American centric discourse of development generally assumes that economic 
development of today’s underdeveloped countries is considered to be in the past of 
a historical trajectory that culminates in the now Euro-American developed 
countries. Accordingly, a country’s underdevelopment is considered as a 
consequence of its own political, economic and socio-cultural deprivation (Frank, 
1989). The discourse of development, as Frank (1989) argues, ignores the 
interconnected relationship between the now-developed metropolitan countries, on 
the one hand, and colonialism, imperialism, colonial exploitation, unequal 
development, on the other hand. Going further, Grosfoguel (2009) deconstructs the 






discourse of development by pointing out that coloniality and modernity constitute 
two sides of a single coin. According to Grosfoguel (2009), coloniality is the darker 
side of Western modernity, yet is constantly disguised with the rhetoric of salvation, 
civilisation, progress, development, and market democracy. By representing 
Western aid in Africa in a ‘promoting development’ narrative, the media disguise 
the reality of the West’s colonial exploitation of Africa, and absolve it of its 
responsibility for African underdevelopment. 
 
Frank (1970) analyses the nature of underdevelopment. He regards contemporary 
underdevelopment as a historical product of the West’s colonial and imperialist 
exploitation as well as the continuing neo-colonial economic relations between the 
now-developed metropolitan countries and the underdeveloped satellite in the 
postcolonial era. These relations serve as underpinnings of the structure of the 
capitalist system, and facilitate its development on a global scale (Frank, 1970). 
Preobrazhensky (1965) points out that the destruction of the natural economy and 
mode of production in Africa is closely related to primitive accumulation during the 
colonial period. Marx et al. (1887) expose the primitive accumulation by defining 
it as the historical process by which the basic condition for the capitalist system was 
achieved. Overseas expansion and forced colonisation are ways by which the 
process of “primitive accumulation” was achieved in the sixteenth- and eighteenth-
century (the detailed narrative of colonialism in Africa could be found in Section 
7.2.1). The legacy of colonisation has been the expansion of capitalism as a system 
and the massive accumulation of colonial nation-states at the expense of greatly 
weakened political systems and economies in Africa. “The wealth that was created 
by African resources was grabbed by the capitalist countries of Europe,” writes 
Rodney (1972), “[r]estrictions were placed upon African capacity to make the 
maximum use of its economic potential […] African economies are integrated into 
the very structure of the developed capitalist economies, and they integrated in a 
manner that is unfavourable to Africa and insures that Africa is dependent on the 
big capitalist countries” (Wengraf, 2016-17, p.4). The colonial monopoly led to 
Africa being subjected to “capitalist penetration without capitalist development” 
(Phillips, 1989, p.162). Colonial modes of production ensured that Africa was 






drained of its capital in the form of bullion, consumption goods, raw materials and 
so on. McEachern (1979, p.13) posits that the colonial mode of production 
“transmitted to the colonies the pressures of the accumulation process in the 
metropolis without unleashing any corresponding expansion in the forces of 
production”. In other words, the West increased and concentrated capital through 
colonialism, including taxes, seizure of land and livestock, conversion of conquered 
peoples to slaves, conquest of trade routes, and state loans (Amin, 2001, 
Preobrazhensky, 1965). Consequently, colonialism left Africa with a highly 
distorted and fragile economy, which resulted in economic systems being anchored 
in narrow export bases, with a concomitant weak industrial sector and rates of 
growth. African states inherited an underdeveloped infrastructure geared toward 
exports, which lacks capital and is skewed towards supplying unfinished goods to 
the advanced countries. In essence, “the development effort of late colonial regimes 
never did provide the basis for a strong national economy. Economies remained 
externally oriented and the state’s economic power remained concentrated at the 
gate between inside and outside” (Wengraf, 2016-17, p.4). Africa was reduced to 
exclusive European domains in disregard of pre-existing economic, cultural and 
linguistic ties among peoples. The West’s colonial conquest resulted in Africa being 
involved in the expansion of global mercantile and industrial capitalist system, and 
brought the monopolistic metropolis-satellite structure of capitalism to African 
domestic economy. These conditions have posed severe challenges for Africa and 
its prospects for building sustainable economies that are capable of lifting the 
population out of poverty and achieving development in the international order 
(Wengraf, 2016-17). As a direct consequence of protracted colonial conquest and 
imperialism, contemporary Africa is marked by the economic, social, and political 
structure of satellite underdevelopment. 
 
Furthermore, imposing the international division of labour under formal 
colonialism had the indirect effect of laying the foundations for continued economic 
control and domination over colonial resources even in the absence of direct 
political administration (Hoogvelt, 1997). The implication is that decolonisation 
resulted not in the colonial powers ceding their grip on the economic levers of the 






African economic machinery. The exploitation of colonies continues to adversely 
impact Africans, an impact aggravated by the neo-liberal policies pursued by 
developed states and their international financial institutions in recent decades. 
Political independence was followed by other strategies of economic control that 
included ‘aid’ for economic development to the African continent. Amadi (2012) 
deconstructs the nature of ‘aid’ and points out that it is a feature of neo-colonialism 
in the postcolonial period. According to Amadi (2012), the conditionality of the WB 
and IMF has ensured that African nations have to open up their economies and serve 
as exporters of primary products. In order to secure more financial support from the 
West and its institutions, the poor countries compete with each other by means of 
offering reduced wages, lower standards, as well as providing raw resources at a 
lower price. As such, these countries get involved in a spiralling race to the bottom. 
Sanou Mbaye (2010, cited in Haslam et al., 2015, p. 878), a senior official at the 
African Development Bank, points out that “‘aid’, as it now stands, is an industry 
allowing the West to keep Africa hostage, starved, bound, and addicted to hand-
outs”. In other words, the exploitive loans and grants fraught with conditions tie the 
developing African countries to developed counties or international financial 
institutions, with rules of engagement being dictated by rich Western nations 
(Okolo and Akwu, 2016). The aid of the IMF and WB, as many academics (cf. 
Haslam et al., 2015, Okolo and Akwu, 2016) argue, often benefits the donor 
countries and further marginalises the local communities. In conclusion, African 
underdevelopment cannot be ascribed to its own economic, political, social and 
cultural ‘backwardness’ as well as China’s role in Africa, but was and still is the 
consequence of the historical process of capitalist development. 
7.6 Summary 
The CDA of the American mainstream media’s representation of China-Africa 
relations reveals that the media gloss over Western colonialism and neo-colonialism 
in Africa, and ignore the importance of China in facilitating African decolonisation 
and independence, and discursively construct China-Africa relations in a ‘China 
threat’ narrative. The media construct an image of China as ‘threatening’ and 






‘uncivilised’, which evokes deep-seated oriental stereotypes of China, and 
denigrates it as the ‘Other’. Specifically, the news texts adopt metaphors of hunger 
and disasters to construct China as ‘avaricious’, and portray China’s investment in 
Africa as ‘dangerous’. Moreover, the media construct a distinction between a 
‘threatening’ China and a ‘victimised’ Africa by strategically employing negative 
descriptors and terms. China is orientalised as an ‘authoritarian’ and ‘aggressive’ 
‘Other’. Chinese companies in Africa are portrayed as ‘ruthless’, ‘predatory’, 
‘destructive’, ‘racialising Africans’, and ‘environmentally-unfriendly’. The 
Chinese in Africa are framed by their illegality and criminality, and are represented 
as ‘unethical’ and ‘dangerous’. The media construct China’s role in Africa as ‘neo-
colonial’. Furthermore, the media essentialise the understanding of China-Africa 
relations by constructing discourses of African ‘weakness and vulnerability’, 
Northern ‘trusteeship’, and Chinese ‘ruthlessness’. The use of negative descriptors 
and terms ensures that Africa is represented as ‘poverty-stricken’, ‘barbaric’, and 
in need of ‘salvation’ by Northern ‘benevolence’. In addition, the media adopt 
nominalisation to conceal the role of the West in the colonial plunder, and thus stage 
a spectacle of colonial amnesia. In so doing, the media reconstitute the West (in this 
case the U.S.) as ‘ethical’ and ‘good’, and innocent of its imperialist histories.  
 
The narrative of a ‘weak’ Africa, ‘ruthless’ China, and ‘ethical’ West epitomises 
Euro-American-centrism in international relations. Drawing on postcolonial IR on 
world order, this chapter has argued that the ‘China-as-colonialist’ discourse has 
little to do with the realities of China-Africa relations, but merely reflects the 
anxieties of traditional powers to lose their hegemonies and control in Africa. The 
chapter has also deconstructed the discourse of ‘racialisation of Africans by the 
Chinese’ following the revelation that the West imposes its racist representation of 
Africans on the analysis of China-Africa relations. Furthermore, the chapter has 
shattered the ‘Orientalist’ myth that often describes China’s role as that of a ‘China 
threat’ driven by the desire to monopolise markets and undermine development on 
the continent. In contrast, Western powers such as the U.S. are portrayed as knights, 
seeking to assist Africa’s economic recovery and spread democracy. These 
portrayals contribute to an ideological formation that erases history and unravel the 






historical links that bind the West and Africa. In framing China as a ‘threat’ in Africa, 
the media exculpate the West from its brutality, exploitation, plunder, and 
transforms the colonial agent into an innocent bystander, confirming its status as 
‘ethical’, ‘good’ and ‘humane’. By placing the discussion in the historical context 
of the West’s colonial and neo-colonial control in Africa, the chapter has argued that 
the contemporary African crisis and underdevelopment constitute a historical 
process rather than existing in a vacuum, and that it is the colonial plunder and 
hierarchies of race that have interacted with the continuous “neocolonial” 
hegemony, producing Africa’s instable political situations, ethnical conflicts, weak 









































8.1 Introduction  
This study examines the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of 
China in the intersection of power, media discourse and knowledge. The study 
seeks to address the following research questions: 
1. In what ways has China been defined and represented in the American 
mainstream press? 
2. How have linguistic tools been employed to construct China in particular 
ways? 
3. How have such representations and discourse concealed racialised ideology 
of the press and unequal power relations between cultures and nations? 
These research questions are addressed through applying postcolonial and 
decolonial theories and the CDA approach which is underpinned by Marxism and 
Foucauldian discourse/power/knowledge. Three cases are analysed, i.e. the 
American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, of the 
2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of 
China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. The study reveals that China is 
discursively constructed in a way that is resonant with the racialised “Yellow Peril” 
imagery and ideology of the imperialist and colonial times. Deconstructing 
dominant discourses and representations, the study provides a subaltern 
interpretation and reconstruction of the events through contextualising and re-
establishing historical connectivities between China as a former semi-colonised 
nation and Western colonialism and imperialism. 
  
In what follows, I synthesise the main findings and arguments of the research, as 
well as point to areas where further study could be conducted. Section 8.2 
summarises the main findings of the study. Section 8.3 explains the contributions 






and implications of the study. Section 8.4 puts forward suggestions and 
recommendations for future research.   
8.2 Key findings and arguments 
The thesis’ critical review of literature concerning theoretical debates and media 
representation of ‘Others’ shows that Western media associate non-Western 
cultures with negative and stereotypical images, such as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, 
‘simplicity’, ‘lack of cultures’, and ‘nature’, and ignore their visibility unless the 
non-western cultures fit with existing ethnic and racial stereotypes or prejudices 
(see Chapter 3). Western media discourses, as such, are underpinned by deeply 
rooted racial prejudice of the West against non-western nations, cultures and 
peoples, and thus constitute part of Euro-American-centric knowledge. Such Euro-
American-centric knowledge construction of non-western cultures and societies 
leads to the subalternity of the indigenous knowledge of non-western nations, hence 
“asymmetric ignorance” (Chakrabarty, 2000a, p.28), and symbolic and “epistemic 
violence” (Spivak, 1988, p.281). China Studies is not exempt from such an 
asymmetric structure of knowledge production and epistemic violence. Euro-
American-centric perspectives remain dominant in the field of China Studies, 
which is manifested in its (western) cultural univocity and the scarcity of critical 
and pluralistic perspectives. Writings on China are explicitly or implicitly 
orientalist and often racialised. Such a body of knowledge of China is uncritically 
accepted as unquestioned ‘facts’ and ‘Truths’. Although research has started to 
emerge in recent years, such as that from Qing Cao (2007, 2014), Hongling Liang 
(2015), Xu Shi (2007, 2015), and Vukovich (2012, 2017), providing a critical voice 
and paying particular attention to China, such critical voices are scarce and remain 
marginal in the China Studies field. Furthermore, despite that postcolonial and 
decolonial theories challenge western-centric thinking about the colonial world and 
the Euro-American-centric interpretations and knowledge of world history, the 
dialogue and mutual engagement between postcolonialism and decolonialism on 
the one hand and China Studies on the other hand are absent. Against such a 
scholarly background, this study focuses on news discourses, and investigates the 






representation of China in American mainstream newspapers from a critical 
perspective. It thus, contributes to emerging critical debates in China Studies. 
 
Discourse could be used to index and express power, as well as challenge and alter 
distributions of power. CDA approach, which is underpinned by Marxism and 
Foucauldian notions of discourse/power/knowledge, aims to analyse the way that 
discourse is employed by dominant groups to impose power abuse and reproduce 
social domination. Marxism, however, remains culture-blind and thus cannot fully 
address the research questions guiding this study. A postcolonial perspective is 
introduced in order to provide theoretical insights into cultural and racial relations 
as well as domination and hegemony by particular cultural/ethnic groups over 
others through representation and discourse. Drawing on the CDA approach, with 
a focus on a postcolonial perspective, the study analyses the way in which China is 
represented in American mainstream media discourse, and uncovers ideology and 
power relations between cultures hidden in such representations. The key findings 
are elaborated as follows.  
8.2.1 Discursive construction of China as the ‘Other’  
American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China is inherently associated 
with the notion of Orientalism. The notion of Orientalism is an underlying 
repertoire, based on which a variety of discourses are produced to construct China 
as the cultural ‘Other’. My research confirms findings from Chakrabarty (1992) and 
Liu (2017), who argue that the orientalist discourses of non-western cultures and 
societies are underpinned by self-perceptions of the West as ‘superior’ on the basis 
of racial differences, and deeply rooted in the Western colonial project that has 
historically defined ‘exotic’ ‘Others’ from the gaze of the West. Postcolonial and 
de-colonial theories direct our attention to the historical linkages between orientalist 
discourses and the West’s colonialism and imperialism. 
 
Following the colonial encroachment of the world beyond Europe in the early 16th 
century, white colonial power constructs a racial hierarchy and domination of the 






Europeans in which the colonised is placed in a situation of inferiority to the 
colonisers (Grosfoguel, 2013, 2015, Quijano, 2000, Said, 1978). Drawing on the 
idea of race, the West essentialises the difference between the colonisers and the 
colonised, and exercises white colonial power through colonial expansion and 
representational practices in which the colonised ‘Others’ are defined in terms of 
their differences from the ‘civilised’, ‘rational’ and ‘superior’ West, and are 
orientalised as ‘mysterious’, ‘eccentric’, ‘primitive’, ‘despotic’ and ‘cruel’ 
(McEwan, 2008, Grosfoguel, 2015, Quijano, 2000, Said, 1978). By comparing the 
extent to which other societies resemble or are different from the European 
prototype of ‘civilisation’, the West creates a binary opposition between the West 
and the Rest, imposes its Euro-American-centrism on the rest of the world, 
marginalises and excludes indigenous values, cultures and languages, and exerts 
epistemic violence. Such representational practices contribute to the colonial 
perspective that privileges the ‘superiority’ of the West in the production of 
‘universal’ knowledge, seeks to restrain, regulate, and control the colonised, and 
justifies the West’s colonial occupation and oppression. As Goldberg (1996, p.184) 
notes, “materially colonialism seeks to strengthen domination for the sake of human 
and economic exploitation”. Representationally, it constructs an ‘oriental myth’, 
and seeks to maintain and perpetuate epistemic conditions through creating an 
ideological or discursive image of the colonised (Goldberg, 1996).  
 
Such epistemic violence underpinned by the idea of race continues to exist in the 
postcolonial period and is embedded in the notions of ‘modernity’ and 
‘development’. The West is represented as an embodiment of a range of ‘universal’ 
economic and political values such as ‘progress’, ‘rationality’, and ‘innovation’ (cf. 
Huntington, 1993). These values are presented as international ‘norms’ and are 
imposed on the non-West. As De Carvalho et al. (2011, p.745) say, “Europe 
expands outwards and graciously bequeaths sovereignty and Europe’s panoply of 
civilised and rational institutions to the inferior Eastern societies”. Such Eurocentric 
assumptions result in a racialised epistemological hierarchy, i.e. the West is 
regarded as a ‘norm’/‘standard’ against which the non-West, in particular, China, 
is rated and judged, as uncovered by this study.  







In applying CDA, the thesis has shown that Euro-American-centrism underpins 
American mainstream newspaper coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in 
Hong Kong, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist 
aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. Eurocentric 
assumptions and ideological structures in American mainstream newspaper 
coverage of China are reflected in their discursive construction of the otherness of 
China through the use of various linguistic strategies, such as negative other-
presentation, scapegoating, exclusion of voices, and distortion, and linguistic tools 
such as lexical choice, metaphors, transitivity. As such, the media establish a binary 
discursive construction, i.e. a ‘threating’, ‘authoritarian’ China (the out-group, 
Other) versus a ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’ West (the in-group, Self). 
 
The study finds that the media repeatedly assign negative attributions to China, 
which construct China as inherently different from the West. An ideological 
‘communist’ frame has been used by the media to define, and bring back the 
memory of the Cold War ‘fault-line’ between capitalism and socialism. Negatively 
connoted words, such as “corruption”, “unfairness”, “no press freedom”, “no 
religious freedom” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014), “dark” and “wrong” 
(The New York Times, 28 September 2014) are adopted by the media to frame China. 
The media create an image of China as ‘totalitarian’, which is the opposite of the 
‘liberal’ West. Through such frames, the media construct and perpetuate the 
discourse of an essentially different, morally ‘evil’, and ideologically ‘threatening’ 
‘Other’.  
 
The media additionally constructs a discourse of ‘crisis’ to denigrate China and the 
Chinese economy. Conceptual metaphors such as the ‘patient’, ‘natural disaster’, 
and an orientational metaphor are adopted by the media to portray China as 
‘suffering’ from profound ‘crisis, and thus as a society that is about to ‘collapse’. 
The ‘patient’ metaphor that is used suggests that China’s economy is “weak”, and 
in bad condition (The Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2015). The ‘natural disaster’ 
metaphor suggests that China is hit by “economic squalls” (The New York Times, 






22 September 2015) and thus is in “economic turbulence” (Los Angeles Times, 6 
September 2015). The orientational metaphor represents China’s economy as 
“plummeting” (The New York Times, 1 September 2015) or “slumping” (The New 
York Times, 2 September 2015), serving to invoke and generate an image of “China 
collapse”. This group of metaphors paints a picture of ‘negativity’ and the ‘failure’ 
of China. 
 
Another discursive practice adopted by the American mainstream newspapers to 
debase China and Chinese culture is through the discourse of ‘deficit’. This 
discourse works through the idea that non-western nations are ‘deficient’ or 
essentially ‘lack’ ‘rationality’ and ‘progress’, and thus should “develop by 
modernising and should follow the same trajectories as western economies in order 
to ‘catch up’, both in economic terms and in terms of civilisation”, as pointed by 
McEwan (2008, pp.131-132) in her analysis of development texts. Through 
associating China with negatively connoted predications such as “not [being] 
accountable to” its domestic economic, and socio-cultural development (The New 
York Times, 30 July 2015), the media insinuate that China is ‘irrational’ and 
‘irresponsible’ and as such resonant with the orientalist discourse of the ‘uncivilised’ 
‘other’. Such a discursive construction of China as the ‘uncivilised’ ‘Other’ is also 
manifest in the media’s portrayals of China as “adamantly reject[ing] liberal 
Western values”, (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015), “endors[ing] the 
tough approach to the protests” (The New York Times, 29 September 2014), and 
“ramp[ing] up media and Internet censorship” (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 
2015). Moreover, China is portrayed as a nation with “underfunded health and 
education systems” (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015), “atmospheric 
pollution” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013) and “poverty” at home (The 
Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015). As such, the media construct China as 
‘savage’, ‘force-oriented’, and ‘despotic’, and China’s domestic socio-culture as 
‘weak’ and ‘backward’. Using such lexical choice, the media stigmatise China and 
Chinese culture as essentially ‘deficient’ and different from a ‘civilised’ West. This 
implies that the China ‘in deficit’ should be ‘taught’ by the ‘civilising’ West through 
its ‘civilising missions’.  







Making use of linguistic tools such as lexical choice and metaphors, the media 
deliberately attribute negative characteristics to China and denigrate China as 
‘authoritarian’, “uncivilised” and ‘backward’, in opposition to the ‘democratic’, 
“civilised” and ‘advanced’ West. The repeated use of negative characteristics harks 
back to the Orientalist assumption underlying western attitudes towards China. As 
such, the media create a distinct sense of “Us” (the West) versus the “Other” (China) 
and reinforce the stereotypes and prejudice against China.  
 
Furthermore, central to the media representation of China is the attempt to make 
the ‘China threat’ discourse ‘real’. The discursive strategy of scapegoating is 
adopted by the media to construct China as a nation which has constituted a ‘threat’ 
to the existing ‘world order’. This is also often performed through the use of 
metaphors. For example, the ‘hunger’ metaphor is adopted to represent China as 
having an “insatiable” “appetite” for African raw materials (The New York Times, 3 
December 2015), implying that China is a ‘dangerous’ ‘alien’ nation that can ‘harm’ 
Africa. Moreover, the ‘flood’ metaphor is used to depict Chinese people in Africa 
as well as mainland Chinese in Hong Kong as ‘invaders’ (such as Chinese “have 
flooded into Ghana’s gold-producing regions” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), 
“an unwelcome influx of mainlanders” (Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2014)). 
These metaphors construct a negative image of Chinese people as ‘dangerous’ and 
‘disastrous’, in an attempt to stir up panic among the public and exclude China and 
Chinese people as ‘Others’ .    
 
In addition, the media activate China as an actor in relation to material processes in 
a negative semantic field such as “projecting [power]” (Los Angeles Times, 4 
September 2015), “throwing aside [the postwar order]” (The Wall Street Journal, 
25 August 2015), “eroding [freedom in Hong Kong]” (The New York Times, 28 
September 2014), and “undermining [good governance and economy in Africa]” 
(The New York Times, 26 March 2013). As such, the media ascribe ‘threatening’ 
characteristics to China, portraying China as a ‘trouble maker’, and representing 
China as an ‘aggressive’ , ‘sharp’ power which ‘threatens’ the existing western-






dominated world order (see Chapter 6). Similarly, making use of denigratory words, 
the media frame mainland Chinese people as ‘secretive’, ‘unethical’ and ‘dangerous’ 
‘aliens’ that cause all kinds of ‘problems’ in Hong Kong and Africa. For example, 
the mainland Chinese are represented as causing ‘an increase in the unemployment 
rate’, and ‘putting a burden’ on services such as education and health care in Hong 
Kong (see Chapter 5). Chinese people in Africa are framed using connotations of 
‘illegality’ and ‘criminality’, and are represented as causing ‘environmental 
devastation’ and ‘economic instability’ in Africa (see Chapter 7). Making use of 
scapegoating, the media discursively construct a dichotomy between China as a 
‘world order violator’ (the ‘Other’) versus the West as a ‘world order defender’ (the 
‘Self’) under a fundamental assumption that the existing ‘world order’ is 
universally and globally accepted as just, fair and should be maintained. The media 
stigmatise China and Chinese people as a ‘threat’ (the ‘Other’) that should be kept 
out. The thesis argues that such a present-day media discourse of ‘China threat’ 
reproduces and extends the historical colonial discourse of the ‘Yellow Peril’, 
thereby entrenching the essentialist racial differences and representations of China, 
Chinese cultures and Chinese people, and serving to perpetuate unequal power 
relations. As such, the media normalise racialised practices that exclude and 
marginalise China, and justify American imperialist military presence and 
hegemony in the Asian Pacific area, in Africa and globally. 
 
The study also shows that juxtaposed with the media discursive construction of 
otherness of China is the idea of the “West”. According to Hall (1992, p.277; cited 
in Cao, 2014, p.130), the discourse of the West refers to “a set of images that 
integrates a range of characteristics into one picture”. Such a set of images serve as 
a system of representation. On the basis of these representations, the West 
constructs a schematic knowledge, which is well manifested in the notions of 
‘modernity’ and ‘development’ (Cao, 2014). The West as an image is considered 
to be a ‘standard’ or ‘model’ for comparison (e.g. ‘rationality’, ‘science’, and 
‘progress’) and provides criteria for evaluation around which the images of other 
cultures and societies are constructed (Hall, 2002). This study on American 
mainstream media representation of China confirms these theoretical insights; 






discourses of an ‘ethical’, ‘civilised’, ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘modern’ West are 
constructed, against which China is culturally portrayed as ‘immoral’, ‘uncivilised’, 
‘threatening’, ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’. Through the binary framework of the 
‘positive’ West and ‘negative’ China, the media establish and exercise a hierarchy 
of cultural power where China is degraded not only as essentially ‘different’ 
(‘strange’) ‘Other’/‘Them’, but also ‘unpredictable’, ‘aggressive’, ‘dangerous’ and 
most importantly, ‘inferior’ to the ‘Self’/ ‘Us’.  
 
Media representations do not simply and transparently mirror reality. The media 
disseminate and reproduce dominant ideologies in a hidden way and are allied to 
“cloud the mind of people”, with ideas that the ruling groups want them to have 
(Berger, 2014). In addition to the discursive construction of otherness of China, the 
media reinforce the dichotomy between the West and China through exclusion and 
purposeful omission of information that could undermine dominant discourses. For 
example, during the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the 2014 Hong 
Kong “Occupy Central” event, the “anti-Occupy Central” campaign and 
demonstration – which were carried out against the planned ‘occupy’ – was 
completely ignored by the American mainstream newspapers despite their scale and 
impact, as these campaigns and demonstrations did not fit the media’s Orientalist 
ideology, and the Eurocentric positioning and agenda when representing the ‘Other’.  
 
The American mainstream media representation of China is regarded as a symbolic 
struggle for ‘truth’ within existing dynamic power relations. Historically orientalist 
stereotypes that are closely linked with the western/American colonial project of 
cultural and political dominance, hegemony and interest, continue to provide the 
fundamentally epistemological foundations for the American mainstream 
newspapers’ representation of China. Making use of discursive strategies as well as 
the strategy of selection, exclusion, omission, and silencing, the media invoke 
colonial imaginaries and fantasies, reproduce the West’s deeply-entrenched 
stereotypes, orientalist ideology, and racialised discourses on China, whilst 
silencing other discourses that are inconsistent with the orientalist ideology. The 
media construct China as the ‘negative, uncivilised and threatening Other’, which 






is in stark contrast to the ‘positive, civilised and security-protecting’ West. As such, 
the media confirm the assumed ‘superiority’ of the West, and reinforce the 
dichotomy between the ‘civilised’ West and ‘threatening’ China. This entrenched 
binary dichotomy operates to frame the way in which China is understood through 
Western eyes, and structures knowledge and patterns of thought when talking about 
China. Accordingly, the media naturalise the Western-centric discourse of China as 
a ‘truth’ and ‘fact’, which, in turn, reinforces the existing unequal power relations 
between the West and China, and maintains the hegemony of the West. The effect 
of interwoven relations between colonial ideologies and American media 
representations on the construction of western-centric knowledge of China reifies 
the power-knowledge-discourse nexus (Foucault, 1980).  
8.2.2 Identity, collective memory and connected histories 
American mainstream newspapers assign negative and deviant attributions to China 
and construct a contemporary ‘authoritarian’ ‘threatening’ China vis-a-vis a 
‘democratic’ ‘civilised’ West. Such an American media representation of China 
does not bear a close resemblance to reality. McEwan (2008, p.129) points out that 
the West “produces the Third Word and the subaltern through discourse to suit [its] 
own image and desire”. The American representations say more about the West, 
which does the representation, than about Chin, which is represented. The dominant 
discourses of China as a cultural ‘Other’ reinforce the self-image of the West as 
‘superior’, and justify the ‘positional superiority’ of the West against non-western 
cultures and in particular indigenous Chinese values and cultures, which leads to 
the subalternisation of the collective memories and histories of China and 
influences the construction of identity in both mainland China and postcolonial 
Hong Kong.  
 
The discourse of otherness fixes China as always, irrevocably different. A highly 
racialised hierarchy between ‘inferior’ China and the ‘superior’ West is established. 
The denigration of China as a subaltern subject is crucial to the self-definition of 
the West as ‘superior’. Such a core contradiction between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 






justifies the West’s colonial expansion in semi-colonial China and in particular in 
colonial Hong Kong (see Chapter 5), and constitutes ‘the white man’s burden’ to 
‘civilise’ the ‘Other’, which has a great impact on the identity construction of 
postcolonial Hong Kong people. The discourses of the civilised West’ and 
‘civilising mission’ gloss over the West’s racial segregation, colonial domination 
and exploitation in colonial Hong Kong, and play an important role in shaping the 
domination of colonial Hong Kong, and contribute to the construction of a socio-
cultural hierarchy in which the Britain is superior, mainland China is inferior and 
Hong Kong sits in-between. As I have argued in the analysis of the ‘Occupy Central’ 
event in Chapter 5, the media construct a dichotomy between ‘uncivilised’ and 
‘authoritarian’ China versus the ‘civilised’ and ‘democratic’ West and dehistoricise 
the interpretation of the event, thus depicting the event as ‘democratic’. Moreover, 
in the analysis, I deconstruct the dominant interpretation of the event and provide 
an alternative interpretation by contextualising it in relation to the specificities of 
the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present, its relationships with 
the British Empire and the Chinese mainland and its changing position in Asia. I 
argue that the ‘Occupy Central’ event reflects identity anxieties in the postcolonial 
Hong Kong and is the result of ‘colonial nostalgia’ in Hong Kong. The continuity 
of many colonial institutions, ideologies and hierarchies of race, nationality and 
language in postcolonial Hong Kong influence the construction of its collective 
identity. The continuity of colonial institutions and ideologies have permeated the 
social fabric and thus contributed to the continuity of highly racialised socio-
cultural structures. These persistently produce and reproduce imperialist fantasies 
and consciousness, resulting in filtered identities, and ultimately, the colonial 
nostalgic and its associated identity anxieties and crises in the postcolonial Hong 
Kong SAR.  
 
Moreover, fundamental to an orientalist fantasy of China as the ‘inferior Other’ is 
an assumption that the ‘uncivilised’ and ‘primitive’ China is incapable of producing 
knowledge and thus the media necessitate ‘objective’ western ‘scientific’ values 
and thoughts. The discourse of the otherness of China justifies the West’s privilege 
in the production and construction of knowledge and history, and serves as a means 






for the West to impose Western-centric knowledge and values on the rest of the 
world. Non-western nations and in particular China are represented as unable to 
produce thoughts worthy of being recognised as knowledge, and are degenerated 
as ‘objects’ which are spoken about. The West produces knowledge based on its 
provincialised experiences, marginalises and silences indigenous cultures and 
values, and imposes western-centric knowledge on other nations as the ‘truth’, 
which greatly affects the construction of collective memories and national identities 
in non-western nations. As I have discussed in in Chapter 6, the media establish a 
dichotomy between a ‘threatening’ and ‘uncivilised’ China and the ‘peace-
defending’ and ‘liberal’ U.S and its allies (in this case Japan), silence China’s 
struggles against Japanese Fascism and discursively construct the parade in a 
decontexualised way resonant with the ‘Yellow Peril’ narrative. As such, the media 
construct a collective and consensual narrative of the parade that coincides with the 
western interpretation of the history of WWII. Such a Euro-American-centric 
interpretation of WWII is mainly concerned with wars/battles in the European 
battle-ground. Little attention has been paid to the devastating wars that took place 
in non-western nations – in this case, the Japanese colonial conquest in China. Such 
an amnesia of Chinese sufferings and struggles against Japanese militarism has 
silenced the collective memories and commemorations of the subaltern China and 
influenced the construction of national identity in China. Through contextualising 
the discussion of the parade in relations to the history of China’s war against Japan’s 
fascism between 1931 and 1942, I deconstruct the dominant discourses of the 
parade, bring back collective memories of the Chinese people, and produce a more 
comprehensive account of WWII that moves beyond a Eurocentric narrative. I 
argue that the atrocities and the most evil forms of racist genocide committed by 
the Japanese colonial expansion in the colonised Asian nations and in particular in 
China, as well as sufferings of Chinese people and Chinese communist party in the 
context of the resistance against Japanese militarism and fascism and the overall 
global victory over Fascism are erased from the history of WWII. The West imposes 
the Euro-American-centric interpretation of the history of WWII to the rest of the 
world as a ‘truth’, marginalises the voice of subaltern Chinese in the construction 
of history, and establishes its epistemic hegemony/violence.  







In addition, postcolonial theory explains that creating an image of the ‘Other’ is 
central to the identity construction of the ‘Self’ (Hall, 1992, Said, 1978). Media 
reporting is part of a constant negotiation in drawing cultural boundaries between 
the West and the rest. In this way, cultural and power relations between the West 
and the rest are reproduced, maintained and reinforced (Cao, 2014). In the process 
of denigrating China as the other, the cultural consensus and the self-identity of the 
West is confirmed and strengthened. Notions of ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’, 
‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’ are represented as exclusive to the West. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 7, through portraying China as a ‘rogue’ which ‘threatens’ and 
‘undermines’ the socio-political and economic development of Africa, the media 
maintain the self-image of the West as an ‘ethical’ ‘knight’ seeking to ‘save’ the 
‘weak’ Africa (see Chapter 7). Such a self-image of the West as an epitome of 
‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ disconnects the West from its colonialist past, and 
confirms Kapoor’s (2004, p.630) argument that the discourse of ‘development’ 
“ignores colonialism, or situates [colonialism] securely in the past to make [people] 
think it is now over and done with”. The West ignores the interrelationships 
between advanced economies on the one hand, and colonial exploitation in the 
South that have contributed to industrial capitalism, on the other. I problematise the 
dominant discourses and provide an alternative interpretation through building 
historical connectivities between colonialised Africa and the West’s colonialism, 
and contextualising the discussion on China-Africa relations in relation to China’s 
historical and contemporary role in Africa. I argue that the media construction of 
the discourse of a ‘weak’ Africa, ‘ruthless’ China and the ‘ethical’ West erases the 
colonialist and imperialist history, the West’s brutal conquest of the African 
continent, the transatlantic slave trade, the expropriation and genocide of 
indigenous peoples, wars of conquest, land grabs, exploitation and oppression. The 
complicated situation in Africa, including its unstable political situations, weak 
economy, environmental degradation, and its ‘peripheral’ position in the world 
order is considered to be caused by the presence of China’s investment and Chinese 
people in Africa, rather than as a consequence of historical processes that stem from 
the colonial plunder and the hierarchy of race, which further strengthens the West’s 






stereotypes towards non-Western nations. As such, the West reimagines its 
colonialist/imperialist past, justifies the continued economic, geopolitical and 
(neo)colonial interventions in Africa in the name of ‘development’ and 
‘democracy’. 
8.3 Contributions and implications of the research  
The study demonstrates that the Western colonial and imperialist ideologies and 
racial and cultural hierarchies are reinforcing and reproducing one another, and 
continue to constrain how non-white people and in particular China are represented 
in Western media discourse, lead to a hierarchisation of the ways knowledge is 
accepted, recognised, and diffused, and exert epistemic racism and violence. The 
findings from this research carry theoretical and practical significance concerning 
thinking and practices in terms of discourse, representation and the nature of 
knowledge. 
 
Theoretically, the study has attempted to bring critical perspectives into China 
studies. Current writings and discourses on China are explicitly or implicitly 
orientalist by nature. China Studies are dominated by west-centric perspectives 
which are manifested in the cultural monolog and the lack of reflexive and critical 
perspectives as well as lack of voices of the subaltern Chinese. Such a body of 
knowledge on China is taken to be the accepted ‘wisdom’, unquestioned ‘fact’, and 
the ‘truth’. Although a few pioneering works (cf. Cao, 2014, Shi, 2007, and Liang 
H., 2015) have started to question the accepted ‘wisdoms’ by interrogating these 
assumptions, they remain marginal to the dominant discourse in the China Studies 
field. Systematic postcolonial critiques in China Studies remain scarce. This study 
deals with the lacunae in the current literature by applying an interdisciplinary 
conceptual framework which incorporates CDA and postcolonialism to critically 
analyse American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China and reveal the 
ideology and power relations hidden in such discourses. The study contributes 
to emerging theoretical debates on postcolonialism and China (cf. Lee, et al., 2015, 
Liang H., 2015, Vukovich, 2012, 2017). It thus allows for the subjectivity and 






agency of the formerly colonised and oppressed China and for a space where the 
‘subaltern’ Chinese could speak for themselves rather than being spoken about as a 
mere object. 
 
Secondly, a postcolonial lens has been adopted in the study to unveil the colonial 
and imperialist ideologies embedded in the American media discursive practices 
concerning China. The study brings a Chinese experience and perspective to 
postcolonial and critical discourse studies, and as such it broadens and enriches this 
body of literature with a China-specific empirical analysis. Current postcolonial and 
critical discourse studies have focused on analysing colonial discourses and 
ideologies in the world regions including the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and other former colonies by American and European (western) powers. 
Postcolonial perspectives have rarely been engaged with China. China’s unique 
experience of colonialism, i.e. semi-colonialism, tends to be regarded as non-
colonialism, and overlooked in postcolonial studies. Although never fully colonised 
by a single Western power and although its territory was never made into a foreign 
possession, China, as a semi-colonised nation, suffered from multiple colonial 
agendas (Liang H., 2015) and was carved up by western powers in the same way as 
other fully colonised nations in Africa, Latin America and South Asia (Lee et al., 
2015). The study extends the postcolonial and critical discourse analysis beyond 
the above-mentioned geographical areas, shows the “continuing economic, social, 
political, and cultural effects of colonialism” on China (Nkomo, 2011, p.281), and 
examines how the colonial relationship shapes the West’s media discourse on China. 
Such a postcolonial lens has been particularly helpful in examining how American 
mainstream newspapers draw on and transmit colonial and racialised ideologies 
across time and space to produce and shore up U.S. global hegemony and 
domination. Guided by the postcolonial perspective, the study has sought to explore 
how colonial discourses of China as a non-western ‘Other’ are produced and 
reproduced and universalised by American mainstream media, and sought to 
challenge taken-for-granted assumptions underpinning the discursive construction 
of the ‘threatening’ China. The study represents one of the first attempts to apply 
postcolonial theory and the CDA method to an analysis of western media’s 






representation of China. As such, it enriches empirical analysis in postcolonial and 
critical discourse studies and contributes to an emerging critical theoretical 
reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about discourse, 
domination, representation of the Other, and ideology.  
 
On a practical level, the study pays attention to the possibility of bridging 
theoretical discussions on the representation of the ‘Other’ with socio-cultural 
problems that China and other non-western nations face. The study has shown how 
discourses of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are employed by the media to place China in a 
hierarchical power order and construct China as a cultural ‘Other’. Moreover, the 
study has revealed the inseparable relations between power and media discourse in 
the construction of knowledge in general and that about China in particular. Such 
findings imply that to counter such a cultural demonisation undercurrent, Chinese 
media can play an important role in building China’s international image informed 
and underpinned by critical theories and by a better understanding of discourse 
construction. Such an endeavour would also potentially challenge the western 
dominated discourse and representation of the Third World and contribute to the 
fundamental altering of the politically, culturally and racially constructed hierarchy 
and its underpinned ‘world order’.  
 
Moreover, in practical terms, the study contributes to the collective efforts 
associated with the epistemic and psychological decolonisation in China. The study 
reveals that marginalisation and othering occur in a hidden, unconscious and subtle 
way. Rather than assuming a conscious silencing and exclusion of the ‘Other’ by 
elites (Van Dijk, 1993a), the Euro-American-centric ideology and the 
marginalisation of cultural ‘Others’ are realised through unconscious mechanisms 
such as linguistic discursive techniques. Such unconscious mechanisms are not 
easily detectible by readers. In so doing, the media insidiously impose on readers 
Euro-American-centric knowledge and discourses of the non-west. In this respect, 
the findings of the study bring awareness to the level of asymmetric ignorance and 
epistemic violence exercised by non-western cultures and peoples. A greater 
sensitivity to the colonial assumptions embedded within media discourses on China 






is called for. Moreover, the findings from this study call for meaningful, complex 
and honest discussions, and scholarly debates on the ways of deconstructing Euro-
American-centric epistemologies and discursive practices. These range from the 
language used when discussing the representation of the ‘Other’, to the national 
efforts in strengthening the voice of China. 
8.4 Future Research  
The study mainly examines the representation of China in American mainstream 
newspapers through adopting an interdisciplinary approach that combines CDA 
with a postcolonial perspective. Due to word count limitation, the study mainly 
focused on news texts, and did not include visual features such as images and videos 
in the analysis. Recommendations for future studies are as follows. 
 
With the development of technology, interactive digital media technology plays an 
increasingly important role in transmitting information, constructing knowledge 
and encouraging social interaction (O'Halloran et al., 2017). Meanings are created 
not only through texts, but also through different visual and audio features. In terms 
of future research, scholars might wish to extend this study by examining 
representations of China in multimodal texts such as social media postings, 
websites, films, documentaries and videos. Accordingly, scholars could explore 
how China is defined and in what way China is represented in the multimodal texts, 
and reveal ideologies and unequal power relations embedded in the representations.  
 
Theoretically, there is a new, ‘Sinological’ form orientalism at work in the world, 
which has dominated and defined the Western knowledge production about China 
(Vukovich, 2012). As Vukovich (2012) points out, such Sinological-orientalism 
construes China as being in a process of becoming-the-same as ‘Us’, i.e. the ‘open’, 
‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ West. The new Sinological-orientalism – which is 
manifested in the discourse of ‘becoming-the-same’ – implies a hierarchical 
difference between Orient and Occident and is considered to be part of a neo-
colonial and imperial project (Vukovich, 2012). In addition to Sinological-






orientalism, another kind of self-orientalism occurs in the face of western economic 
pressure to satisfy a white imperialist imagination. As Hirose and Pih (2011) point 
out, the Orient internalise and self-inscribe orientalist images on the basis of 
pressures to conform to the West’s fantasies and definition of ethno-racial identity. 
Future research could also examine the processes of self-Orientalism and 
Sinological-orientalism and explore their implications for knowledge construction, 
power relations between cultures, identity construction as well as their implications 
for work and organisations in great depth. 
 
Empirically, discourses of Chinese elites play an important role in disseminating 
western-centric viewpoints, and colonising the mind of people. Future research 
could also examine Chinese elites’ discourses from a critical perspective and 
explore the way that China and the West are represented in the elites’ discourse and 
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Glossary of Chinese Terms 
Chinese in Pinyin Chinese English 
Balujun  八路军 Eighth Rout Army (led by the 
Chinese Communist Party 
during the War of Resistance 
Against Japan) 
Baituan dazhan  百团大战 Hundred Regiments 
Offensive 
Huang chong 蝗虫 a homonym for ‘yellow 
worms’ , meaning “locusts” 
in English 
Dongbei kangri lianjun  
 
东北抗日联军 Northeast Anti-Japanese 
United Army 
Kangri genjudi   抗日根据地 anti-Japanese base areas 
Kangri minzu tongyi 
zhanxian  
抗日民族统一战线 an anti-Japanese United Front 
between the Chinese 
Communist party and 
Nationalist party 
Kangri zhengfu  
 
抗日政府 Anti-Japanese Government 






three-all policy, i.e. kill all, 
burn all, loot all 
Yidai yilu 一带一路 One belt, one road, also 
known as “Silk Road 
Economic Belt and Maritime 
Silk Road” 
Yiguo liangzhi  一国两制 One country, two systems 
































Table 1. List of selected news articles on the 2014 “Occupy Central” Event in Hong 
Kong 
 
No. Newspapers Date Title 
1 NYT Sep 27, 2014  Pro-Democracy Students Are Arrested in Hong Kong 
2 NYT Sep 28, 2014  Pro-Democracy Group Shifts to Collaborate With Student Protesters in Hong 
Kong 
3 NYT Sep 29, 2014  Hong Kong Police Confront Crowd 
4 NYT Sep 30, 2014  After Tear Gas, Hong Kong Protesters Defy Officials’ Call to Disperse  
5 NYT Oct 1, 2014 Told to End Protests, Organizers in Hong Kong Vow to Expand Them  
6 NYT Oct 1, 2014 Hong Kong Protests Are Leaderless but Orderly 
7 NYT Oct 2, 2014 Hong Kong Government's Strategy on Protesters: Wait Them Out 
8 NYT Oct 3, 2014 Hong Kong Leader Refuses to Resign, but Deputy Meets With Protesters 
9 NYT Oct 3, 2014 Some City Residents, Weary of Disruptions, Find Fault With Protesters' 
Methods 
10 NYT Oct 4, 2014 Attackers and Hostile Crowds Besiege Hong Kong Protesters 
11 WP Sep 28, 2014 Hong Kong pro-democracy activists commence mass protest 
12 WP Sep 29, 2014 Pro-democracy protest erupts in Hong Kong 
13 WP Sep 30, 2014 In Hong Kong, a conundrum for Beijing 
14 WP Oct 1, 2014 In Hong Kong protests, holiday may sway future 
15 WP Oct 2, 2014 Hong Kong protesters, government grope for advantage 
16 WP Oct 3, 2014 Hong Kong leader refuses to resign 
17 WP Oct 4, 2014 Hong Kong protesters stay despite attacks 
18 WP Oct 5, 2014 Attacks revive main camp, but endgame seems near 
19 WP Oct 6, 2014 In Hong Kong, protest evolves into stalemate 
20 WSJ Sep 27, 2014 Thousands Gather in Hong Kong After Police Clash With Protesters 
21 WSJ Sep 27, 2014 Occupy Central Launches Hong Kong Protest Campaign 
22 WSJ Sep 27, 2014 Hong Kong Students Lead the Charge in Fight for Democracy 
23 WSJ Sep 28, 2014 Supporters of Hong Kong's Pro-Democracy Protesters Undaunted 
24 WSJ Sep 29, 2014 Pro-Democracy Protests Shake Hong Kong 
25 WSJ Sep 29, 2014 Hong Kong on Edge as Protests Grow 
26 WSJ Sep 30, 2014 China's Democracy Dilemma 
27 WSJ Oct 1, 2014 Hong Kong Protesters Brace for a Holiday Test 
28 WSJ Oct 1, 2014 Hong Kong Government Seeks to Wait Out Protesters 
29 WSJ Oct 1, 2014 Hong Kong Government Open to Meeting With Protesters, Official Says 
30 WSJ Oct 1, 2014 Hong Kong Protests Extend Beyond Organizers' Grasp 
31 WSJ Oct 2, 2014 Hong Kong Leader Offers Talks With Protesters 
32 WSJ Oct 3, 2014 Clashes Break Out at Hong Kong Protest Site 
33 WSJ Oct 5, 2014 Positions Harden Among Hong Kong Protesters, Government 
34 WSJ Oct 5, 2014 A Hong Kong Protest Run on Fumes and Instant Noodles 
35 WSJ Oct 5, 2014 Hong Kong Students Say Protests Will Continue 
36 WSJ Oct 5, 2014 Hong Kong Protests Enter New Phase 
37 LAT Sep 27, 2014 Anger grows in Hong Kong; 
38 LAT Sep 28, 2014 Faceoff at Hong Kong protest 
39 LAT Sep 29, 2014 China tested on Hong Kong; 
40 LAT Sep 30, 2014 Hong Kong leader urges protesters to go home, says he won't resign 
41 LAT Sep 30, 2014 Hong Kong shopping district becomes political protest haven 
42 LAT Sep 30, 2014 Protests grow in Hong Kong 
43 LAT Oct 1, 2014 Protests overshadow China's National Day ceremonies in Hong Kong 
44 LAT Oct 3, 2014 Hong Kong talks planned; 
45 LAT Oct 4, 2014 Foes attack Hong Kong protesters; 
46 LAT Oct 5, 2014 Hong Kong protesters stay in streets, but schools reopen 
47 LAT Oct 5, 2014 Deadline for Hong Kong protest; 
 
Table 2. List of selected news articles on China’s 2015 70th Anniversary 
Commemoration of the Victory Day against the Japanese Aggression 
 
No. Newspapers Date Title 
1 NYT May 9, 2015 On Day That Defines Russia, Putin Reaches Out to China 






2 NYT Sep 1, 2015 China: Scores Punished Over ‘Rumors’ 
3 NYT Sep 2, 2015 Strutting in China as the Economy Sputters 
4 NYT Sep 2, 2015 Beijing Officials Unleash a Simian Secret Weapon 
5 NYT Sep 3, 2015 During Show of Force, China Announces It Will Cut Military by 300,000 
6 NYT Sep 4, 2015 Parade Gives Chinese Leader a Platform to Show Grip on Power 
7 NYT Sep 4, 2015 Rocky Economy Tests Friendship of Xi and Putin 
8 NYT Sep 22, 2015 Chinese Leader Comes to U.S. Facing Fresh Economic Doubts 
9 WP Jul 23, 2015 Hostility flares, long after war's end 
10 WP Aug13, 2015 For some, an awkward invitation to China 
11 WP Sep 2, 2015 Kim will skip Beijing's WWII parade 
12 WP Sep 3, 2015 China merges symbols of war and peace in huge military show 
13 WP Sep 4, 2015 China recalls war's end, underscores its power 
14 WP Sep 4, 2015 Chinese warships in Bering Sea 
15 WSJ Mar 3, 2015 Will Japan Get Invite to China's WWII Parade? 
16 WSJ Jul 1, 2015 China Invites North Korea's Kim Jong Un to Beijing in September 
17 WSJ Jul 29, 2015 RSVP Angst: Who Will Attend China's World War II Parade? 
18 WSJ Aug 24, 2015 Shinzo Abe to Skip China's World War II Parade; 
19 WSJ Aug 25, 2015 China Reveals Guest List for Big Military Parade 
20 WSJ Aug 25, 2015 In Beijing's World War II Narrative, Communists Get Starring Role 
21 WSJ Aug 26, 2015 Latest Victim of China's Pollution Problem: Iron Ore 
22 WSJ Aug 28, 2015 As China Celebrates WWII Victory, Businesses Cope With Loss 
23 WSJ Aug 30, 2015 Crises Put First Dents in Xi Jinping's Power 
24 WSJ Aug 31, 2015 Asian Markets Wrap Up a Rough Month 
25 WSJ Sep 2, 2015 Five Chinese Navy Ships Are Operating in Bering Sea off Alaska 
26 WSJ Sep 2, 2015 Missing From Beijing's WWII Victory Parade: Price Tag 
27 WSJ Sep 3, 2015 World News: Military to Drop Troop Numbers By 300,000 
28 WSJ Sep 3, 2015 China Flexes Its Military Muscle at World War II Parade; 
29 WSJ Sep 3, 2015 China Military Parade: Face Time With Xi a Hot Commodity for Oil 
Producers; 
30 WSJ Sep 3, 2015 China to Slim Down Its Military 
31 WSJ Sep 4, 2015 Chinese Navy Ships Came Within 12 Nautical Miles of U.S. Coast 
32 WSJ Sep 9, 2015 Nationalism Gives Xi a Boost, but Comes With Risk; 
33 WSJ Sep 17, 2015 China's Strategy for Asian Dominance 
34 LAT Jul 5, 2015 At WWII victory parade, Taiwan's Nationalists tout role fighting Japan 
35 LAT Aug 18, 2015 In China, a host of restrictions herald a major military parade 
36 LAT Sep 1, 2015 China's parade: 850,000 volunteers, 12,000 troops, plus monkeys, falcons 
and tanks and ... 
37 LAT Sep 1, 2015 In China, long-delayed recognition for troops who fought in World War II 
38 LAT Sep 2, 2015 Communists' version of China's wartime record frustrates Taiwan 
39 LAT Sep 2, 2015 Who's who (and who isn't) at China's big parade 
40 LAT Sep 2, 2015 Pentagon spots Chinese military ships off Alaskan coast 
41 LAT Sep 2, 2015 A show of arms at peace parade in China 
42 LAT Sep 2, 2015 At military parade, Chinese president says nation will cut 300,000 troops 
43 LAT Sep 2, 2015 China struts its military might and announces troop cuts 
44 LAT Sep 3, 2015 A handy parade for Xi; 
45 LAT Sep 4, 2015 A smaller but not weaker Chinese military 
46 LAT Sep 6, 2015 U.S. vets honored at China parade 
47 LAT Sep 6, 2015 Russia's pivot to China stall 
48 LAT Sep 8, 2015 A 'Military Parade Blue' sky turns grey 
 
Table 3. List of selected news articles on China-Africa relations 
 
No. Newspapers Date  Title  
1 NYT Mar 26, 2013 China's New Leader Tries to Calm African Fears of His Country's Economic 
Power 
2 NYT Jun 7, 2013 Ghana Arrests Chinese in Gold Mines 
3 NYT Jun 11, 2013 Chasing a Golden Dream, Chinese Miners Are on the Run in Ghana 
4 NYT Sep18, 2013 China Finds Resistance To Oil Deals In Africa 
5 NYT Dec16, 2013 Africa and the Chinese Way 
6 NYT May17, 2014 Into Africa: China's Wild Rush 
7 NYT Aug5, 2014 The Battle of the Regimes 
8 NYT Aug11, 2014 President Obama's Africa Push 
9 NYT Sept12, 2014 China Expands Investment in Tanzania 
10 NYT Sep17, 2014 China Under Pressure to Increase Ebola Aid as Crisis Grows 
11 NYT Sept26, 2014 South Sudan: China to Send Troops for U.N. Mission 
12 NYT Oct20, 2014 Beijing Donates $6 Million for Food Aid in Ebola Fight 






13 NYT Nov 5, 2014 Chinese President's Delegation Tied to Illegal Ivory Purchases During Africa 
Visit 
14 NYT Jan7, 2015 China Strives to Be on African Minds, and TV Sets 
15 NYT Mar3, 2015 For the U.S. and China, a Test of Diplomacy on South Sudan 
16 NYT May21, 2015 Greenpeace Accuses Chinese of Illegal Fishing Off Africa 
17 NYT July 30, 2015 A Barely Veiled Pitch on China's Turf 
18 NYT Sept27, 2015 President of China Pledges $2 Billion to Fight Poverty 
19 NYT Nov27, 2015 With Outpost Overseas, China Retools Its Military 
20 NYT Dec 3, 2015 Zambia's Economy, Driven by Copper, Tumbles as Chinese Demand Cools 
21 NYT Dec 5, 2015 China Pledges $60 Billion to Aid Africa's Development 
22 NYT Jan 26, 2016 African Economies, and Hopes for a New Era, Tumble 
23 NYT Dec31, 2016 Closing China's Ivory Market: Will It Save Elephants? 
24 WP Aug18, 2013 In China, Kenya finds more generous donor, less demanding ally 
25 WP Aug10, 2014 Africa's shift 
26 WP Nov 7, 2014 Chinese president's entourage used visit to Tanzania to smuggle ivory, report 
says 
27 WP Jul 26, 2015 Nearly a decade later, a new Nairobi 
28 WP Oct 9, 2015 Queen of Ivory' is dethroned, Tanzania says 
29 WP Jan 12, 2016 China's financial mayhem resounds 
30 WP Jan17, 2016 Let China win. It's good for America 
31 WP Apr16, 2016 China's seizures in Kenya 
32 WP May20, 2016 China fights a vile rumor in Zambia 
33 WP Oct 5, 2016 Ethiopia has a lot riding on new railway to the sea 
34 WSJ Mar 4, 2013 China's Limits in Africa 
35 WSJ May13, 2013 Angola Looks to China as Oil Sales to U.S. Decline 
36 WSJ Oct 8, 2013 The Strategy Behind China's Aid Expansion 
37 WSJ Jan 6, 2014 Telecom Deal by China's ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism; 
38 WSJ Feb 3, 2014 China Demand Still Buoys Global Producers; 
39 WSJ May 5, 2014 China to Increase Loans to Africa by $10 Billion 
40 WSJ May 6, 2014 China Takes Wary Steps Into New Africa Deals 
41 WSJ May22, 2014 China Launches $2 Billion African Development Fund; 
42 WSJ Sep 9, 2014 China Deploys Troops in South Sudan to Defend Oil Fields, Workers 
43 WSJ Oct 21, 2014 Ebola Fears Spark China Pullback in West Africa; 
44 WSJ Oct 31, 2014 China Sending Elite Army Medical Team to Liberia; 
45 WSJ Jul 27, 2015 As China's Global Footprint Grows, So Do Risks for Chinese Abroad 
46 WSJ Aug17, 2015 China's Currency Move Rattles African Economies 
47 WSJ Sep 9, 2015 In Africa, Those Who Bet on China Face Fallout; 
48 WSJ Sep 28, 2015 China Commits to More Aid for Developing Countries 
49 WSJ Oct 10, 2015 South African Official Urges More Clarity From China 
50 WSJ Oct 20, 2015 China Probes Graft in Angola Oil Deals; 
51 WSJ Oct 29, 2015 Angola's Boom, Fueled by China, Goes Bust; 
52 WSJ Nov26, 2015 China to Build Naval Hub in Djibouti; 
53 WSJ Nov30, 2015 China's Xi to Make Rare Stop-Off in Zimbabwe on Route for Africa Summit; 
54 WSJ Dec 2, 2015 Chinese, South African Leaders Agree on Investments 
55 WSJ Dec 4, 2015 China's Xi Pledges $60 Billion for Africa Development Over Three Years 
56 WSJ Aug19, 2016 China Builds First Overseas Military Outpost; 
57 LAT Feb 20 2014 Even China has second thoughts on South Sudan after violence 
58 LAT Nov 6 2014 Chinese officials accused of smuggling African ivory on official visits 
59 LAT Oct 16 2015 Who is killing Zimbabwe's elephants? 
60 LAT Dec 2, 2015 China's leader is welcomed 
61 LAT Jul 13 2016 Some of the people who are supposed to be saving rhinos are helping them 
die out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
